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90 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1872–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.green2 sentences2004See, e.g., Stivison v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 498 , 499 . 2004See, e.g., Stivison v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 498 , 499 , 1997-Ohio-321 . | 31 | 31 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.green2 sentences2021“A disputed fact is material if it is an essential element of the claim as determined by the applicable substantive law-one which might affect the outcome of the litigation.” Id., citing 13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) and Burkes v. Stidham, 107 Ohio App.3d 363, 371 (8th Dist.1995). “[T]he dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ * * * if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson at 248 . 2014Medina No. 07CA0059-M, 2008-Ohio-996, ¶ 9 , (“A disputed fact is material if it is an essential element of the claim as determined by the applicable substantive law – one which might affect the outcome of the litigation.” (Citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).)) {¶17} Accordingly, the Nagys’ assignment of error is overruled. | 2 | 7 |
Mount v. Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co.green2 sentences2025Co., 39 Ohio App.3d 1, 2 (5th Dist.1987). 2024Co., 39 Ohio App.3d 1, 2 (5th Dist.1987). | 2 | 2 |
Morgan v. Beigelgreen2 sentences2025If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party”). {¶14} Under Ohio law a material fact “is an essential element of the claim or defense, as defined by the substantive law.” Morgan v. Beigel, 2011-Ohio-406, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), citing Mount v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. 2024If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party”). {¶8} Under Ohio law a material fact “is an essential element of the claim or defense, as defined by the substantive law.” Morgan v. Beigel, 2011-Ohio-406, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), citing Mount v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. | 2 | 2 |
Logan v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Electionsgreen1 sentence2026Logan at ¶ 37 (affirming the granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings where the plaintiff did not cite specific statements of law from federal or state constitutions and statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common law in support of her wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim), citing Dohme. | 1 | 1 |
Farrar v. Hobbygreen2 sentences2024But as the Farrar Court explained, even though a party that has obtained nominal damages is technically a prevailing party, “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” (Citation omitted.) Farrar at 115. 6 January Term, 2024 for actual injury but pockets nothing except a jury finding of non-injurious breach; to prevail in a suit that seeks only actual damages—compensation for provable economic harm—there must be a showing that the plaintiff was actually 2024Instead, it points to the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Farrar that “‘[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.’” Majority opinion at ¶ 12, fn. 2, quoting Farrar at 115. | 1 | 1 |
Halpern v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024DPLJR, Ltd, 2008-Ohio- 5872, at ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “[T]o raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of damages and survive summary judgment, [Plaintiff] must set forth specific facts to show that she can establish, with reasonable certainty, the existence and amount of her loss.” Halpern v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-1370, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Sohio Oil Co., 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5192 , * 13 (8th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Turnergreen1 sentence2021To determine whether a genuine issue exists, “a court must inquire ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Wall v. Firelands Radiology, Inc., 106 Ohio App.3d 313, 322-323 (6th Dist.1995), quoting Anderson at 251-252 and Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Wall v. Firelands Radiology, Inc.green1 sentence2021To determine whether a genuine issue exists, “a court must inquire ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Wall v. Firelands Radiology, Inc., 106 Ohio App.3d 313, 322-323 (6th Dist.1995), quoting Anderson at 251-252 and Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Cosentinogreen1 sentence2020“Only disputes over facts that have the potential to affect the outcome of the lawsuit preclude entry of summary judgment, not factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary.” Black v. Cosentino, 117 Ohio App.3d 40, 43 (9th Dist.1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Kryder v. Krydergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lalli v. Lalligreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doner v. Snappgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Epling v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Texler v. D.O. Summers Cleaners & Shirt Laundry Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Raysor v. Port Authority Of New York And New Jerseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dorangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sweitzer v. Outlet Communications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dresher v. Burt
green
2 sentences2003Id. {¶ 11} Where the non-moving party would have the burden of proving a number of elements in order to prevail at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may point to evidence that the non-moving party cannot possibly prevail on an essential element of the claim. 2003Id. {¶ 8} Where the non-moving party would have the burden of proving a number of elements in order to prevail at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may point to evidence that the non-moving party cannot possibly prevail on an essential element of the claim. | 10 | 1998–2020 |
