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24 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1894–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences1966See Jones v. State, 155 Fla. 558 , 20 So.2d 901 .” See also Sneed v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 653 . 1966See Jones v. State, 155 Fla. 558 , 20 So.2d 901 .” See also Sneed v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 653 . | 2 | 2 |
Wolf v. Stategreen2 sentences1938Wolf v. State, 72 Fla. 572 , 73 So. 1936Wolf v. State, 72 Fla. 572 , 73 So. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Espertigreen2 sentences1983State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Lowery v. State, 402 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). 1981State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). | 1 | 3 |
Kittleson v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Similarly, “[w]here an indictment or information entirely fails to charge a criminal offense[,] the accused may test the sufficiency thereof in habeas corpus proceedings.” Kittleson v. State, 9 So. 2d 807, 807 (Fla. 1942). | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that lesser included offenses fall into two categories, necessary and permissive: necessarily included lesser offenses are those offenses in which the statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always subsumed within those of the charged offense, while a permissive lesser included offense exists when the two offenses appear to be separate but the facts alleged in the pleadings are such that the lesser offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the greater offense has been); see also State v. Baker, 456 So.2d 419, 422 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bakergreen1 sentence2017See Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that lesser included offenses fall into two categories, necessary and permissive: necessarily included lesser offenses are those offenses in which the statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always subsumed within those of the charged offense, while a permissive lesser included offense exists when the two offenses appear to be separate but the facts alleged in the pleadings are such that the lesser offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the greater offense has been); see also State v. Baker, 456 So.2d 419, 422 | 1 | 1 |
Glendening v. Stategreen1 sentence1989See also Glendening v. State, 503 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (ex post facto violation where law retroactively deprives the accused of a defense which was available when the offense was committed). | 1 | 1 |
Meeks v. Stategreen1 sentence1987See section 90.404(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that evidence of a pertinent character trait of a "victim" offered by the accused is an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. [5] In fact, our earlier opinion in this very case ordered the evidentiary hearing now on review and observed that the 3.850 motion prepared for Floyd Williams by Attorney Cary had sufficient specific allegations, as required by Meeks v. State, 382 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1980), "indicating that facts could (and should) have been discovered via pretrial preparation in regard to impeachment of the tw | 1 | 1 |
Sneed v. Mayogreen1 sentence1966See Jones v. State, 155 Fla. 558 , 20 So.2d 901 .” See also Sneed v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 653 . | 1 | 1 |
Skipper v. Schumachergreen2 sentences1942See Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384 , 169 So. 58 ; State ex rel. v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892 ; 180 So. 357 ; Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253 , 200 So. 856 ; Sec. 140 Florida Criminal Procedure- Act. 1942See Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384 , 169 So. 58 ; State ex rel. v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892 ; 180 So. 357 ; Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253 , 200 So. 856 ; Sec. 140 Florida Criminal Procedure- Act. | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Stategreen1 sentence1921See Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74 , 51 South. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duke
green
2 sentences1983State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Lowery v. State, 402 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). 1981State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
Dobbert v. Florida
green
2 sentences1987Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977). 1987Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Robinson v. State
green
1 sentence1987Recently, in Robinson v. State, 487 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1986), we were faced with a situation similar to the one sub judice. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1985Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Lowery v. State
green
1 sentence1983State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Lowery v. State, 402 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1981There was, however, an obvious alternative, and the Court found it in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). 1981There was, however, an obvious alternative, and the Court found it in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence1981We held that the State had gone too far in the introduction of testimony about a later crime committed by the accused so that the inquiry transcended the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried, and we stated: This may not be done for the very good reason that in a criminal prosecution such procedure devolves from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant whose character is insulated from attack unless he introduces the subject. 117 So.2d at 475-76 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence1981Thereafter, in Wilson v. State, 330 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1976), we held that the introduction of six hundred pages of trial transcript pointing to separate crimes committed by the defendant was not reversible error because this evidence was relevant to establish a pattern of conduct similar to the conduct for which defendant was being prosecuted. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1969The deputy had gotten as far as advising the defendant of his right to have a lawyer present, that he did not have to make any statement at all, and that any statement he did make must be free and voluntary, when the defendant said, “I know my rights.” The officer attempted to continue advising the defendant of his further, right to have an attorney appointed if he was indigent when the defendant interrupted and stated, “I did it.” The defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting his statements into evidence under the United States Supreme Court opinion prohibiting custodial inte 1969The deputy had gotten as far as advising the defendant of his right to have a lawyer present, that he did not have to make any statement at all, and that any statement he did make must be free and voluntary, when the defendant said, “I know my rights.” The officer attempted to continue advising the defendant of his further, right to have an attorney appointed if he was indigent when the defendant interrupted and stated, “I did it.” The defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting his statements into evidence under the United States Supreme Court opinion prohibiting custodial inte | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State Ex Rel. Florida Bar v. Grant
green
1 sentence1966Florida Bar v. Grant, Fla., 85 So.2d 232 , and In Re The Integration Rule Of The Florida Bar, supra. By his question III, which asked if the proceedings were handled with dispatch with due regard for the protection of the accused and the bar, respondent pointed to the lapse of nearly five years from the date of the filing of the judgment by the circuit court dismissing the suit (count I) to the date of the filing of the judgment of the board of governors, and to the lapse of over three years from the date of the filing of his client’s affidavit before the circuit court grievance committee to t | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State Ex Rel. Williams v. Coleman
green
2 sentences1942See Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384 , 169 So. 58 ; State ex rel. v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892 ; 180 So. 357 ; Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253 , 200 So. 856 ; Sec. 140 Florida Criminal Procedure- Act. 1942See Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384 , 169 So. 58 ; State ex rel. v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892 ; 180 So. 357 ; Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253 , 200 So. 856 ; Sec. 140 Florida Criminal Procedure- Act. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Jones v. Cook
green
2 sentences1942See Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384 , 169 So. 58 ; State ex rel. v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892 ; 180 So. 357 ; Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253 , 200 So. 856 ; Sec. 140 Florida Criminal Procedure- Act. 1942See Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384 , 169 So. 58 ; State ex rel. v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892 ; 180 So. 357 ; Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253 , 200 So. 856 ; Sec. 140 Florida Criminal Procedure- Act. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Ingram v. Prescott
green
2 sentences1938In Ingraham v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320 , 149 So. 369 , we held. 1938In Ingraham v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320 , 149 So. 369 , we held. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Miller v. State
green
1 sentence1894State, 15 Fla., 577 , decided in 1876, it was held that the sworn statement made by the accused of his defense iñ a criminal prosecution was for the jury alone, and to be taken by them into consideration in connection with all the evidence of the case, and to be allowed such weight and such only as they in their judgment may see fit to give it. | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.