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10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kolkman v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2003Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 31-32 , 300 P. 575, 584 (1931). 1992But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited." 89 Colo, at 31-32, 300 P. at 584 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Millergreen1 sentence2020As an affirmative defense, involuntary intoxication does not “simply challenge the existence of an element of the offense, but [it] seek[s] to justify or mitigate the entire crime, and [is] therefore [a] complete defense[].” People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005). ¶3 As is pertinent to our discussion, section 18-1-804(1), which we will shorten to “subsection (1)” for the rest of this opinion, does two other things. ¶4 First, subsection (1) states that a defendant may introduce evidence of voluntary, self-induced intoxication to “negative the existence” of specific intent. § 18-1-804( | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lowgreen2 sentences2006See People v. Loio, 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo.1987); People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo.1982). 2006See People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo.1987); People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Aragongreen2 sentences2006See People v. Loio, 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo.1987); People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo.1982). 2006See People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo.1987); People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vigilgreen2 sentences2006Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that “intoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge.” Id. at 267 . 2006Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that "intoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge." Id. at 267 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Heintzegreen2 sentences1983We observed in People v. Heintze, 200 Colo. 248 , ___, 614 P.2d 367, 371 (1980), that the purpose of Rule 5 is "to furnish a prophylaxis against abuses in the detention process and, more importantly, to place the accused in early contact with a judicial officer so that the right to counsel may not only be clearly explained but also be implemented upon the accused's request." We have consistently *1071 declined to adopt a per se rule of exclusion for Rule 5 violations, but instead have required the defendant to show that the delay was unnecessary and that some prejudice resulted therefrom. 1983We observed in People v. Heintze, 200 Colo. 248 , ___, 614 P.2d 367, 371 (1980), that the purpose of Rule 5 is "to furnish a prophylaxis against abuses in the detention process and, more importantly, to place the accused in early contact with a judicial officer so that the right to counsel may not only be clearly explained but also be implemented upon the accused's request." We have consistently *1071 declined to adopt a per se rule of exclusion for Rule 5 violations, but instead have required the defendant to show that the delay was unnecessary and that some prejudice resulted therefrom. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Harlan
green
2 sentences2020The opinion states that, after introducing intoxication evidence to counter the prosecution’s evidence that the defendant acted with specific intent, a defendant “nonetheless remains liable for a lesser included general intent offense . . . .” 8 P.3d at 471 . 2004Thus, § 18-1-804(1) “absolves a defendant of liability only for a specific intent offense when the evidence of intoxication negates the existence of the specific intent.” People v. Harlan, supra, 8 P.3d at 471 . | 2 | 2004–2020 |
Peo v. Stone
green
2 sentences2020SUMMARY Date, February 13, 2020 2020COA23 No. 15CA2076, Peo v Stone — Criminal Law — Provisions Applicable to Offenses Generally — Intoxication Section 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2019, states that “[i]ntoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge . . . .” This opinion of a division of the court of appeals addresses, for the first time in a published opinion in Colorado, the contention that this statutory subsection is unconstitutional because it bars the defendant from presenting evidence of voluntary intoxication to contest his guilt in a trial involving only general intent crimes 2020COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA23 Court of Appeals No. 15CA2076 Douglas County District Court No. 14CR154 Honorable Paul A. King, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan Cole Stone, Defendant-Appellant. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1992But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited." 89 Colo, at 31-32, 300 P. at 584 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 1992But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited." 89 Colo, at 31-32, 300 P. at 584 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. CALVAREST
green
2 sentences1984To support his argument the defendant cites People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975) (criminal statutes imposing different penalties for identical conduct irrationally discriminate against an accused in violation of equal protection), and People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981) (extreme indifference first-degree murder was held to be not constitutionally distinguishable from second-degree murder). 1984To support his argument the defendant cites People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975) (criminal statutes imposing different penalties for identical conduct irrationally discriminate against an accused in violation of equal protection), and People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981) (extreme indifference first-degree murder was held to be not constitutionally distinguishable from second-degree murder). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Marcy
red
1 sentence1984To support his argument the defendant cites People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975) (criminal statutes imposing different penalties for identical conduct irrationally discriminate against an accused in violation of equal protection), and People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981) (extreme indifference first-degree murder was held to be not constitutionally distinguishable from second-degree murder). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Spillers v. State
green
2 sentences1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State of Oregon v. Pirkey
green
2 sentences1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Shondel
green
2 sentences1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Chavez
green
2 sentences1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 1981E. g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79 , 419 P.2d 456 (1966); Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23 , 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343 , 453 P.2d 146 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Van Straaten v. People
green
2 sentences1968The defense of insanity stands upon the same footing. * * *” (Emphasis added.) In Van Straaten v. People, 26 Colo. 184 , 56 P. 905 , this court was concerned with a case in which the accused was charged with the crime of larceny and the court erroneously instructed in a manner to lead the jury to believe that “the guilt of the accused is a presumption which the law requires shall be made from the fact of his being found in possession * * This court reversed and in treating the instruction said: “* * * It is also erroneous in imposing upon plaintiffs in error the burden of satisfying the jury t 1968The defense of insanity stands upon the same footing. * * * (Emphasis added.) In Van Straaten v. People, 26 Colo. 184 , 56 P. 905 , this court was concerned with a case in which the accused was charged with the crime of larceny and the court erroneously instructed in a manner to lead the jury to believe that "the guilt of the accused is a presumption which the law requires shall be made from the fact of his being found in possession * * *." This court reversed and in treating the instruction said: "* * * It is also erroneous in imposing upon plaintiffs in error the burden of satisfying the jur | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Kring v. Missouri
red
2 sentences1931Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221 ; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 . 1931Kring v. Missouri , 107 U.S. 221 ; Thompson v. Utah. 170 U.S. 343 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Thompson v. Utah
red
2 sentences1931Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221 ; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 . 1931Kring v. Missouri , 107 U.S. 221 ; Thompson v. Utah. 170 U.S. 343 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.