essential element claim in New Jersey

2023See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589 ; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-36 ; Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16 ; Rodriguez, 399 N.J.

2023See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589 ; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-36 ; Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16 ; Rodriguez, 399 N.J.

2023See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589 ; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-36 ; Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16 ; Rodriguez, 399 N.J.

2022Our decision in Reichert v. Vegholm, 366 N.J.

2019The Court began with a discussion of the principle that in a self-defense case, evidence of the victim's violent character . . . demonstrates the victim's propensity for violence, which tends to support an inference that the victim was the initial aggressor[.] [W]here the accused has knowledge of the victim's prior violent acts, it tends to show the reasonableness of the accused's belief that the use of self-defense . . . was necessary. [Id. at 457.] N.J.R.E. 405 prohibits specific instances of conduct from being presented "unless a trait of character is an essential element to a claim or defe

2010Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J.Super. 547, 567 , 966 A. 2d 29 (App.Div.2009) ("Laches is an equitable doctrine that `is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'") (quoting In re Kietur, 332 N.J.Super. 18, 28 , 752 A. 2d 799 (App.Div.2000)).

2010Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J.Super. 547, 567 , 966 A. 2d 29 (App.Div.2009) ("Laches is an equitable doctrine that `is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'") (quoting In re Kietur, 332 N.J.Super. 18, 28 , 752 A. 2d 799 (App.Div.2000)).

2010Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J.Super. 547, 567 , 966 A. 2d 29 (App.Div.2009) ("Laches is an equitable doctrine that `is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'") (quoting In re Kietur, 332 N.J.Super. 18, 28 , 752 A. 2d 799 (App.Div.2000)).

2010Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J.Super. 547, 567 , 966 A. 2d 29 (App.Div.2009) ("Laches is an equitable doctrine that `is invoked to deny a party enforcement of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'") (quoting In re Kietur, 332 N.J.Super. 18, 28 , 752 A. 2d 799 (App.Div.2000)).

2009Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 560 , 569 A. 2d 793 (1990).

2009Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 560 , 569 A. 2d 793 (1990).

2008In United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 676 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a character trait is an essential element of a claim or defense only when "proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisfies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense." The Keiser court held that the victim's violent character is not an essential element of self-defense because it is not determinative of the success of the defense.

2008In United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 676 , 133 L.Ed.2d 525 (1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a character trait is an essential element of a claim or defense only when “proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisf[ies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense.” The Reiser court held that the victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense because it is not determinative of the success of the defense.

2008In United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 676 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a character trait is an essential element of a claim or defense only when "proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisfies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense." The Keiser court held that the victim's violent character is not an essential element of self-defense because it is not determinative of the success of the defense.

2008In United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 676 , 133 L.Ed.2d 525 (1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a character trait is an essential element of a claim or defense only when “proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisf[ies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense.” The Reiser court held that the victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense because it is not determinative of the success of the defense.

2008In United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 676 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a character trait is an essential element of a claim or defense only when "proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisfies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense." The Keiser court held that the victim's violent character is not an essential element of self-defense because it is not determinative of the success of the defense.

2008In United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 , 116 S.Ct. 676 , 133 L.Ed.2d 525 (1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a character trait is an essential element of a claim or defense only when “proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait by itself actually satisf[ies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense.” The Reiser court held that the victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense because it is not determinative of the success of the defense.

2000Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., the court addressed the argument of one defendant that "reliance is an essential element of a claim of fraud" and that plaintiffs had not relied upon the false representation of the bank's prime rate. 848 F. 2d 674 , 679 n. 8 (6th Cir.1988).

2000The court accepted plaintiff's claim that "it relied upon the proper calculation of that payoff balance as being based upon the established `prime rate.' " Ibid.

1992The majority opinion apparently assumes that an essential element of the defense is police misconduct "so egregious as to violate defendant's rights to due process and fundamental fairness." Ante at 66, 607 A. 2d at 628 .

1990Fenwick v. Kay American Jeep, Inc., 72 N.J. 372, 378 , 371 A. 2d 13 (1977).

1990Fenwick v. Kay American Jeep, Inc., 72 N.J. 372, 378 , 371 A. 2d 13 (1977).

1990Hence, as the court concluded in State v. West, supra, involuntary intoxication is not a defense to the motor vehicle violation of drunk driving. [I]ntoxication is not a defense unless it establishes a reasonable doubt as to the existence of an element of the offense ... [Since driving under the influence] ... is not subject to the provisions of ... the criminal code requiring a ‘culpable mental state’ ... [and] the only elements of the offense charged are operating a motor vehicle and being under the influence of intoxicating liquor while doing so, it follows that intoxication ... cannot esta

1990Hence, as the court concluded in State v. West, supra, involuntary intoxication is not a defense to the motor vehicle violation of drunk driving. [I]ntoxication is not a defense unless it establishes a reasonable doubt as to the existence of an element of the offense ... [Since driving under the influence] ... is not subject to the provisions of ... the criminal code requiring a ‘culpable mental state’ ... [and] the only elements of the offense charged are operating a motor vehicle and being under the influence of intoxicating liquor while doing so, it follows that intoxication ... cannot esta

1988As a general practice, trial courts will find it saves considerable time to require testimony on this element of the affirmative defense of duress or necessity first, simply because such testimony can be heard in a fairly short time, whereas testimony going to the other necessary elements of duress or necessity may take considerably longer to present." Id. at 412-413 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 635-636 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 588 . *657 This court finds the holding of the Bailey court persuasive, and thus the preliminary judicial inquiry as to whether the defendants sought official assistance, before or after

1988As a general practice, trial courts will find it saves considerable time to require testimony on this element of the affirmative defense of duress or necessity first, simply because such testimony can be heard in a fairly short time, whereas testimony going to the other necessary elements of duress or necessity may take considerably longer to present." Id. at 412-413 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 635-636 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 588 . *657 This court finds the holding of the Bailey court persuasive, and thus the preliminary judicial inquiry as to whether the defendants sought official assistance, before or after

1984Pomeroy defines laches as "such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity." [ 90 N.J. at 151 .] As a matter of logic, if passage of time cannot be considered in defense, as plaintiff asserts, the defense of laches could not have been established, since time is an essential element of that defense.

1984Loehr v. Ventura Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App.3d 1071 , 195 Cal.Rept. 576 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., 1983).