accused error in Alabama

2000Gipson v. State, 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), aff'd, 375 So.2d 514 (Ala.1979). "[G]rants of immunity play a vital role in the performance of the duties of prosecuting attorneys, and without this method of obtaining valuable testimony prosecuting attorneys would be severely hampered in their efforts to gain convictions." Ex parte Graddick, 501 So.2d at 446.

1985In Gipson v. State, 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), this court noted that "district attorneys are utterly without authority and power to grant an accused immunity from arrest and prosecution for violating our criminal laws.

2000Gipson v. State, 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), aff'd, 375 So.2d 514 (Ala.1979). "[G]rants of immunity play a vital role in the performance of the duties of prosecuting attorneys, and without this method of obtaining valuable testimony prosecuting attorneys would be severely hampered in their efforts to gain convictions." Ex parte Graddick, 501 So.2d at 446.

1999Gipson v. State , 375 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), aff'd, 375 So.2d 514 (Ala. 1979). `[G]rants of immunity play a vital role in the performance of the duties of prosecuting attorneys, and without this method of obtaining valuable testimony prosecuting attorneys would be severely hampered in their efforts to gain convictions.' Ex parte Graddick , 501 So.2d at 446 .

2002However, this rule does not apply where the former testimony was given at a hearing where the accused was denied his right to the assistance of counsel, People v. Martin, 21 Mich.App. 667 , 176 N.W.2d 470 (1970), or where the former testimony was `impelled' in order to rebut evidence *252 introduced against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights.

2002However, this rule does not apply where the former testimony was given at a hearing where the accused was denied his right to the assistance of counsel, People v. Martin, 21 Mich.App. 667 , 176 N.W.2d 470 (1970), or where the former testimony was `impelled' in order to rebut evidence *252 introduced against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights.

2006Its only purpose is to obtain from the accused his answer or plea to the indictment— Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625 , 16 Sup.Ct. 952 , 40 L.Ed. 1097 [(1896)]; Early v. State, 1 Tex.App. 248 , 28 Am.

2006Its only purpose is to obtain from the accused his answer or plea to the indictment— Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625 , 16 Sup.Ct. 952 , 40 L.Ed. 1097 [(1896)]; Early v. State, 1 Tex.App. 248 , 28 Am.

2002Harrison, supra." 462 So.2d at 1008 .

1999Ashurst, 462 So.2d at 1008 . *822 Here, "the record ... clearly shows that [Whitehead] intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent. [He] voluntarily took the stand and testified [at his co-defendant's trial] under the guidance and supervision of his counsel and in the presence of and under the protection of the trial court." Ex parte Godbolt, 546 So.2d at 996 .

1990"A violation of the exclusionary ruling granting a motion in limine does not always or automatically result in ineradicable prejudice to the accused and error requiring a mistrial." Richardson v. State , 439 So.2d 756 , 757 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).

1983This is compatible with this Court's recent holding that "a violation of the exclusionary ruling granting a motion in limine does not always or automatically result in ineradicable prejudice to the accused and error requiring a mistrial." Richardson v. State , 439 So.2d 756 , 757 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).

1953In the case of Howard v. State, 165 Ala. 18 , 50 So. 954, 958 , it is said that, with us an arraignment “is nothing more than calling the accused to the bar of the court, and reading or explaining the indictment to him, and demanding his plea.

1953In the case of Howard v. State, 165 Ala. 18 , 50 So. 954, 958 , it is said that, with us an arraignment “is nothing more than calling the accused to the bar of the court, and reading or explaining the indictment to him, and demanding his plea.

2023App. 1997), this Court noted that "Alabama is one of a number of states that do not have a general statute authorizing prosecuting attorneys to grant immunity from prosecution." However, despite the lack of such a statute, "prosecuting attorneys and judges are not forbidden from granting an accused immunity from prosecution for criminal offenses," and "[n]onstatutory grants of immunity can be valid in Alabama if they follow the guidelines established in Ex parte Graddick, [ 501 So. 2d 444 (Ala. 1986)], i.e., the grant of immunity must be signed by the district attorney and approved by the tria

2013Where the error in the charge is in the form of the verdict and there is not prejudice to the rights of the accused the error is harmless.’ ” Edwards, 570 So.2d at 253 -54 (quoting Peterson v. State, 508 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.Crim.App.1974)).

2013Where the error in the charge is in the form of the verdict and there is not prejudice to the rights of the accused the error is harmless.’ ” Edwards, 570 So.2d at 253 -54 (quoting Peterson, supra).

2013In Bradford , the trial court entered judgment on the jury-verdict form reading “reckless endangerment,” instead of “reckless driving.” Bradford, supra. According to this logic, as well as the holding of Edwards , subsequent judgment on an imperfect verdict form that nonetheless clearly evidences the intent of the jury is acceptable; to hold otherwise would call into question the necessity of assessing “intent” in jury-verdict-discrepancy issues.

2008See also Rodgers v. State, 649 S.W.2d 371, 373-376 (Tex.App. 3 Dist.1983). “ ‘In the present case, the jury’s verdict was not responsive to the offense charged in the indictment and the jury’s intent is not clear; therefore, the language stating that the appellant was found guilty of the “possession of marijuana” cannot be held to be surplusage. “ ‘In State v. Whiting, 41 Ohio App.3d 107 , 534 N.E.2d 904 (1987), the defendant argued on appeal that the jury verdict was insufficient to sustain his sentence for a second or third degree felony.

