53 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences2011State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. 2007The presumption in favor of alternative sentencing may be overcome “by facts contained in the presentence report, evidence presented by the state, the testimony of the accused or a defense witness, or any other source provided it is made a part of the record.” State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. | 31 | 31 |
United States v. Novia Turkette, Jr., United States of America v. John Vargasgreen2 sentences2014The court stated that “the defendants sat in the front row of the spectator's area of the courtroom, hardly a place calculated to strip an accused of his presumption of innocence in the eyes of the jury.” United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1981). 2006The court stated that “the defendants sat in the front row of the spectator’s area of the courtroom, hardly a place calculated to strip an accused of his presumption of innocence in the eyes of the jury.” United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1981). | 3 | 3 |
John Wayne Gacy v. George Welborn, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, and Roland W. Burris, Attorney General of Illinoisgreen2 sentences2000See Gacy, 994 F.2d at 316 (holding when direct evidence is available the constitution does not provide “an accused the privilege of proffering, through hearsay, his self-serving statements....”)- A declarant must be unavailable to testify for the declaration against penal interest exception to be applicable. 2000See Gacy, 994 F.2d at 316 (holding when direct evidence is available the constitution does not provide “an accused the privilege of proffering, through hearsay, his self-serving 11 statements. . . .”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bonestelgreen2 sentences2010Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d at 167 . 2000Regardless, even if the appellant could be presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing, this court has observed that “[t]he presumption can be successfully rebutted by facts contained in the presentence report, evidence presented by the State, the testimony of the accused or a defense witness, or any other source provided it is made a part of the record.” Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d at 167 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Jernigangreen2 sentences2010State v. Jernigan, 929 S.W.2d 391, 395-396 (Tenn. Crim. 1998As this court said in Jernigan: The presumption can be successfully rebutted by facts contained in the presentence report, evidence presented by the state, the testimony of the accused or a defense witness, or any other source provided it is admissible evidence and made a part of the record. 929 S.W.2d at 395-96 . | 1 | 2 |
Kyles v. Whitleygreen1 sentence2017See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tuttlegreen1 sentence2003State v. Tuttle, 914 S.W.2d 926, 932 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); State v. Montgomery, 840 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1992); Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn.1992). 1998See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); State v. Montgomery, 840 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1992); Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences1997See Arizona v Youngblood 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). 1997See Arizona v Youngblood 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2001As recognized in Miranda, however, the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis fails to fully protect the accused from violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege precisely because it is exceedingly difficult to discern where a statement divulged during a custodial interrogation lies on the already blurred line between voluntariness and coercion. 384 U.S. at 455 , 86 S.Ct. at 1617-18 . 2001As recognized in Miranda, however, the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis fails to fully protect the accused from violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege precisely because it is exceedingly difficult to discern where a statement divulged during a custodial interrogation lies on the already blurred line between voluntariness and coercion. 384 U.S. at 455 , 86 S.Ct. at 1617-18 . | 3 | 1992–2001 |
State v. Blackstock
green
2 sentences2006Id. 2006Id. | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2020This issue has been previously determined, and the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.1 We 1 In addressing whether his Sixth Amendment claim has been waived for failure to present it in prior proceedings, see T.C.A. § 40-30-106(g), the Petitioner asserts that the State failed to provide timely discovery and cites in his reply brief to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused is a violation of due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kring v. Missouri
red
2 sentences2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Medley
green
2 sentences2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Thompson v. Utah
red
2 sentences2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lindsey v. Washington
green
2 sentences2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 2016In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), the Court stated, “But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” Then, in Lindsey v. Washington, the Court cited Kring to support its statement that “[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.” 301 U.S. 39 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2006Similarly, in State v. Johnson , the Supreme Court of Washington held that the seating arrangement whereby the defendant and his counsel sat at the counsel table farthest from the jury box during voir dire did not prejudice the defendant and was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 462 P.2d at 935 . 2006Similarly, in State v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the seating arrangement whereby the defendant and his counsel sat at the counsel table farthest from the jury box during voir dire did not prejudice the defendant and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. 462 P.2d at 935 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Goode
green
1 sentence2003Id. -5- The presumption in favor of alternative sentencing may be overcome by facts contained in the presentence report, evidence presented by the State, the testimony of the accused or a defense witness, or any other source, provided it is made part of the record. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence1998See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); State v. Montgomery, 840 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1992); Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn.1992). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Montgomery
green
1 sentence1998See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); State v. Montgomery, 840 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1992); Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn.1992). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.