6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003In defining “bona fide” in the criminal law context, we have concluded that “[a] bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C.1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 357 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C.1976)) (citation omitted); see also Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C.1979); Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 439 (D.C.1971) (“[a] bona fide belief must have some justification — some reasonable basis.”). 1979A bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior. [Citations and footnotes omitted.] In Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 281 A.2d 438 (1971), we upheld a conviction for unlawful entry where the defendant proffered that he was merely taking a shortcut. | 3 | 4 |
Gaetano v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003In defining “bona fide” in the criminal law context, we have concluded that “[a] bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C.1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 357 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C.1976)) (citation omitted); see also Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C.1979); Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 439 (D.C.1971) (“[a] bona fide belief must have some justification — some reasonable basis.”). 1989This court has repeatedly held, as the trial court in this case instructed the jury, that “[a] bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Jackson v. United States, 357 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C.1976) (citation omitted), quoted with approval in Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003In defining “bona fide” in the criminal law context, we have concluded that “[a] bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C.1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 357 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C.1976)) (citation omitted); see also Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C.1979); Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 439 (D.C.1971) (“[a] bona fide belief must have some justification — some reasonable basis.”). 1989This court has repeatedly held, as the trial court in this case instructed the jury, that “[a] bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Jackson v. United States, 357 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C.1976) (citation omitted), quoted with approval in Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Hemmati v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003In defining “bona fide” in the criminal law context, we have concluded that “[a] bona fide belief must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C.1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 357 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C.1976)) (citation omitted); see also Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C.1979); Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 439 (D.C.1971) (“[a] bona fide belief must have some justification — some reasonable basis.”). | 1 | 1 |
Cureton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1979However, the Court left undisturbed that fundamental principle which holds that pretrial identification or recognition of an accused by a witness in the absence of participation by the police or prosecution does not bring such identification within the ambit of the due process principles set *967 forth in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. See Cureton v. United States, D.C.App., 386 A.2d 278, 287 (1978), and cases cited therein. | 1 | 1 |
Landay v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Papworthgreen1 sentence1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah
green
2 sentences1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S 1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
White v. Butler
green
2 sentences1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S 1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Thompson v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S 1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S 1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
International Ass'n of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Keig v. Lake Shore Athletic Club Members' Committee
green
1 sentence1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
United States ex rel. Karpathiou v. Schlotfeldt
neutral
1 sentence1972As the Supreme Court stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), “ . . . it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited . . . ” by the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and this includes statutes which change the “rules of evidence . . . so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.” Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.