accused immunity in California

2018Code, §§ 100, 26500.) Hy-Lond explained that though "in conducting the prosecution of violations of state law on behalf of the people, the district *746 attorney is acting as an agent of the state," it only acted as such an agent "within the territorial limits of the county for which he was elected." ( Hy-Lond , supra , 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 751 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 , citing Singh v. Superior Court , supra , 44 Cal.App. at p. 66 , 185 P. 985 .) Thus, it observed, "No one could reasonably contend that in return for a plea of guilty to an offense committed in one county, the district attorney of th

2018Code, §§ 100, 26500.) Hy-Lond explained that though "in conducting the prosecution of violations of state law on behalf of the people, the district *746 attorney is acting as an agent of the state," it only acted as such an agent "within the territorial limits of the county for which he was elected." ( Hy-Lond , supra , 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 751 , 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 , citing Singh v. Superior Court , supra , 44 Cal.App. at p. 66 , 185 P. 985 .) Thus, it observed, "No one could reasonably contend that in return for a plea of guilty to an offense committed in one county, the district attorney of th

2014(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 ; United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 675-676 ) (Bagley); see also People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 473 (Ochoa ).) Evidence is favorable to an accused if the defense could use it either to impeach the state’s witnesses or to exculpate the accused.

1992The loss of the bindle was not tantamount to suppression of evidence favorable to the accused in violation of the mandate of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , and its progeny. 4.

2001"Under the facts, we need not resolve the question of whether the presence of an accused at such a hearing `bears a "reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge" [Citation.]' [Citation.] Any error in the court's decision was harmless and remains so irrespective of defendant's absence from some portion of the proceedings." ( Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 653 , 280 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 809 P.2d 351 .) 5.

2001"Under the facts, we need not resolve the question of whether the presence of an accused at such a hearing `bears a "reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge" [Citation.]' [Citation.] Any error in the court's decision was harmless and remains so irrespective of defendant's absence from some portion of the proceedings." ( Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 653 , 280 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 809 P.2d 351 .) 5.

1984(People v. Ellis [1966] 65 Cal.2d 529 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 421 P.2d 393 ].) ‘In such a test,’ the court reasoned, ‘the speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are unimportant.’ ([Citation], italics added.) By contrast, the court observed, a lie detector test would be ‘essentially testimonial’ because it is ‘designed to probe the conscious knowledge of the accused.’ [Citation.] *83 “Shortly after this court’s decision in Ellis , the Supreme Cou

1984(People v. Ellis [1966] 65 Cal.2d 529 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 421 P.2d 393 ].) ‘In such a test,’ the court reasoned, ‘the speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are unimportant.’ ([Citation], italics added.) By contrast, the court observed, a lie detector test would be ‘essentially testimonial’ because it is ‘designed to probe the conscious knowledge of the accused.’ [Citation.] *83 “Shortly after this court’s decision in Ellis , the Supreme Cou

1984(People v. Ellis [1966] 65 Cal.2d 529 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 421 P.2d 393 ].) ‘In such a test,’ the court reasoned, ‘the speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are unimportant.’ ([Citation], italics added.) By contrast, the court observed, a lie detector test would be ‘essentially testimonial’ because it is ‘designed to probe the conscious knowledge of the accused.’ [Citation.] *83 “Shortly after this court’s decision in Ellis , the Supreme Cou

1980The court noted that the testimonial component of the privilege "reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses that are also communications...." (384 U.S. at pp. 763-764 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 916].) However, the procedure to extract the blood did not involve "even a shadow of testimonial compulsion ... or enforced communication...." ( Id., at p. 765 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 916].) The court noted that the accused's "participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone." ( Ibid

1984(People v. Ellis [1966] 65 Cal.2d 529 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 421 P.2d 393 ].) ‘In such a test,’ the court reasoned, ‘the speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are unimportant.’ ([Citation], italics added.) By contrast, the court observed, a lie detector test would be ‘essentially testimonial’ because it is ‘designed to probe the conscious knowledge of the accused.’ [Citation.] *83 “Shortly after this court’s decision in Ellis , the Supreme Cou

1984(People v. Ellis [1966] 65 Cal.2d 529 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 421 P.2d 393 ].) ‘In such a test,’ the court reasoned, ‘the speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are unimportant.’ ([Citation], italics added.) By contrast, the court observed, a lie detector test would be ‘essentially testimonial’ because it is ‘designed to probe the conscious knowledge of the accused.’ [Citation.] *83 “Shortly after this court’s decision in Ellis , the Supreme Cou

2023In People v. Zammora (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 166 , the trial court accused defense counsel of repeatedly making unfounded objections, sarcastically referred to someone using ventriloquism to make defense counsel’s statements for him, and accused defense counsel of sleeping (id. at p. 209). 23 In sum, whether viewed singly or collectively, the judge’s comments in this case do not mandate reversal.

