18 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1929–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Auburn v. Brookegreen2 sentences2004See City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wn.2d 623, 629 , 836 P.2d 212 (1992) (“The primary purpose [of charging documents] is to give notice to an accused so a defense can be prepared.”); see also Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 97 . 2004See City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wn.2d 623, 629 , 836 P.2d 212 (1992) (“The primary purpose [of charging documents] is to give notice to an accused so a defense can be prepared.”); see also Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 97 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kjorsvikgreen2 sentences2004See City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wash.2d 623, 629 , 836 P.2d 212 (1992) ("The primary purpose [of charging documents] is to give notice to an accused so a defense can be prepared."); see also Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 97 , 812 P.2d 86 . 2004See City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wn.2d 623, 629 , 836 P.2d 212 (1992) (“The primary purpose [of charging documents] is to give notice to an accused so a defense can be prepared.”); see also Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 97 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2003See Hendon, 609 N.E.2d at 544 (reasoning “the only apparent purpose in requiring a ‘cash only’ bond to the exclusion of the other forms provided in [the rules] is to restrict the accused’s access to a surety and, thus, to detain the accused in violation of [the State Constitution]”); see also Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 353 (noting “cash only bail orders can be used to deny bail to those accused who have other means of providing sufficient surety”). 1 And such an application of CrRLJ 3.2(a)(7) would also be inconsistent with the purposes underlying the rules of securing “simplicity in procedure, fai 2003See Hendon, 609 N.E.2d at 544 (reasoning "the only apparent purpose in requiring a `cash only' bond to the exclusion of the other forms provided in [the rules] is to restrict the accused's access to a surety and, thus, to detain the accused in violation of [the State constitution]"); see also Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 353 (noting "cash only bail orders *181 can be used to deny bail to those accused who have other means of providing sufficient surety"). [1] And such an application of CrRLJ 3.2(a)(7) would also be inconsistent with the purposes underlying the rules of securing "simplicity in procedu | 2 | 2 |
State ex rel. Jones v. Hendongreen2 sentences2003See Hendon, 609 N.E.2d at 544 (reasoning “the only apparent purpose in requiring a ‘cash only’ bond to the exclusion of the other forms provided in [the rules] is to restrict the accused’s access to a surety and, thus, to detain the accused in violation of [the State Constitution]”); see also Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 353 (noting “cash only bail orders can be used to deny bail to those accused who have other means of providing sufficient surety”). 1 And such an application of CrRLJ 3.2(a)(7) would also be inconsistent with the purposes underlying the rules of securing “simplicity in procedure, fai 2003See Hendon, 609 N.E.2d at 544 (reasoning "the only apparent purpose in requiring a `cash only' bond to the exclusion of the other forms provided in [the rules] is to restrict the accused's access to a surety and, thus, to detain the accused in violation of [the State constitution]"); see also Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 353 (noting "cash only bail orders *181 can be used to deny bail to those accused who have other means of providing sufficient surety"). [1] And such an application of CrRLJ 3.2(a)(7) would also be inconsistent with the purposes underlying the rules of securing "simplicity in procedu | 2 | 2 |
State v. McCroreygreen2 sentences1998Cf., e.g., State v. Harp, 13 Wash.App. 273, 275 , 534 P.2d 846 (1975) (finding that delay of criminal trial violates article I, section 10, if there is prejudice to accused); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash.App. 103, 116 , 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) ("The total disregard for procedure in this case [where trial court did not provide written findings and conclusions required by JuCR 7.11(d)] creates an appearance of unfairness that compels dismissal"). 1998Cf., e.g., State v. Harp, 13 Wash.App. 273, 275 , 534 P.2d 846 (1975) (finding that delay of criminal trial violates article I, section 10, if there is prejudice to accused); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash.App. 103, 116 , 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) ("The total disregard for procedure in this case [where trial court did not provide written findings and conclusions required by JuCR 7.11(d)] creates an appearance of unfairness that compels dismissal"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2017“The purpose of this ‘essential elements’ rule is to give notice of the nature and cause of an accusation against the accused so that a defense can be prepared.” State v. Campbell, 125 Wn.2d 797, 801 , 888 P.2d 1185 (1995). 2017“The purpose of this ‘essential elements’ rule is to give notice of the nature and cause of an accusation against the accused so that a defense can be prepared.” State v. Campbell, 125 Wn.2d 797, 801 , 888 P.2d 1185 (1995). | 4 | 2011–2017 |
In re the Personal Restraint Gentry
green
2 sentences2004Gentry, 137 Wn.2d at 396 . 2004Gentry, 137 Wash.2d at 396 , 972 P.2d 1250 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Harp
green
2 sentences1998Cf., e.g., State v. Harp, 13 Wn. 1998Cf., e.g., State v. Harp, 13 Wash.App. 273, 275 , 534 P.2d 846 (1975) (finding that delay of criminal trial violates article I, section 10, if there is prejudice to accused); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash.App. 103, 116 , 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) ("The total disregard for procedure in this case [where trial court did not provide written findings and conclusions required by JuCR 7.11(d)] creates an appearance of unfairness that compels dismissal"). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2021State v. Anderson, 92 Wn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Holsworth
green
2 sentences2016In State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 159 , 607 P.2d 845 (1980), our State Supreme Court addressed the circumstances under which an accused may challenge the validity of an earlier conviction, and, on a challenge, which party holds the burden of proving the validity or invalidity of the earli_er conviction. 2016In State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 159 , 607 P.2d 845 (1980), our State Supreme Court addressed the circumstances under which an accused may challenge the validity of an earlier conviction, and, on a challenge, which party holds the burden of proving the validity or invalidity of the earli_er conviction. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Reno v. Koray
green
2 sentences2006Thus, under the language of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant suffers “detention” only when committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions, as respondent was, is “released.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57 , 115 S. Ct. 2021 , 132 L. 2006Thus, under the language of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant suffers “detention” only when committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions, as respondent was, is “released.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57 , 115 S. Ct. 2021 , 132 L. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Personal Restraint of Gentry
green
1 sentence2004Gentry, 137 Wash.2d at 396 , 972 P.2d 1250 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1974State v. Rogers, 83 Wn.2d 553, 557 , 520 P.2d 159 (1974). 1974State v. Rogers, 83 Wn.2d 553, 557 , 520 P.2d 159 (1974). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1929In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 , among other things, that court said: “Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. [Citing cases.] And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, of which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. [Citing cases.] But it is now well settled that st | 1 | 1929–1929 |
United States v. Grimaud
green
1 sentence1929In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 , among other things, that court said: “Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. [Citing cases.] And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, of which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. [Citing cases.] But it is now well settled that st | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.