Burkes v. Stidham
green
2 sentences2021“A disputed fact is material if it is an essential element of the claim as determined by the applicable substantive law-one which might affect the outcome of the litigation.” Id., citing 13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) and Burkes v. Stidham, 107 Ohio App.3d 363, 371 (8th Dist.1995). “[T]he dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ * * * if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson at 248 . 2008Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242 , 248 ; Burkes v. Stidham (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 363 , 371 . | 4 | 2007–2021 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2017Barnes, supra, 94 Ohio St.3d at 23 . {¶68} Appellant argues summarily such testimony would have been admissible to demonstrate his state of mind at the time of the incident, but Perry’s alleged propensity for violence is not an essential element of the defense of self-defense. 2017Barnes, supra, 94 Ohio St.3d at 23 . {¶68} Appellant argues summarily such testimony would have been admissible to demonstrate his state of mind at the time of the incident, but Perry’s alleged propensity for violence is not an essential element of the defense of self-defense. | 4 | 2011–2017 |
Wochna v. Mancino, 07ca0059-M (3-10-2008)
neutral
2 sentences2014Medina No. 07CA0059-M, 2008-Ohio-996, ¶ 9 , (“A disputed fact is material if it is an essential element of the claim as determined by the applicable substantive law – one which might affect the outcome of the litigation.” (Citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).)) {¶17} Accordingly, the Nagys’ assignment of error is overruled. 2011No. 07CA0059-M, 2008-Ohio-996, at ¶9 , citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 248 . (“A disputed fact is material if it is an essential element of the claim as determined by the applicable substantive law-one which might affect the outcome of the litigation.”) As such, her affidavit is sufficient to demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact, and the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the State. | 3 | 2011–2014 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2016State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2002-Ohio-68 , 759 N.E.2d 1240 . {¶20} Appellant also argues the testimony was admissible to demonstrate his state of mind at the time of the incident. 2012State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2002-Ohio-68 , 759 Ohio St.3d 1240 (2002). | 2 | 2012–2016 |
O'Day v. Webb
green
2 sentences2002O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215 , 220 . 1999O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215 , 220 . | 2 | 1999–2002 |
State v. Carlson
green
2 sentences2000State v. Spinks, supra; State v. Carlson, supra; Evid.R. 404(A)(2) and 405(B). 1999See State v. Baker (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 204 , 208 ; State v. Carlson (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 72 , paragraph one of the syllabus. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church of Columbus, Ohio, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Cooper v. Grace Baptist *764 Church of Columbus, Ohio, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 734 , 612 N.E.2d 357, 360-361 . 1997Cooper v. Grace Baptist *764 Church of Columbus, Ohio, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 734 , 612 N.E.2d 357, 360-361 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Myrtle Nell Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Louis H. Catrett, Deceased v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation
green
2 sentences1996Instead of requiring the movant to prove “in effect the negative of plaintiff’s case, even though the plaintiff has no evidence on an essential element of her claim[,]* * * [t]he majority should have required the defendant only to persuade the trial judge that there is no triable, factual dispute on causation.” Id. at 190 . {¶ 39} In adopting this view, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party must support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Celotex at 323 , 106 1996Instead of requiring the movant to prove “in effect the negative of the plaintiffs case, even though the plaintiff has no evidence on an essential element of her claim[,] * * * [t]he majority should have required the defendant only to persuade the trial judge that there is no triable, factual dispute on causation.” Id. at 190 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrett
green
2 sentences1996Instead of requiring the movant to prove “in effect the negative of plaintiff’s case, even though the plaintiff has no evidence on an essential element of her claim[,]* * * [t]he majority should have required the defendant only to persuade the trial judge that there is no triable, factual dispute on causation.” Id. at 190 . {¶ 39} In adopting this view, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party must support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Celotex at 323 , 106 1996Instead of requiring the movant to prove “in effect the negative of plaintiff’s case, even though the plaintiff has no evidence on an essential element of her claim[,]* * * [t]he majority should have required the defendant only to persuade the trial judge that there is no triable, factual dispute on causation.” Id. at 190 . {¶ 39} In adopting this view, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party must support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Celotex at 323 , 106 | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Parker v. I&F Insulation Co.
