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33 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spector v. Stategreen2 sentences1983But a bill of particulars may itself solve the double jeopardy problem because "should a second prosecution for the same offense be attempted, the accused could bar a retrial by producing the record of the case.” State v. Morton, supra, 295 Md. at 494, 456 A.2d at 913 ; Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 424 , 425 A.2d 197, 205 , cert. den. 452 U.S. 906 (1981). 1983But a bill of particulars may itself solve the double jeopardy problem because "should a second prosecution for the same offense be attempted, the accused could bar a retrial by producing the record of the case.” State v. Morton, supra, 295 Md. at 494, 456 A.2d at 913 ; Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 424 , 425 A.2d 197, 205 , cert. den. 452 U.S. 906 (1981). | 1 | 2 |
Calhoun v. Bailargreen2 sentences1983See, e.g., Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 424 , 425 A.2d 197, 205 (1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981). 1983But a bill of particulars may itself solve the double jeopardy problem because "should a second prosecution for the same offense be attempted, the accused could bar a retrial by producing the record of the case.” State v. Morton, supra, 295 Md. at 494, 456 A.2d at 913 ; Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 424 , 425 A.2d 197, 205 , cert. den. 452 U.S. 906 (1981). | 1 | 2 |
Street v. Stategreen1 sentence2026Generally, “any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars [the accused’s] right to assert self-defense [or defense of others] as a justification or excuse for a homicide.” Street v. State, 26 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Peaks v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See also Peaks v. State , 419 Md. at 251, 18 A.3d 917 ("The duty of the trial court may be triggered upon motion of the accused or defense counsel , or upon sua sponte action of the court." (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted).). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Pedro Angel Gomezgreen1 sentence2004Id. at 1539. | 1 | 1 |
Witherspoon v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, [391 *208 U.S. 510, 519 n. 15, 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 1775 n. 15, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) ] (“One of the most important functions any jury can perform ... is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system....). 2002See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, [391 *208 U.S. 510, 519 n. 15, 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 1775 n. 15, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) ] (“One of the most important functions any jury can perform ... is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system....). | 1 | 1 |
Tejeda v. Stategreen2 sentences2000EVID. 504(2) merely protects an accused's spouse from being called as a witness for the State."); Tejeda v. State, 905 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.1995, pet. ref'd) ("The spouse of an accused has a privilege not to be called as a witness for the State...."). 2000EVID. 504(2) merely protects an accused’s spouse from being called as a witness for the State.”); Tejeda v. State, 905 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.1995, pet.refd) (“The spouse of an accused has a privilege not to be called as a witness for the State.... ”). | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, i 2000The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, i | 1 | 1 |
McKnight v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, i 2000The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, i | 1 | 1 |
Cross v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, i 2000The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, i | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences1983And on the issue of notice, the Court of Appeals has recognized that a bill of particulars may remove an objection to an indictment based on uncertainty; State v. Morton, supra; Thomas v. State, 173 Md. 676, 688 , 197 A. 296, 301-302 (1938). 1983And on the issue of notice, the Court of Appeals has recognized that a bill of particulars may remove an objection to an indictment based on uncertainty; State v. Morton, supra; Thomas v. State, 173 Md. 676, 688 , 197 A. 296, 301-302 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Tateogreen2 sentences1979See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); see also Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. 1979See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); see also Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Tabbs v. Stategreen2 sentences1979See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); see also Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. 