2014(Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 676 ; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 473 .) Evidence is material “‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [Citation.]” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 .) “A ‘reasonable probability’ is one sufficient to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome.’ (United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [ 105 S.Ct. at p. 3381 ].)” (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 473 .) Thus, a “Brady violation occurs only when three conditions are met: ‘The evidence

2014(Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 676 ; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 473 .) Evidence is material “‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [Citation.]” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 .) “A ‘reasonable probability’ is one sufficient to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome.’ (United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [ 105 S.Ct. at p. 3381 ].)” (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 473 .) Thus, a “Brady violation occurs only when three conditions are met: ‘The evidence

2002(Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42 [ 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 ]; Colder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390 [1 L.Ed 648, 650].) Simply stated, “Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” (Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. 37, 43 [ 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719 ]; People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 791 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346 , 982 P.2d 211 ].) A change in the law that merely operates to the disadvantage of the defendant or constitutes a burden is not necessarily ex post facto.

1998We consider only the effect of the trial court's failure to inquire into the need for continued protection of the CI.'s identity as it relates to denial of the suppression motion. [3] Although defendant correctly points out that Waller did not involve exclusion of the accused from the hearing, United States v. Kiser (9th Cir. 1983) 716 F.2d 1268 (hereafter Kiser ) did.

1998There, the Ninth Circuit specifically approved use of an in camera proceeding, held outside the accused's presence, to determine whether the identity of an informant should be disclosed in order to permit the accused to mount a challenge pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 . ( Kiser, supra, 716 F.2d. at p. 1273 .) We therefore reject defendant's contention that an in camera proceeding is a per se violation of his constitutional protections. [4] Law enforcement is legally privileged to protect the identity of a person who has furnished information

1998There, the Ninth Circuit specifically approved use of an in camera proceeding, held outside the accused's presence, to determine whether the identity of an informant should be disclosed in order to permit the accused to mount a challenge pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 . ( Kiser, supra, 716 F.2d. at p. 1273 .) We therefore reject defendant's contention that an in camera proceeding is a per se violation of his constitutional protections. [4] Law enforcement is legally privileged to protect the identity of a person who has furnished information

1998There, the Ninth Circuit specifically approved use of an in camera proceeding, held outside the accused's presence, to determine whether the identity of an informant should be disclosed in order to permit the accused to mount a challenge pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 . ( Kiser, supra, 716 F.2d. at p. 1273 .) We therefore reject defendant's contention that an in camera proceeding is a per se violation of his constitutional protections. [4] Law enforcement is legally privileged to protect the identity of a person who has furnished information

1995In either event, absent an objection from the remaining defendants, their consent to the continuance will be implied. [14] (See fn. 10, ante. ) If an objection from a remaining defendant is forthcoming, the trial court, cognizant of the principles that a continuance granted at counsel's implied consent is valid absent "evidence showing incompetency of counsel [citation] or circumstances where counsel's request for a continuance is prompted only by the need to service other clients ... [citation]" ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 389 [ 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 , 802 P.2d 221 ]), should determ

1994Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel.” (Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 179-180 [88 L.Ed.2d at pp. 498-499], fns. omitted.) The high court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue came in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. 436, and this time the court rejected a Sixth Amendment chall

1994Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to the assistance of counsel." ( Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 179-180 [88 L.Ed.2d at pp. 498-499], fns. omitted.) The high court's most recent pronouncement on the issue came in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. 436 , and this time the court rejected a Sixth Amendment cha

1992Trombetta and Youngblood Assuming that the bindle in question was material, was its loss by law enforcement officials a violation of Von Villas’s rights to due process of law under California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 , and Arizona v. Young-blood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 [ 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ], In California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, 491 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 423-424 ], the high court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce the results o

1992Trombetta and Youngblood Assuming that the bindle in question was material, was its loss by law enforcement officials a violation of Von Villas’s rights to due process of law under California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 , and Arizona v. Young-blood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 [ 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ], In California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, 491 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 423-424 ], the high court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce the results o

1991Defense Counsel's "Conflict of Interest" During the in camera hearing, defendant's attorney indicated, "[T]his does not constitute a conflict because any attorney representing Mr. Cox would be privy to this information. [¶] In our investigation of the case there — we think that there is some possibility that there may be an escape attempt in this case." (12a) Defendant asserts the court should have pursued this revelation to assure he was represented by "conflict free" counsel or obtained his express waiver of such representation. (13) "Included in the right to effective assistance of counsel

1991Defense Counsel's "Conflict of Interest" During the in camera hearing, defendant's attorney indicated, "[T]his does not constitute a conflict because any attorney representing Mr. Cox would be privy to this information. [¶] In our investigation of the case there — we think that there is some possibility that there may be an escape attempt in this case." (12a) Defendant asserts the court should have pursued this revelation to assure he was represented by "conflict free" counsel or obtained his express waiver of such representation. (13) "Included in the right to effective assistance of counsel