accused defense in Indiana

1978The rule relied upon was stated by this Court in its simplest form in the case of Dunn v. State, (1904) 162 Ind. 174 , 70 N.E. 521 : . “[T]he law will not permit the State to depart from the issue, and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses or misconduct that have no natural connection with the pending charge, and which are calculated to prejudice the accused in his defense.” 162 Ind. at 182 , 70 N.E. at 523 .

1978The rule relied upon was stated by this Court in its simplest form in the case of Dunn v. State, (1904) 162 Ind. 174 , 70 N.E. 521 : . “[T]he law will not permit the State to depart from the issue, and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses or misconduct that have no natural connection with the pending charge, and which are calculated to prejudice the accused in his defense.” 162 Ind. at 182 , 70 N.E. at 523 .

2010In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record[.] The statement on which the State relies as "opening the door," Konopasek's acknowledgement he was on probation, left no such "false or misleading impression of the facts related," nor was it "a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal ree-ord." Id.

2006In Hawkins, we noted "an accused may challenge the qualifications of the officer to determine the nature of the detected odor." 766 N.E.2d at 752 .

2004Rejecting a claim of ex post facto, the Court stated: is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited." 269 U.S. at 170 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 , 70 L.Ed. at 218 .

2004Rejecting a claim of ex post facto, the Court stated: is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited." 269 U.S. at 170 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 , 70 L.Ed. at 218 .

1988Edwards, 479 N.E.2d at 547 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1984Smith v. State, 176 Ind.App. at 39 , 373 N.E.2d at 1113 .

1984Smith v. State, 176 Ind.App. at 39 , 373 N.E.2d at 1113 .

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In Randolph v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 31 , 378 N.E.2d 828 , the accused falsely denied that he had ever been arrested, and the State was permitted to cross-examine him about an arrest for an unrelated offense.

1978In Randolph v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 31 , 378 N.E.2d 828 , the accused falsely denied that he had ever been arrested, and the State was permitted to cross-examine him about an arrest for an unrelated offense.

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978In most of these cases the accused or a defense witness has made a deceptively incomplete disclosure of his criminal record; Baker v. State, supra; Martin v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 492 , 306 N.E.2d 93 (“conflicts with the law”); Roby v. State (1977) 173 Ind.App. 280 , 363 N.E.2d 1039 (“past skirmishes with the law”); McDonald v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 667 , 325 N.E.2d 862 (“appellants refer to their status as parolees — State allowed to show convictions”); Hannah v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 317 , 311 N.E.2d 838 (“past record”).

1978More recently in applying this general rule in Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 , we again recognized that the rule does not render evidence otherwise competent and relevant and which tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue inadmissbile, even though it may show guilt of another crime.

1978More recently in applying this general rule in Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 , we again recognized that the rule does not render evidence otherwise competent and relevant and which tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue inadmissbile, even though it may show guilt of another crime.

1977Watford v. State, (1957) 237 Ind. 10 , 143 N.E.2d 405 .

1977Watford v. State, (1957) 237 Ind. 10 , 143 N.E.2d 405 .

1959Rochin v. People of California (1952), 342 U. S. 165 , 72 S. Ct. 205 , 96 L.

1959Rochin v. People of California (1952), 342 U. S. 165 , 72 S. Ct. 205 , 96 L.

1916In holding the admission of this evidence erroneous it was said: “It is a rule as old as the law itself, subject to numerous exceptions * * * that substantive evidence in both civil and criminal cases must be confined to the facts embraced within the issues joined and that no such evidence is competent that does not form a link in -the chain of proof which naturally and reasonably tends to establish some material fact in the case as made between the parties. * * * And the law will not permit the State to depart from the issue and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses or misconduct th

1916In holding the admission of this evidence erroneous it was said: “It is a rule as old as the law itself, subject to numerous exceptions * * * that substantive evidence in both civil and criminal cases must be confined to the facts embraced within the issues joined and that no such evidence is competent that does not form a link in -the chain of proof which naturally and reasonably tends to establish some material fact in the case as made between the parties. * * * And the law will not permit the State to depart from the issue and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses or misconduct th

1916This was hearsay in its nature and incompetent in addition to the fact that any statement made by a eoeonspirator after the consummation of the conspiracy was not binding on appellant; besides, as was said by this court in Porter v. State (1909), 173 Ind. 694, 703 , 91 N. E. 340 , citing Dunn v. State (1903), 162 Ind. 174 , 70 N. E. 521 : “ ‘The law will not permit the State to depart from the issue, and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses of misconduct that have no natural .connection with- the pending charge, and which are calculated to prejudice the accused in his defense.’ ” (C

1916This was hearsay in its nature and incompetent in addition to the fact that any statement made by a eoeonspirator after the consummation of the conspiracy was not binding on appellant; besides, as was said by this court in Porter v. State (1909), 173 Ind. 694, 703 , 91 N. E. 340 , citing Dunn v. State (1903), 162 Ind. 174 , 70 N. E. 521 : “ ‘The law will not permit the State to depart from the issue, and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses of misconduct that have no natural .connection with- the pending charge, and which are calculated to prejudice the accused in his defense.’ ” (C

1916Rock v. State (1915), ante 51, 110 N. E. 212 , and cases cited.

1904Bonsall v. State, 35 Ind. 460 ; McIntire v. State, 10 Ind. 26 ; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 456 , 14 N. E. 319 , 1 Am.

1904Bonsall v. State, 35 Ind. 460 ; McIntire v. State, 10 Ind. 26 ; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 456 , 14 N. E. 319 , 1 Am.

1904Bonsall v. State, 35 Ind. 460 ; McIntire v. State, 10 Ind. 26 ; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 456 , 14 N. E. 319 , 1 Am.

1904Bonsall v. State, 35 Ind. 460 ; McIntire v. State, 10 Ind. 26 ; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 456 , 14 N. E. 319 , 1 Am.

1881In Blanton v. The State, 5 Blackf. 560 , it was held that the keeper of a billiard table, though he did not play on it himself for money, nor suffer others to do so, yet, if, for a stipulated compensation per game, he allowed any persons to use it, he was liable under a statute which provided, among other things, that the keeper or exhibitor of a billiard table, for the purpose of winning or gaining money, or any other article or pi’operty of value, either directly or indirectly, should be fined, etc. Mount v. The State, 7 Ind. 654 , was a prosecution against the accused for a violation of sec

1881In Blanton v. The State, 5 Blackf. 560 , it was held that the keeper of a billiard table, though he did not play on it himself for money, nor suffer others to do so, yet, if, for a stipulated compensation per game, he allowed any persons to use it, he was liable under a statute which provided, among other things, that the keeper or exhibitor of a billiard table, for the purpose of winning or gaining money, or any other article or pi’operty of value, either directly or indirectly, should be fined, etc. Mount v. The State, 7 Ind. 654 , was a prosecution against the accused for a violation of sec