accused presumption in Pennsylvania

1983See e.g., Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. 601 , 391 A.2d 1048 (1978); Commonwealth v. Roman, 465 Pa. 515 , 351 A.2d 214 (1976); Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177 , 292 A.2d 373 (1972); Commonwealth v. Wright, 259 Pa.Super. 293 , 393 A.2d 833 (1978).

1983See e.g., Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. 601 , 391 A.2d 1048 (1978); Commonwealth v. Roman, 465 Pa. 515 , 351 A.2d 214 (1976); Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177 , 292 A.2d 373 (1972); Commonwealth v. Wright, 259 Pa.Super. 293 , 393 A.2d 833 (1978).

1935It is “...... the right and duty of the trial judge, after the evidence of the Commonwealth has been fully produced, to determine as matter of law, whether the proof has been sufficient in volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus put the accused to a defense”: Com. v. Byers, 45 Pa. Superior Ct. 37, 39 .

1933“It is the duty of the trial Judge, • after thé evidence of the Commonwealth has been fully produced, to determine as a matter of law whether the proof has been sufficient in volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus put the accused to a defense: Com. v. Byers, supra;” Com. v. Bone, supra; Com. v. Exler, 61 Pa. Superior Ct. 423, 434 .

2021Id. at 87-91 .

2018Appellant contends that the Commonwealth denied him discovery and Brady material that effectively precluded him from raising his claims ____________________________________________ 3Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding government’s suppression of material evidence favorable to an accused is a violation of due process). - 10 - J-S38007-18 earlier.

1994Everest on Matterhorn, even if the District Attorney conscientiously believes the defendant to be as guilty as Cain, and no matter with what certainty the Judge views the culpability of the accused at the bar----” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 472 Pa. 485, 491 , 372 A.2d 794, 797 (1977), (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335, 338 , 147 A.2d 313, 315 (1958) and Commonwealth v. Conklin, 399 Pa. 512, 515 , 160 A.2d 566 (I960)).

1994Everest on Matterhorn, even if the District Attorney conscientiously believes the defendant to be as guilty as Cain, and no matter with what certainty the Judge views the culpability of the accused at the bar----” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 472 Pa. 485, 491 , 372 A.2d 794, 797 (1977), (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335, 338 , 147 A.2d 313, 315 (1958) and Commonwealth v. Conklin, 399 Pa. 512, 515 , 160 A.2d 566 (I960)).

1985In its well-known decision in Wong Sun v. United States, [ 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ], the Supreme Court of the United States restated the principle that the exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of evidence obtained from an accused in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments prohibits also the indirect use of such evidence.

1985In its well-known decision in Wong Sun v. United States, [ 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ], the Supreme Court of the United States restated the principle that the exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of evidence obtained from an accused in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments prohibits also the indirect use of such evidence.

1937It is the duty of the trial judge, after the evidence of the Commonwealth has been fully produced, to determine, as a matter of law, whether the proof has been sufficient in volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence and thus put the accused to a defense: Com. v. Bone, supra. Appellant also relies upon decisions of the Federal Courts, collected in Graceffo v. United States, 46 Fed. (2d) 852 and Donovan et al. v. United States, 54 Fed. (2) 193, as controlling in the present case.

1933“It is the duty of the trial Judge, • after thé evidence of the Commonwealth has been fully produced, to determine as a matter of law whether the proof has been sufficient in volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus put the accused to a defense: Com. v. Byers, supra;” Com. v. Bone, supra; Com. v. Exler, 61 Pa. Superior Ct. 423, 434 .

1933“It is the duty of the trial Judge, • after thé evidence of the Commonwealth has been fully produced, to determine as a matter of law whether the proof has been sufficient in volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus put the accused to a defense: Com. v. Byers, supra;” Com. v. Bone, supra; Com. v. Exler, 61 Pa. Superior Ct. 423, 434 .