1979See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); see also Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Bruce v. Stategreen2 sentences1975Anderson 1957): “While there is no fixed rule applicable to every case with reference to what constitutes one an aggressor so as to preclude his right to self-defense, it may be stated generally that any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars his right to assert self-defense as a justification or excuse for a homicide. . . .” In Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 96-97 , 145 A. 2d 428, 433 (1958), the following instruction was approved: “.. . in order to justify or excuse the killing of another on the gro 1975Anderson 1957): “While there is no fixed rule applicable to every case with reference to what constitutes one an aggressor so as to preclude his right to self-defense, it may be stated generally that any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars his right to assert self-defense as a justification or excuse for a homicide. . . .” In Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 96-97 , 145 A. 2d 428, 433 (1958), the following instruction was approved: “.. . in order to justify or excuse the killing of another on the gro | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1975In Smith v. State, 209 Tenn. 499, 503 , 354 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1961) the defendant, while engaged in the perpetration of a robbery of a liquor store, shot and killed the proprietor who attempted to shoot him. 1975In Smith v. State, 209 Tenn. 499, 503 , 354 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1961) the defendant, while engaged in the perpetration of a robbery of a liquor store, shot and killed the proprietor who attempted to shoot him. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millettgreen1 sentence1975Anderson 1957): “While there is no fixed rule applicable to every case with reference to what constitutes one an aggressor so as to preclude his right to self-defense, it may be stated generally that any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars his right to assert self-defense as a justification or excuse for a homicide. . . .” In Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 96-97 , 145 A. 2d 428, 433 (1958), the following instruction was approved: “.. . in order to justify or excuse the killing of another on the gro | 1 | 1 |
| Parker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. New Jerseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rouse v. State
green
2 sentences1979Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481 . 1970We think the holdings in Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310 , that the acquittal of a particular crime does not bar a subsequent prosecution for a conspiracy to commit the crime, and in Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481 , that *674 a prior conviction of a particular crime does not entitle the accused to the defense of res judicata in a subsequent prosecution for conspiracy, even though the same evidence was introduced as part of the proof of the conspiracy, still prevail. | 3 | 1969–1979 |
Hill v. State
green
2 sentences2019Hill v. State, 35 Md. 2019Hill v. State , 35 Md. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Montgomery County Department of Health & Human Services v. P.F.
green
2 sentences2016Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. P.F., 137 Md.App. 243 , *324 272, 768 A.2d 112 (2001). 9 The statute “addresses the inherent questions of trustworthiness raised by such a young child’s out of court statement and balances the need to protect child victims from the trauma of court proceedings with the fundamental right of the accused to test the reliability of evidence proffered against him or her.” Id. 2016Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. P.F., 137 Md.App. 243 , *324 272, 768 A.2d 112 (2001). 9 The statute “addresses the inherent questions of trustworthiness raised by such a young child’s out of court statement and balances the need to protect child victims from the trauma of court proceedings with the fundamental right of the accused to test the reliability of evidence proffered against him or her.” Id. | 2 | 2012–2016 |
Roberts v. State
green
2 sentences2014Roberts, 361 Md. at 364 , 761 A.2d at 895 . 2014Roberts, 361 Md. at 364 , 761 A.2d at 895 . | 2 | 2011–2014 |
Brady v. State
green
2 sentences1986The suppression or withholding by the State of material evidence exculpatory to an accused is a violation of due process.” 226 Md. at 427 , 174 A.2d at 169 . 1986The suppression or withholding by the State of material evidence exculpatory to an accused is a violation of due process.” 226 Md. at 427 , 174 A.2d at 169 . | 2 | 1966–1986 |
Turpin v. State
green
2 sentences1972It is obvious, however, as was pointed out in Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462 (1881), that *366 the privilege of challenging peremptorily is a right to reject a-juror without the necessity of first showing cause and not a right to select a juror.” See also Johnson v. State, 9 Md. 1962It is obvious, however, as was pointed out in Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462 (1881), that the privilege of challenging peremptorily is a right to reject a juror without the necessity of first showing cause and not a right to select a juror. | 2 | 1962–1972 |
Gaetano v. United States
green
2 sentences1999The State refers us to Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C.1979), for the proposition that “a bona fide claim must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Gaetano, 406 A.2d at 1293 . 1999The State refers us to Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C.1979), for the proposition that “a bona fide claim must have some reasonable basis before an accused can claim that such a belief exonerates his behavior.” Gaetano, 406 A.2d at 1293 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Maine v. Moulton
green
2 sentences1992In that regard, the Court continued, at 180, 106 S.Ct. at 489 ; “To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel____ On the other hand, to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public’s interest in the investigation of cr 1992Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel.” (Emphasis added.) In an important footnote to that last sentence, the Court added, “[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Griffin v. California