2008See also Rodgers v. State, 649 S.W.2d 371, 373-376 (Tex.App. 3 Dist.1983). “ ‘In the present case, the jury’s verdict was not responsive to the offense charged in the indictment and the jury’s intent is not clear; therefore, the language stating that the appellant was found guilty of the “possession of marijuana” cannot be held to be surplusage. “ ‘In State v. Whiting, 41 Ohio App.3d 107 , 534 N.E.2d 904 (1987), the defendant argued on appeal that the jury verdict was insufficient to sustain his sentence for a second or third degree felony.

1999Only "where the former testimony was given at a hearing where the accused was denied his right to the assistance of counsel, People v. Martin, 21 Mich.App. 667 , 176 N.W.2d 470 (1970), or where the former testimony was `impelled' in order to rebut evidence introduced against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights, Harrison [v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968)]," is this general rule inapplicable.

1999Only "where the former testimony was given at a hearing where the accused was denied his right to the assistance of counsel, People v. Martin, 21 Mich.App. 667 , 176 N.W.2d 470 (1970), or where the former testimony was `impelled' in order to rebut evidence introduced against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights, Harrison [v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968)]," is this general rule inapplicable.

1999Ashurst, 462 So.2d at 1008 . *822 Here, "the record ... clearly shows that [Whitehead] intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent. [He] voluntarily took the stand and testified [at his co-defendant's trial] under the guidance and supervision of his counsel and in the presence of and under the protection of the trial court." Ex parte Godbolt, 546 So.2d at 996 .

1994In Neal v. State, 257 Ala. 496 , 59 So.2d 797 (1952), this Court reversed a judgment in a capital case in which the judge had gone into the jury room in response to a question from the jury and there had given further jury instructions without the defendant being present.

1994In Neal v. State, 257 Ala. 496 , 59 So.2d 797 (1952), this Court reversed a judgment in a capital case in which the judge had gone into the jury room in response to a question from the jury and there had given further jury instructions without the defendant being present.

1993"The accused may challenge the test results by competent evidence, such as, for example, that he had not consumed enough alcohol in the relevant time to reach the level indicated by the chemical test results." Davis, 8 Va.App. at 300 , 381 S.E.2d at 16 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 538 A.2d 1151 (D.C.App. 1988)).

1993"The accused may challenge the test results by competent evidence, such as, for example, that he had not consumed enough alcohol in the relevant time to reach the level indicated by the chemical test results." Davis, 8 Va.App. at 300 , 381 S.E.2d at 16 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 538 A.2d 1151 (D.C.App. 1988)).

1993"The accused may challenge the test results by competent evidence, such as, for example, that he had not consumed enough alcohol in the relevant time to reach the level indicated by the chemical test results." Davis, 8 Va.App. at 300 , 381 S.E.2d at 16 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 538 A.2d 1151 (D.C.App. 1988)).

1990See also Singleton v. Thigpen , 847 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 1019 , 109 S.Ct. 822 , 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989) (low intelligence of an accused is not a bar to admission of his statement); Smith v. State , 529 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (defendant's functional illiteracy goes to weight and credibility of confession, not its admissibility); Cliff v. State , 518 So.2d 786 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denied (Ala. 1988) (defendant's low mentality goes to weight and credibility, not admissibility, of confession); Whittle v. State , 518 So.2d 793 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denie

1990See also Singleton v. Thigpen , 847 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 1019 , 109 S.Ct. 822 , 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989) (low intelligence of an accused is not a bar to admission of his statement); Smith v. State , 529 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (defendant's functional illiteracy goes to weight and credibility of confession, not its admissibility); Cliff v. State , 518 So.2d 786 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denied (Ala. 1988) (defendant's low mentality goes to weight and credibility, not admissibility, of confession); Whittle v. State , 518 So.2d 793 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denie

1990See also Singleton v. Thigpen , 847 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 1019 , 109 S.Ct. 822 , 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989) (low intelligence of an accused is not a bar to admission of his statement); Smith v. State , 529 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (defendant's functional illiteracy goes to weight and credibility of confession, not its admissibility); Cliff v. State , 518 So.2d 786 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denied (Ala. 1988) (defendant's low mentality goes to weight and credibility, not admissibility, of confession); Whittle v. State , 518 So.2d 793 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denie

1990See also Singleton v. Thigpen , 847 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 1019 , 109 S.Ct. 822 , 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989) (low intelligence of an accused is not a bar to admission of his statement); Smith v. State , 529 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (defendant's functional illiteracy goes to weight and credibility of confession, not its admissibility); Cliff v. State , 518 So.2d 786 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denied (Ala. 1988) (defendant's low mentality goes to weight and credibility, not admissibility, of confession); Whittle v. State , 518 So.2d 793 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), cert. denie

1990"This Court has held that a trial judge is allowed the exercise of broad discretion in deciding whether the high degree of necessity required for a mistrial is present." Ex parte McCall , 541 So.2d 1075 , 1076 (Ala. 1989).

1988While federal courts in cases decided when an accused had a privilege to preclude his spouse from testifying have stated that an opportunity should be afforded for the spousal privilege to be claimed in the absence of a jury, Melton v. United States , 398 F.2d 321 , 322 (10th Cir. 1968); Tallo v. United States , 344 F.2d 467 , 469 (1st Cir. 1965); San Fratello v. United States , 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1965), and this apparently is the Massachusetts rule, Commonwealth v. Labbe , 373 N.E.2d at 232; Commonwealth v. Stokes , 374 Mass. 583 , 374 N.E.2d 87 , 96 n. 9, we do not see that this procedur