17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Theisgreen2 sentences2016A district court may accept an Alford plea “if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in 6 support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2016A district court may accept an Alford plea “if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 3 | 8 |
State v. Goulettegreen2 sentences2015We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn.1977), holding that: “[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the, defendant does not admit gui 2015We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn.1977), holding that: “[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the, defendant does not admit gui | 2 | 7 |
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2014See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 37–38, 91 S. Ct. 160 , 167−68 (1970) (holding constitutional court’s acceptance of defendant’s guilty plea, even though defendant maintained his innocence, where state demonstrated strong factual basis for plea and defendant clearly expressed his desire to enter plea based on overwhelming evidence against him); see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (permitting the acceptance of Alford pleas “if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reaso 2014See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 37–38, 91 S. Ct. 160 , 167−68 (1970) (holding constitutional court’s acceptance of defendant’s guilty plea, even though defendant maintained his innocence, where state demonstrated strong factual basis for plea and defendant clearly expressed his desire to enter plea based on overwhelming evidence against him); see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (permitting the acceptance of Alford pleas “if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reaso | 1 | 2 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2015A conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same penalties and collateral consequences as a conventional guilty plea. 5 LaFave et al., supra, § 21.4(f), at 848-49; see, e.g., Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (admitting a conviction obtained via an Alford plea as evidence of a prior felony conviction under the federal felon-in-possession statute); Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir.1993) (concluding that a conviction for tax evasion based on an Alford plea collaterally estopped the defendant from denying tax liability); People v. Miller, 91 N 2015We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977), holding that: “[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the defendant does not admit gui | 1 | 1 |
Armenakes v. Stategreen2 sentences2015A conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same penalties and collateral consequences as a conventional guilty plea. 5 LaFave et al., supra, § 21.4(f), at 848-49; see, e.g., Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (admitting a conviction obtained via an Alford plea as evidence of a prior felony conviction under the federal felon-in-possession statute); Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir.1993) (concluding that a conviction for tax evasion based on an Alford plea collaterally estopped the defendant from denying tax liability); People v. Miller, 91 N 2015We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977), holding that: “[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the defendant does not admit gui | 1 | 1 |
Nelson M. Blohm and Joann M. Blohm v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuegreen2 sentences2015A conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same penalties and collateral consequences as a conventional guilty plea. 5 LaFave et al., supra, § 21.4(f), at 848-49; see, e.g., Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (admitting a conviction obtained via an Alford plea as evidence of a prior felony conviction under the federal felon-in-possession statute); Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir.1993) (concluding that a conviction for tax evasion based on an Alford plea collaterally estopped the defendant from denying tax liability); People v. Miller, 91 N 2015We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977), holding that: “[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the defendant does not admit gui | 1 | 1 |
Andrew Burrell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015A conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same penalties and collateral consequences as a conventional guilty plea. 5 LaFave et al., supra, § 21.4(f), at 848-49; see, e.g., Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (admitting a conviction obtained via an Alford plea as evidence of a prior felony conviction under the federal felon-in-possession statute); Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir.1993) (concluding that a conviction for tax evasion based on an Alford plea collaterally estopped the defendant from denying tax liability); People v. Miller, 91 N 2015We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977), holding that: “[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.” Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the defendant does not admit gui | 1 | 1 |
Ake v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2012See id. at 82 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 15 The United States Constitution and our adversarial process protect the right of an accused to challenge evidence presented by the government. 2012See id. at 82 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 15 The United States Constitution and our adversarial process protect the right of an accused to challenge evidence presented by the government. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Welfare of M.D.S.green1 sentence1985Matter of Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 731-2 (Minn.1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pointer v. Texas
green
2 sentences2012Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). 2012Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Gaulke v. State
green
2 sentences1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun 1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Boyce
green
2 sentences1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun 1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun | 1 | 1975–1975 |
The People v. Walston
green
2 sentences1968People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39 , 230 N.E.2d 233 . 1968People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39 , 230 N.E.2d 233 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Juster Bros. Inc. v. Christgau
green
1 sentence1944Inc. v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108 , 7 N. W. [2d] 501.) Those of the second type have met a varying fate, some Avithstanding and others succumbing to attacks on diverse grounds, vis., that the statute violated the due process clauses of state and federal constitutions; denied equal protection of the laws; impaired the right of trial by jury; deprived the accused of the presumption of innocence; compelled him to give testimony against himself; or encroached upon the powers of the judiciary. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
State v. Barrett.
green
2 sentences1944Upon the proof of an act which the law nowhere forbids or censures, and which is, in and of itself, without meaning, it takes from the accused the presumption of innocence, and calls upon him for his defence; his defence, not to the thing proved, but to the thing not proved, the thing the government has failed to prove, to wit, a sale.” To which should be added the words of another dissenter, Mr. Justice Brown: “* * * the Legislature cannot by its arbitrary will give to a perfectly lawful and innocent act an unlawful and criminal effect, or draw from acts warranted by law, and which everyone m 1944Upon the proof of an act which the law nowhere forbids or censures, and which is, in and of itself, without meaning, it takes from the accused the presumption of innocence, and calls upon him for his defence; his defence, not to the thing proved, but to the thing not proved, the thing the government has failed to prove, to wit, a sale.” To which should be added the words of another dissenter, Mr. Justice Brown: “* * * the Legislature cannot by its arbitrary will give to a perfectly lawful and innocent act an unlawful and criminal effect, or draw from acts warranted by law, and which everyone m | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.