green
2 sentences2024In Parker v. I&F Insulation, 2000-Ohio-151, we considered what it means for a party to be a prevailing party in an appeal under R.C. 1345.09(F) of Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”). 2024In Parker v. I&F Insulation, 2000-Ohio-151 , we considered what it means for a party to be a prevailing party in an appeal under R.C. 1345.09(F) of Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center
green
2 sentences2023Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 293 , 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1977). 2023Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 293 , 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1977). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chambers v. St. Mary's School
green
2 sentences2023Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565 , 697 N.E.2d 198 (1998). {¶23} It is axiomatic that duty is an essential element of a claim for relief for negligence. 2023Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565 , 697 N.E.2d 198 (1998). {¶23} It is axiomatic that duty is an essential element of a claim for relief for negligence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hutchings v. Hutchings
green
1 sentence2022Hutchings v. Hutchings, 2019-Ohio-5362 , 150 N.E.3d 548 , ¶ 23 (6th Dist.), citing Peirce v. Szymanski, 6th Dist. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Schulman v. City of Cleveland
green
2 sentences2020Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 , 544 N.E.2d 639 (1989), citing Schulman v. Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 , 283 N.E.2d 175 (1972). ““‘[L]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness.’”” Electrolux Home Prods. at ¶ 8, quoting Williams v. U.S. Bank Shaker Square, 8th Dist. 2020Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 , 544 N.E.2d 639 (1989), citing Schulman v. Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 , 283 N.E.2d 175 (1972). ““‘[L]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness.’”” Electrolux Home Prods. at ¶ 8, quoting Williams v. U.S. Bank Shaker Square, 8th Dist. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Strother v. Hutchinson
green
1 sentence2020The Woodside Parties concede that there was no direct evidence as to this essential element of their claim and instead they relied entirely upon circumstantial evidence. {¶71} In order to survive a motion for directed verdict, the plaintiff must produce evidence or “evidence of a fact upon which a reasonable inference may be predicated to support such element.” See Strother, 67 Ohio St.2d at 285 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots
green
2 sentences2020Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 , 544 N.E.2d 639 (1989), citing Schulman v. Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 , 283 N.E.2d 175 (1972). ““‘[L]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness.’”” Electrolux Home Prods. at ¶ 8, quoting Williams v. U.S. Bank Shaker Square, 8th Dist. 2020Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 , 544 N.E.2d 639 (1989), citing Schulman v. Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 , 283 N.E.2d 175 (1972). ““‘[L]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness.’”” Electrolux Home Prods. at ¶ 8, quoting Williams v. U.S. Bank Shaker Square, 8th Dist. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Jordan
neutral
2 sentences2020Trumbull No. 2009-T-0110, 2010-Ohio-5183 , ¶ 25, rev’d in part on separate grounds, 128 Ohio St.3d 268 , 2011-Ohio-737 , 943 N.E.2d 565 . 2020Trumbull No. 2009-T-0110, 2010-Ohio-5183 , ¶ 25, rev’d in part on separate grounds, 128 Ohio St.3d 268 , 2011-Ohio-737 , 943 N.E.2d 565 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies
green
1 sentence2019Welco Industries, 67 Ohio St.3d at 346 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Galloway
neutral
1 sentence2017Galloway, supra, 2016-Ohio-776 at ¶ 23, citing State v. Richards, 5th Dist. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Snyder green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Capital Financial Credit, L.L.C. v. Mays green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Cappara v. Schibley green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Cohen v. Estate of Cohen green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Headley green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Byrd v. Smith green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Labine v. Vincent green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Trimble v. Gordon green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Vahila v. Hall green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brookbank v. Gray green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Rybacki v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (4-28-2004) green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Francis v. City of Cleveland green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Insurance green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp. v. Employers Insurance green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Bittinger v. Klotzman green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| cluster 500355 green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Weser v. Carlin green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.