essential element claim in New York

2023For Braddock to prevail, he must establish a "but for" causation standard ( Ullmannglass v Oneida, Ltd. , 121 AD3d 1371, 1372 [3d Dept 2014] ["Causation is an essential element of a claim for tortious interference" and "requires proof that, 'but for' the defendants' conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party"]; Riddell Sports Inc. v Brooks , 872 F Supp 73, 78 [SD NY 1995] ["This Court finds that counterplaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient for the Court to infer that counterplaintiffs would have consummated contractual relationships if not for co

2023For Braddock to prevail, he must establish a "but for" causation standard ( Ullmannglass v Oneida, Ltd. , 121 AD3d 1371 , 1372 [3d Dept 2014] ["Causation is an essential element of a claim for tortious interference" and "requires proof that, 'but for' the defendants' conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party"]; Riddell Sports Inc. v Brooks , 872 F Supp 73, 78 [SD NY 1995] ["This Court finds that counterplaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient for the Court to infer that counterplaintiffs would have consummated contractual relationships if not for c

2014Such a cause of action requires proof that, “but for” the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party (see DiFabio v Jordan, 113 AD3d 1109, 1110 [2014]; Hobler v Hussain, 111 AD3d 1006, 1008 [2013]; Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v Town of Charlton, 103 AD3d 1011, 1015 [2013]).

2014Such a cause of action requires proof that, “but for” the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party (see DiFabio v Jordan, 113 AD3d 1109, 1110 [2014]; Hobler v Hussain, 111 AD3d 1006, 1008 [2013]; Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v Town of Charlton, 103 AD3d 1011, 1015 [2013]).

2014Such a cause of action requires proof that, “but for” the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party (see DiFabio v Jordan, 113 AD3d 1109, 1110 [2014]; Hobler v Hussain, 111 AD3d 1006, 1008 [2013]; Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v Town of Charlton, 103 AD3d 1011, 1015 [2013]).

2014Such a cause of action requires proof that, “but for” the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party (see DiFabio v Jordan, 113 AD3d 1109, 1110 [2014]; Hobler v Hussain, 111 AD3d 1006, 1008 [2013]; Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v Town of Charlton, 103 AD3d 1011, 1015 [2013]).

2000Accordingly, Supreme Court properly determined that plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of a claim for malicious prosecution, namely, the absence of probable cause to prosecute plaintiff for theft of services (see, Dobies v Brefka, 263 AD2d 721, 722 ; Hernandez v State of New York, 228 AD2d 902, 904 ; see also, Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 457 , cert denied sub nom.

1996That finding serves as a complete defense to a claim for false arrest and imprisonment and eliminates an essential element of a claim for mali cions prosecution (see, Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456-458 , cert denied sub nom.

2024Having assented to the PSA, which extinguished the Original PSA upon becoming effective, Fortis and Cobble Hill are unable to establish an essential element of their claim for tortious interference with contract: that Downstate at LICH breached the Original PSA by reason of NYUHC's interference ( see Benjamin v Yeroushalmi , 178 AD3d 650 , 653 [2d Dept 2019]; Pate v BNY Mellon-Alcentra Mezzanine III, LP , 163 AD3d 429 , 429-430 [1st Dept 2018]; Madey v Carman , 51 AD3d 985, 986 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 708 [2008]; cf. Blumenfeld Dev.

2024Having assented to the PSA, which extinguished the Original PSA upon becoming effective, Fortis and Cobble Hill are unable to establish an essential element of their claim for tortious interference with contract: that Downstate at LICH breached the Original PSA by reason of NYUHC's interference ( see Benjamin v Yeroushalmi , 178 AD3d 650 , 653 [2d Dept 2019]; Pate v BNY Mellon-Alcentra Mezzanine III, LP , 163 AD3d 429 , 429-430 [1st Dept 2018]; Madey v Carman , 51 AD3d 985, 986 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 708 [2008]; cf. Blumenfeld Dev.

2021The motion court correctly declined to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, which may be pleaded in the alternative ( Chowaiki & Co. Fine Art Ltd. v Lacher , 115 AD3d 600, 601 [1st Dept 2014]).

2021The motion court correctly declined to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, which may be pleaded in the alternative ( Chowaiki & Co. Fine Art Ltd. v Lacher , 115 AD3d 600, 601 [1st Dept 2014]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2013Auth., 246 AD2d 575, 576 [1998]; Valley Cadillac Corp. v Dick, 238 AD2d 894 [1997]), as well as the absence of contractual privity with the plaintiff, an essential element to a claim of implied warranty (see Arthur Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Catalano v Heraeus Kulzer, Inc., 305 AD2d 356, 358 [2003]; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 272 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

2018"The essential element of the exception is that the declarant spoke while under the stress or influence ***214 of the excitement caused by the event, so that [their] reflective capacity was stilled" ( Nieves , 67 NY2d at 135 , 501 N.Y.S.2d 1 , 492 N.E.2d 109 ).

2018"The essential element of the exception is that the declarant spoke while under the stress or influence ***214 of the excitement caused by the event, so that [their] reflective capacity was stilled" ( Nieves , 67 NY2d at 135 , 501 N.Y.S.2d 1 , 492 N.E.2d 109 ).

2024Hosp., 51 NY2d 242 , 249 n 2, 250 [1980]), and it cannot be waived ( see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 209 [2003]).

2016Hosp., 51 NY2d 242, 250-251 [1980]).