green
2 sentences1989“Because of the divergent opinions in this sensitive area and as the giving of even a cautionary instruction favorable to defendant may violate the spirit of Griffin v. State of California [ 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) ], supra, we believe it is advisable for us to take a definitive position on this issue. 1989“Because of the divergent opinions in this sensitive area and as the giving of even a cautionary instruction favorable to defendant may violate the spirit of Griffin v. State of California [ 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) ], supra, we believe it is advisable for us to take a definitive position on this issue. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Pressley v. State
green
2 sentences1986(It is not plain error even for the court to fail entirely to instruct the jury as to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the presumption of innocence in the absence of a request on the part of the accused for an instruction.) In any event, when the written instructions to the jury are considered in context with the remainder of the instructions presented orally, as they must be, Pressley v. State, 295 Md. 143, 152 , 454 A.2d 347 (1983); Teves v. State, 33 Md.App. 195, 198 , 364 A.2d 593 (1976), cert. denied, 279 Md. 685 (1977), it is pellucid that they properly conformed to con 1986(It is not plain error even for the court to fail entirely to instruct the jury as to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the presumption of innocence in the absence of a request on the part of the accused for an instruction.) In any event, when the written instructions to the jury are considered in context with the remainder of the instructions presented orally, as they must be, Pressley v. State, 295 Md. 143, 152 , 454 A.2d 347 (1983); Teves v. State, 33 Md.App. 195, 198 , 364 A.2d 593 (1976), cert. denied, 279 Md. 685 (1977), it is pellucid that they properly conformed to con | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Teves v. State
neutral
2 sentences1986(It is not plain error even for the court to fail entirely to instruct the jury as to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the presumption of innocence in the absence of a request on the part of the accused for an instruction.) In any event, when the written instructions to the jury are considered in context with the remainder of the instructions presented orally, as they must be, Pressley v. State, 295 Md. 143, 152 , 454 A.2d 347 (1983); Teves v. State, 33 Md.App. 195, 198 , 364 A.2d 593 (1976), cert. denied, 279 Md. 685 (1977), it is pellucid that they properly conformed to con 1986(It is not plain error even for the court to fail entirely to instruct the jury as to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the presumption of innocence in the absence of a request on the part of the accused for an instruction.) In any event, when the written instructions to the jury are considered in context with the remainder of the instructions presented orally, as they must be, Pressley v. State, 295 Md. 143, 152 , 454 A.2d 347 (1983); Teves v. State, 33 Md.App. 195, 198 , 364 A.2d 593 (1976), cert. denied, 279 Md. 685 (1977), it is pellucid that they properly conformed to con | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Chadderton v. State
green
1 sentence1983But a bill of particulars may itself solve the double jeopardy problem because "should a second prosecution for the same offense be attempted, the accused could bar a retrial by producing the record of the case.” State v. Morton, supra, 295 Md. at 494, 456 A.2d at 913 ; Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 424 , 425 A.2d 197, 205 , cert. den. 452 U.S. 906 (1981). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1980We are involved in this case with the proper application of the non-constitutional per se exclusionary rule enunciated in Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314 , 384 A.2d 709 (1978), concerning a statement taken from an accused in violation of M.D.R. 723 a. 1 We shall hold that statements made by appellant Burandous Kennedy subsequent to his appearance before a judicial officer are not the "tainted fruit of a poisonous tree” and hence are admissible in evidence against him notwithstanding the delay in initially bringing him before such a judicial officer. 1980We are involved in this case with the proper application of the non-constitutional per se exclusionary rule enunciated in Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314 , 384 A.2d 709 (1978), concerning a statement taken from an accused in violation of M.D.R. 723 a. 1 We shall hold that statements made by appellant Burandous Kennedy subsequent to his appearance before a judicial officer are not the "tainted fruit of a poisonous tree” and hence are admissible in evidence against him notwithstanding the delay in initially bringing him before such a judicial officer. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Tanner v. State
neutral
1 sentence1973In Tanner v. State, 9 Md. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Scarlett v. State green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Kucharczyk v. State green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Tucker v. United States green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Schowgurow v. State green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Strosnider v. Warden green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Cook v. State neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.