9 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. Green Hill Civic Ass'n, Inc.green2 sentences2007See Stone v. Green Hill Civic Assn. , 786 A.2d 387 , 390-91 (2001). 2005Compare Stone v. Green Hill Civic Association, Inc., 786 A.2d 387, 389 (R.I. 2001) (“One who claims an easement by prescription bears the burden of establishing actual, open, notorious, hostile, and *954 continuous use under a claim of right for at least ten years.”), with DeCosta v. DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261, 1264 (R.I.2003) (“To establish a claim for adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate by strict proof * * * that the possession was ‘actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive’ for the statutory period of ten years.”) (quoting Carnevale v. Dupee, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dellaygreen2 sentences2006In Dellay, 687 A.2d at 438 , the defendant, who was appealing a second-degree murder conviction, argued that certain pri- or specific violent acts of the victim should have been admitted to support his defense of self-defense, even though the defendant was unaware of those acts at the time of *492 the encounter with the victim. 8 The defendant in that case contended that the violent character of a victim was an essential element of the defense of self-defense and that, therefore, Rules 404(a)(2) and 405(b) should have been read together in such a way as to permit the introduction of prior viol 2006Dellay, 687 A.2d at 438 . | 1 | 2 |
William Coscina v. Craig J. DiPetrillogreen1 sentence2026In Coscina, the Court made it clear that “an accurate description of the lands, tenements or hereditaments is an essential element of the claim itself and not an issue that can be decided in the absence of a trial.” Coscina, 186 A.3d at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Arnold Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Tiogue Fire Districtgreen1 sentence2013Mr. Beauregard therefore failed to establish an essential element of his claim of slander of title; the notice of intent was not a “false statement about [Mr. Beauregard’s] ownership of real estate.” See Arnold Road Realty, 873 A.2d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen1 sentence2008See Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 231 . | 1 | 1 |
DeCosta v. DeCostagreen1 sentence2005Compare Stone v. Green Hill Civic Association, Inc., 786 A.2d 387, 389 (R.I. 2001) (“One who claims an easement by prescription bears the burden of establishing actual, open, notorious, hostile, and *954 continuous use under a claim of right for at least ten years.”), with DeCosta v. DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261, 1264 (R.I.2003) (“To establish a claim for adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate by strict proof * * * that the possession was ‘actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive’ for the statutory period of ten years.”) (quoting Carnevale v. Dupee, | 1 | 1 |
Carnevale v. Dupeegreen1 sentence2005Compare Stone v. Green Hill Civic Association, Inc., 786 A.2d 387, 389 (R.I. 2001) (“One who claims an easement by prescription bears the burden of establishing actual, open, notorious, hostile, and *954 continuous use under a claim of right for at least ten years.”), with DeCosta v. DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261, 1264 (R.I.2003) (“To establish a claim for adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate by strict proof * * * that the possession was ‘actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive’ for the statutory period of ten years.”) (quoting Carnevale v. Dupee, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2004The defendant cites Rules .404(a)(2) and 405(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 2 as authority to “allow a defendant to use specific violent acts as proof of violent character.” The trial justice should have exercised his discretion and permitted him to make the inquiry, he maintains, “and then cautioned the jury that such evidence is only to be considered with regard to the witnesses] propensity for violence.” “It is well settled that this Court will not disturb a trial justice’s ruling on an eviden-tiary issue unless that ruling ‘constitutes an abuse of the justice’s discretion that pr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Prescott v. Veri
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation
green
2 sentences1984In Ocean Transportation the court noted that “[a]n intent to waive one’s privilege is not necessary for such a waiver to occur.” 604 F.2d at 675 . 1984In Ocean Transportation the court noted that "[a]n intent to waive one's privilege is not necessary for such a waiver to occur." 604 F.2d at 675 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.