2018The exception's rationale posits that when a "declarant is exposed to a startling or upsetting *885 **492 event that is sufficiently powerful to render [their] normal reflective processes inoperative" ( People v. Cantave, 21 N.Y.3d 374 , 381, 971 N.Y.S.2d 237 , 993 N.E.2d 1257 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), the resulting statement could "not [be] the product of studied reflection and[/or] possible fabrication" ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 , 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 804 N.E.2d 402 [2003] ).

2018The exception's rationale posits that when a "declarant is exposed to a startling or upsetting *885 **492 event that is sufficiently powerful to render [their] normal reflective processes inoperative" ( People v. Cantave, 21 N.Y.3d 374 , 381, 971 N.Y.S.2d 237 , 993 N.E.2d 1257 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), the resulting statement could "not [be] the product of studied reflection and[/or] possible fabrication" ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 , 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 804 N.E.2d 402 [2003] ).

2018The exception's rationale posits that when a "declarant is exposed to a startling or upsetting *885 **492 event that is sufficiently powerful to render [their] normal reflective processes inoperative" ( People v. Cantave, 21 N.Y.3d 374 , 381, 971 N.Y.S.2d 237 , 993 N.E.2d 1257 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), the resulting statement could "not [be] the product of studied reflection and[/or] possible fabrication" ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 , 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 804 N.E.2d 402 [2003] ).

2018The exception's rationale posits that when a "declarant is exposed to a startling or upsetting *885 **492 event that is sufficiently powerful to render [their] normal reflective processes inoperative" ( People v. Cantave, 21 N.Y.3d 374 , 381, 971 N.Y.S.2d 237 , 993 N.E.2d 1257 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), the resulting statement could "not [be] the product of studied reflection and[/or] possible fabrication" ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 , 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238 , 804 N.E.2d 402 [2003] ).

1989(People v Williams, supra, at 1047 [dissent by Fuchsberg, J.]; People v Snyder, 138 AD2d, supra, at 118, affd 73 NY2d 900 , supra; People v Whitehead, 123 AD2d 895, 896 [2d Dept 1986].) The defendant’s testimony that he intended to take the gun back to Queens and dispose of it, if credited, does not reflect an intent to exercise such dominion and control over the weapon as to foreclose this defense.

1988But an intent to surrender a weapon to the police is not an essential element of the defense of temporary and lawful possession (see, People v Whitehead, 123 AD2d 895, 896 ).

1989The essential element of this exception is that the declarant spoke while under the stress or influence of the excitement caused by the event, so that his reflective capacity was stilled (People v Nieves, supra; see, People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227, 230-231 , supra; People v Marks, 6 NY2d 67, 71 ).

1986The essential element of the exception is that the declarant spoke while under the stress or influence of the excitement caused by the event, so that his reflective capacity was stilled (see, People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227, 230-231 , supra; People v Marks, 6 NY2d 67, 71 ).

1986Sinai Hosp., supra, at pp 177-179 [emphasis added].) Thus, in George (supra), the court sustained the timeliness of the second action under CPLR 205 (a), notwithstanding the fact that the first action did not satisfy a statutory requirement, namely, suit by a duly appointed administrator, a condition precedent and, as such, an essential element of the claim (see, Carrick v Central Gen.

1980Sinai Hosp., supra, at pp 176-177).

2025"Proof of damages is an essential element of a claim for breach of contract under New York law" ( iGo Mktg. & Entertainment , LLC v Hartbeat Prods. , LLC , 217 AD3d 753, 754-755 [2d Dept 2023]; see also Pearl St.

2025"Proof of damages is an essential element of a claim for breach of contract under New York law" ( iGo Mktg. & Entertainment , LLC v Hartbeat Prods. , LLC , 217 AD3d 753, 754-755 [2d Dept 2023]; see also Pearl St.

2025Servs., Inc., 188 AD3d 624, 628 [2d Dept 2020] [holding dismissal of breach of contract claim for lack of actual damages premature as actual damages not an essential element for such claim]; Perry v McMahan, 164 AD3d 1488 , 1489-1490 [2d Dept 2018] [upholding lower court’s award of nominal damages of $1 after a jury found plaintiff did not suffer damages from breach of confidentiality provision stating “defendant acknowledged that she breached the confidentiality provision of the parties' settlement agreement.

2024Furthermore, disposing of a weapon without turning it into the authorities when the defendant has not had an opportunity to do so, or by throwing the weapon and ammunition in the trash does not convert a temporary lawful possession into an illegal possession ( see Rose , 191 AD3d at 699; cf .

2024Moreover, an intent to surrender a weapon to the police [*5]is not an essential element of the defense of temporary and lawful possession ( Pemberton , 144 AD2d at 223 ; People v Thomas , 172 AD2d 572, 573 [2d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 927 [1991]).

2024Hosp., 51 NY2d 242 , 249 n 2, 250 [1980]), and it cannot be waived ( see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 209 [2003]).

2023Co., 269 US 385, 391 [1926]; Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 Harvard L Rev 542, 543 [2009] [“From the inception of Western culture, fair notice has been recognized as an essential element of the rule of law”]).

2023Under New York law, where an agreement expressly leaves decisions in a party's "sole discretion" — as this agreement does — that party's reliance on another cannot be found to be the "but for" cause for that decision ( Bank Leumi Trust Co. of NY v D'Evori Intl., Inc. , 163 AD2d 26, 32 [1st Dept 1990]; CrossLand Fed.

2023Under New York law, where an agreement expressly leaves decisions in a party's "sole discretion" — as this agreement does — that party's reliance on another cannot be found to be the "but for" cause for that decision ( Bank Leumi Trust Co. of NY v D'Evori Intl., Inc. , 163 AD2d 26, 32 [1st Dept 1990]; CrossLand Fed.