1916It is the duty of the trial judge, after the evidence of the Commonwealth has been fully produced, to determine as a matter of law whether the proof has been sufficient in volume and quality to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus put the accused to a defense: Com. v. Byers, supra; Com. v. Exler, supra. It is not a question of the weight of the evidence but of its sufficiency.

2017In particular, the Commonwealth points to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), wherein the Court held that prosecutors must give notice to an accused of factors necessary for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence and that an accused has the right to have those factors determined by the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt; The Commonwealth argues that the information filed in this case reflects its effort to comply with constitutional requirements mandated in Alleyne .

2017In particular, the Commonwealth points to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), wherein the Court held that prosecutors must give notice to an accused of factors necessary for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence and that an accused has the right to have those factors determined by the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt; The Commonwealth argues that the information filed in this case reflects its effort to comply with constitutional requirements mandated in Alleyne .

2017The Commonwealth also directs our attention to Commonwealth v. Langley, 145 A.3d 757 (Pa. Super. 2016), in which this Court rejected a challenge to a charging document that alleged, in a single count, that the defendant committed a DUI-general impairment offense and thereafter included subparts stating that the defendant would be subject to the enhanced penalties found in 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3804(b)(2), 3804(c), and 3804(c.1).

2010The right of confrontation, in turn, provides the accused with an opportunity to respond to testimonial statements against him, and thus the “ultimate goal” of the Confrontation Clause is to permit the accused to test the reliability of a testimonial statement “in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. at 61 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2010The right of confrontation, in turn, provides the accused with an opportunity to respond to testimonial statements against him, and thus the “ultimate goal” of the Confrontation Clause is to permit the accused to test the reliability of a testimonial statement “in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. at 61 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2005Finally, we note that the corpus delicti may be proven through circumstantial evidence, Rivera, supra at 1104 , and that the criminal responsibility of the accused is not a requirement of the rule.

1994The court concluded that an intrusion may have occurred and applying the standard from Ripso, noted that there was a likelihood of prejudice to the defendant because “[wjhen the government has access to information discussed by the accused and defense counsel, the potential for devastation to the effective representation of the accused becomes quite real.” Id.

1989Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 309-310 , 513 A.2d 373, 378 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 962 , 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987).

1989Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 309-310 , 513 A.2d 373, 378 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 962 , 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987).

1989Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 309-310 , 513 A.2d 373, 378 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 962 , 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987).

1987Unfortunately, there have been decisions which purportedly applied the Washington standard that presumed preju dice where it was not evident from the record. 4 Commonwealth v. Bolden, 512 Pa. 468 , 517 A.2d 935 (1986) (Nix, C.J. and McDermott, J. dissenting); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 506 Pa. 571 , 487 A.2d 346 (1985).

1987Unfortunately, there have been decisions which purportedly applied the Washington standard that presumed preju dice where it was not evident from the record. 4 Commonwealth v. Bolden, 512 Pa. 468 , 517 A.2d 935 (1986) (Nix, C.J. and McDermott, J. dissenting); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 506 Pa. 571 , 487 A.2d 346 (1985).

1987Unfortunately, there have been decisions which purportedly applied the Washington standard that presumed preju dice where it was not evident from the record. 4 Commonwealth v. Bolden, 512 Pa. 468 , 517 A.2d 935 (1986) (Nix, C.J. and McDermott, J. dissenting); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 506 Pa. 571 , 487 A.2d 346 (1985).

1987Unfortunately, there have been decisions which purportedly applied the Washington standard that presumed preju dice where it was not evident from the record. 4 Commonwealth v. Bolden, 512 Pa. 468 , 517 A.2d 935 (1986) (Nix, C.J. and McDermott, J. dissenting); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 506 Pa. 571 , 487 A.2d 346 (1985).

1986Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 , 101 S.Ct. 703 , 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Commonwealth ex rel.

1986Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 , 101 S.Ct. 703 , 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Commonwealth ex rel.