accused instruction in Nebraska

1962We held in Garcia v. State, 159 Neb. 571 , 68 N. W. 2d 151 : “The mere fact that a witness in a criminal prosecution is a regular public law enforcement officer *559 does not entitle an accused to an instruction that the jury, in weighing his testimony, should exercise greater care than in weighing the testimony of other witnesses. * * * Where informers, detectives, or other persons employed to hunt up- testimony against the accused are called to testify against him, he is entitled to an instruction to the jury that in weighing their testimony greater care should be exercised than in the case

1962We held in Garcia v. State, 159 Neb. 571 , 68 N. W. 2d 151 : “The mere fact that a witness in a criminal prosecution is a regular public law enforcement officer *559 does not entitle an accused to an instruction that the jury, in weighing his testimony, should exercise greater care than in weighing the testimony of other witnesses. * * * Where informers, detectives, or other persons employed to hunt up- testimony against the accused are called to testify against him, he is entitled to an instruction to the jury that in weighing their testimony greater care should be exercised than in the case

2025Ed. 2d 314 (2009) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2025Ed. 2d 314 (2009) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2025The Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause “was intended to prevent the convic- tion of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination.” 55 The Court held that those who certified 51 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 , 129 S. Ct. 2527 , 174 L.

2025The Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause “was intended to prevent the convic- tion of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination.” 55 The Court held that those who certified 51 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 , 129 S. Ct. 2527 , 174 L.

1983As Chief Justice Burger observed in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 , 100 S.Ct. 906 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980): "The contemporary justification for affording an accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive.

1983As Chief Justice Burger observed in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 , 100 S.Ct. 906 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980): "The contemporary justification for affording an accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive.

1979In Denton v. Cronin, 187 Colo. 247 , 529 P. 2d 644 , the Supreme Court of Colorado held the accused could not avoid extradition to a sister state on the ground the law of that state was unconstitutional; comity required the accused to test the constitutionality of the statutes of the sister state in the courts of that state and, if unsuccessful there, then in the appropriate federal courts.

1979In Denton v. Cronin, 187 Colo. 247 , 529 P. 2d 644 , the Supreme Court of Colorado held the accused could not avoid extradition to a sister state on the ground the law of that state was unconstitutional; comity required the accused to test the constitutionality of the statutes of the sister state in the courts of that state and, if unsuccessful there, then in the appropriate federal courts.

1962We find no- error in the refusal to give the requested instruction. ' "■ ■■ • In Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197 , 106 N. W. 2d 22 , we held: “A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to- a public trial by an impartial jury, and when it appears to this court that a defendant has not been accorded a fair trial its duty is to grant a new trial.” In the course of the opinion, we quoted with approval from State v. Long, 127 Mont. 523 , 268 P. 2d 390 , as follows: “Whatever the status of a defendant in a criminal case may be and whatever be the nature of the crime with which

1962We find no- error in the refusal to give the requested instruction. ' "■ ■■ • In Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197 , 106 N. W. 2d 22 , we held: “A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to- a public trial by an impartial jury, and when it appears to this court that a defendant has not been accorded a fair trial its duty is to grant a new trial.” In the course of the opinion, we quoted with approval from State v. Long, 127 Mont. 523 , 268 P. 2d 390 , as follows: “Whatever the status of a defendant in a criminal case may be and whatever be the nature of the crime with which

1962We find no- error in the refusal to give the requested instruction. ' "■ ■■ • In Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197 , 106 N. W. 2d 22 , we held: “A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to- a public trial by an impartial jury, and when it appears to this court that a defendant has not been accorded a fair trial its duty is to grant a new trial.” In the course of the opinion, we quoted with approval from State v. Long, 127 Mont. 523 , 268 P. 2d 390 , as follows: “Whatever the status of a defendant in a criminal case may be and whatever be the nature of the crime with which

1962We find no- error in the refusal to give the requested instruction. ' "■ ■■ • In Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197 , 106 N. W. 2d 22 , we held: “A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to- a public trial by an impartial jury, and when it appears to this court that a defendant has not been accorded a fair trial its duty is to grant a new trial.” In the course of the opinion, we quoted with approval from State v. Long, 127 Mont. 523 , 268 P. 2d 390 , as follows: “Whatever the status of a defendant in a criminal case may be and whatever be the nature of the crime with which

1955See, Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166 , 47 N. W. 2d 349 ; Koch v. State, 130 Neb. 119 , 264 N. W. 172 .

1955See, Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166 , 47 N. W. 2d 349 ; Koch v. State, 130 Neb. 119 , 264 N. W. 172 .

1931In Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387 , it is said: “The position of the appellant is that his detention in custody is unlawful, because the indictment which is its only excuse, is not a charge of crime within the meaning of' the provision of the Constitution regulating interstate extradition. * * * The precise and only question to be determined is whether the indictment constituted such a charge. * * * Counsel for the petitioner .disclaim the purpose of attacking the indictment as a criminal pleading, appreciating correctly that the point here is not whether the indictment is good enough, over s

1897(Goldsby v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 216; State v. Parish, 22 Ia., 284 ; State v. Ruthven, 58 Ia., 121 ; State v. Huckins, 23 Neb., 309 ; Fager v. State, 49 Neb., 439 .) Where, ar in this case, the testimony thus introduced is not directly and plainly rebuttal in its character, but is in support of the main case, and would have been proper testimony in chief for the state on a material question first brought into the case for and by the state, and not rendered necessary by an issue first tendered by the accused in his defense, it is error to allow the witness to testify over the proper

1897(Goldsby v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 216; State v. Parish, 22 Ia., 284 ; State v. Ruthven, 58 Ia., 121 ; State v. Huckins, 23 Neb., 309 ; Fager v. State, 49 Neb., 439 .) Where, ar in this case, the testimony thus introduced is not directly and plainly rebuttal in its character, but is in support of the main case, and would have been proper testimony in chief for the state on a material question first brought into the case for and by the state, and not rendered necessary by an issue first tendered by the accused in his defense, it is error to allow the witness to testify over the proper

1897(Goldsby v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 216; State v. Parish, 22 Ia., 284 ; State v. Ruthven, 58 Ia., 121 ; State v. Huckins, 23 Neb., 309 ; Fager v. State, 49 Neb., 439 .) Where, ar in this case, the testimony thus introduced is not directly and plainly rebuttal in its character, but is in support of the main case, and would have been proper testimony in chief for the state on a material question first brought into the case for and by the state, and not rendered necessary by an issue first tendered by the accused in his defense, it is error to allow the witness to testify over the proper

1897(Goldsby v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 216; State v. Parish, 22 Ia., 284 ; State v. Ruthven, 58 Ia., 121 ; State v. Huckins, 23 Neb., 309 ; Fager v. State, 49 Neb., 439 .) Where, ar in this case, the testimony thus introduced is not directly and plainly rebuttal in its character, but is in support of the main case, and would have been proper testimony in chief for the state on a material question first brought into the case for and by the state, and not rendered necessary by an issue first tendered by the accused in his defense, it is error to allow the witness to testify over the proper