97 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2026“A nonmoving party’s failure to establish an essential element of her claim ‘renders all other facts immaterial’ and mandates summary judgment in favor of the moving party.” Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 (2012), quoting Kourouvacilis, supra, at 711 . 2026“A nonmoving party’s failure to establish an essential element of her claim ‘renders all other facts immaterial’ and mandates summary judgment in favor of the moving party.” Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 (2012), quoting Kourouvacilis, supra, at 711 . 1.1. | 41 | 70 |
Roman v. Trustees of Tufts Collegegreen2 sentences2026“A nonmoving party’s failure to establish an essential element of her claim ‘renders all other facts immaterial’ and mandates summary judgment in favor of the moving party.” Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 (2012), quoting Kourouvacilis, supra, at 711 . 2026“A nonmoving party’s failure to establish an essential element of her claim ‘renders all other facts immaterial’ and mandates summary judgment in favor of the moving party.” Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 (2012), quoting Kourouvacilis, supra, at 711 . 1.1. | 15 | 15 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen2 sentences2015Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714 (1991), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) (White, J., concurring). “[A]lthough that supporting material need not negate, that is, disprove, an essential element of the claim the party on whom the burden of proof at trial rests, it will demonstrate that proof of that element at trial is unlikely to be forthcoming.” Id. 2015Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714 (1991), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) (White, J., concurring). “[A]lthough that supporting material need not negate, that is, disprove, an essential element of the claim the party on whom the burden of proof at trial rests, it will demonstrate that proof of that element at trial is unlikely to be forthcoming.” Id. | 8 | 8 |
Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp.green2 sentences2014Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991); Kourouvacilis, 410 Mass. at 716 . 2007See Flesner, 410 Mass. at 809 (moving parly’s burden is met with proof that an essential element of claim is unlikely to be forthcoming at trial). | 5 | 6 |
Manning v. Nobilegreen2 sentences2014Manning v. Nobüe, 411 Mass. 382 (1991). 2009Manning v. Nobile, 411 Mass. 382, 388 (1991). | 3 | 4 |
Payton v. Abbott Labsgreen2 sentences1997Similarly, in McNeill v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co., 420 Mass. 587 (1995), the Court stated: The fact that an essential element of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is “physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology,” Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982), does not make such emotional distress a bodily injury. 1995The fact that an essential element of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is “physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology,” Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982), does not make such emotional distress a bodily injury. | 3 | 3 |
McNeill v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurancegreen2 sentences2000See McNeill v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance, 420 Mass. 587 , 590 n.4 (1995), citing Payton, supra at 557 . 1997Similarly, in McNeill v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co., 420 Mass. 587 (1995), the Court stated: The fact that an essential element of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is “physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology,” Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982), does not make such emotional distress a bodily injury. | 1 | 2 |
Romero v. UHS of Westwood Pembroke, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Romero v. UHS of Westwood Pembroke, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 542 (2008) (affirming summary judgment on this ground). | 1 | 1 |
Schwartz v. Travelers Indemnity Co.green1 sentence2024Co., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 682 (2001) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on contract claim because plaintiff could not muster any evidence he suffered damage as a result). 2.1.2. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. McHoulgreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. McHoul , 352 Mass. 544 , 546-547, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967) ("A person is not responsible *1187 for criminal conduct if at the time of **138 such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality ... of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" [emphasis added] ). 2018See Commonwealth v. McHoul , 352 Mass. 544 , 546-547, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967) ("A person is not responsible *1187 for criminal conduct if at the time of **138 such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality ... of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" [emphasis added] ). | 1 | 1 |
Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc.green1 sentence2017See Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc., 471 Mass. 679, 681 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Geswell's Casegreen1 sentence2012See, Ledgehill Homes, Inc. v. Chaitman, 348 Mass. 777 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
Santagate v. Towergreen1 sentence2012Count v. is labeled “unjust enrichment.” Unjust enrichment is the “retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience.” Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 324, 329 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Sandman v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurancegreen1 sentence2012See Sandman, supra Since the complaint fails to allege any statement by Lexington, which is an essential element of a claim for either negligent or intentional misrepresentation, counts I, II, and III must be dismissed. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Cottergreen1 sentence2011Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007) 4 A defendant seeking summary judgment may carry its burden by showing that the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his claim. | 1 | 1 |
Community National Bank v. Dawesgreen1 sentence2009“A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial.” Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711 (1991); see also Cmty. Nat’l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976) (stating court grants motion for summary judgment where moving party has carried its burden and plaintiff has not responded with specific facts to establish a triable issue). | 1 | 1 |
Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLPgreen1 sentence2007See Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 108-109 (2003); Equipment & Sys. for Indus., Inc. v. Northmeadows Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. County of Hampdengreen1 sentence2007Ortiz v. Hampden County, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 138, 140 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Jean W. v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2006See Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496, 511 (1993) (Liacos, C.J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Huculakgreen2 sentences2005Under this test, the plaintiff must establish as an essential element of her claim of negligent misrepresentation that her reliance on the defendant’s false statement was “reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances.’’ Collins v. Huculak, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 387, 391 (2003). 2005The question of whether reliance was reasonable and justifiable is generally one of fact left for trial, see id. at 392 , but it may be resolved as a matter of law when no reasonable factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could find that reliance was reasonable and justifiable. | 1 | 1 |
Zimmerman v. Kentgreen1 sentence2003See Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 77 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Dziamba v. Warner & Stackpole LLPgreen1 sentence2003Id.; see also, e.g., Dziamba v. Warner & Stackpole LLP, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 397, 408 (2002) and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Tambolleo v. Town of West Boylstongreen1 sentence2002Manning v. Nobile, 411 Mass. 382, 388 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corporation, 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991); and Tambolleo v. Town of West Boylston, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 526, 530 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.green1 sentence2000Cf. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d at 1328-1329 (claim for injurious falsehood depends on the resolution of a substantial question of Federal patent law). | 1 | 1 |
Judson v. ESSEX AGRICULTURAL & TECHNICAL INSTITUTEgreen1 sentence1999See Judson v. Essex Agric. & Technical Inst., 418 Mass. 159, 162 (1994), quoting from Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). 4. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Knight v. CNA Insurance Companies
green
1 sentence2006Knight, supra, at 5 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hodnett v. Arbella Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2006Knowledge is an essential element of the defense of noncooperation, see Hodnett, supra, at 132 , which Plymouth Rock had the burden of proving. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Nelson v. Massachusetts Port Authority
green
1 sentence2004For example, where the party who does not have the burden of proof at trial establishes that the other party could not prove an essential element of its claim, summary judgment may be appropriate.” Nelson, 55 Mass.App.Ct. at 435 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Douglas v. Whittaker
green
1 sentence2003As stated in Douglas v. Whittaker, supra at 400 , the rationale for permitting a judge to grant a directed verdict after an opening which discloses the absence of any cause of action is to insure that “[t]he time of the court... [is] not wasted in hearing a lost cause and the public ... [is] not put to unnecessary expense arising from the trial of a case already shown to be lacking in merit.” In the perhaps unusual case when the allowance of a motion presented just before trial prevents a party from establishing an essential element of his claim, it would be purely perfunctory, if not pointles | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bowers v. Board of Appeals of Marshfield
green
1 sentence1992Bowers v. Board of Appeals of Marshfield, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 34 . 5 Although the rule 70 judgment in this case stated that the judge was acting under the rule “and by agreement of all parties to this action,” consent of the parties is not an essential element of a rule 70 judgment. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Dusky v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.