accused error in Texas

2024This standard requires proof of no more than “some harm to the accused from the error.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 .

2024Reversal is required if the error is “‘calculated to injure the rights of the defendant,’ which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 .

1999See to Rule 81(b)(2); Haynie v. State, 751 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (error “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant” must be no more than “some harm to the accused from the error” to warrant reversal); Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (“the presence of any harm, regardless of degree ... is sufficient to require a reversal”)(modifying Almanza); Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 731-32 .

1999See to Rule 81(b)(2); Haynie v. State, 751 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (error "calculated to injure the rights of the defendant" must be no more than "some harm to the accused from the error" to warrant reversal); Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) ("the presence of any harm, regardless of degree ... is sufficient to require a reversal")(modifying Almanza ); Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 731-32.

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2005Substantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product “of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its ■ maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (statement is involuntary “only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained

2005Additionally, to the extent appellant is making a federal constitutional claim, [s]ubstantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product “of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (statement is involuntary “only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained ther

2022If the “error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the error is ‘calculated to injure the rights of defendant,’ which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.” Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim.

2021If there is error and the defendant preserved the alleged error, then we must reverse “if there was some harm to the accused from the error.” Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim.

2025“The accused may challenge the State’s power to restrain him at all, i.e., the existence of probable cause, (2) the manner of his restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions attached to bail, and (3) certain issues that would bar prosecution or conviction.” Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 297 (citing Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim.

2025“The accused may challenge the State’s power to restrain him at all, i.e., the existence of probable cause, (2) the manner of his restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions attached to bail, and (3) certain issues that would bar prosecution or conviction.” Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 297 (citing Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim.

2016Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2016Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2017However, when the charging error is not preserved “and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’—in short ‘egregious harm.’” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim.

2015However, when the charging error is not preserved “and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’ — in short ‘egregious harm.’” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (egregious harm “is a difficult standard to meet and requires a showing that the defendants, were deprived of a fair and impartial trial.”).

2010“Substantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product ‘of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.’” State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2010"Substantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product 'of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.'" State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2004Ford , 1 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Purkett , 514 U.S. at 769-70 ).

2004See Ford , 1 S.W.3d at 694 ("All appellant has proven on appeal is that the reason given was incorrect; this is not equal to proving that the reason given was a pretext for a racially motivated strike."); see also Gibson , 117 S.W.3d at 578 .

2000The accused must claim “fundamental” error, and he will obtain a reversal only if the error is egregious and creates such harm that he has been deprived of “a fair and impartial trial — in short ‘egregious harm.’” Almanza 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see also Bailey v. State, 867 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).

1999The accused must claim "fundamental" error, and he will obtain a reversal only if the error is egregious and creates such harm that he has been deprived of "a fair and impartial trial--in short 'egregious harm.'" Almanza 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see also Bailey v. State , 867 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex. Crim.

2005Additionally, to the extent appellant is making a federal constitutional claim, [s]ubstantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product “of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (statement is involuntary “only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained ther

2005Additionally, to the extent appellant is making a federal constitutional claim, [s]ubstantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product “of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (statement is involuntary “only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained ther

2004Harm Because Hernandez objected to the erroneous portion of the jury charge, we will reverse the conviction if the error was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, “which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.” Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 803 (Tex. Crim.

2004Harm Because Hernandez objected to the erroneous portion of the jury charge, we will reverse the conviction if the error was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, "which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error." Brown v. State , 122 S.W.3d 794, 803 (Tex. Crim.

2018Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 294 ; see Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d at 537 .

2013Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 294 ; see Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim.

2002If the defendant timely objects to error in the charge, reversal is required if the error is “‘calculated to injure the rights of defendant,’ which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.” Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 786 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)).

2002On the other hand, if no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was “fundamental,” he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he “has not had a fair and impartial trial” — in short “egregious harm.” Id.

2016Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2016Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217 , 222–23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2023Was there “egregious harm?” Even if we assumed the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction under Article 38.22 or 38.23, we would still have to examine whether Rose suffered “egregious harm.” See Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 182 (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ) (“[I]f no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that 17 the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’-- in short ‘egregious harm.’”).

2010Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169, 170 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) ("If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the errar is calculated to injure the rights of defendant, which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582, 585-86 (Tex.Crim.App.199I) (discussing the harm analysis of Almanza as it applies to a trial court's failure to give a defensive instruction that was raised by the evidence).

2012App. 1985) ("If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the error is calculated to injure the rights of defendant, which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller v. State , 815 S.W.2d 582, 585-86 (Tex. Crim.

2000For example, the State brings to our attention McLean v. State, 787 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi, 1990, pet ref'd), which recognized “an accused may challenge the constitutionality of a statute on appeal without having raised an objection at trial.” Id., citing Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

1993See id.; citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); cf. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

2013Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).

2010Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 .

2015Torres v. State, 4 S.W 3d 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816 , citing McIntire v. State, 698 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim.

1995In the face of a motion for new trial which alleges facts outside the record, a trial court which denies an accused a hearing “abdicates its fact finding function and denies the accused a meaningful appellate review.” McIntire v. State, 698 S.W.2d at 660 .

2007See Rakas v. Ill. , 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Villarreal , 935 S.W.2d at 138 .

2003See Rakas v. Ill. , 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Villarreal , 935 S.W.2d at 138 .

1999See to Rule 81(b)(2); Haynie v. State, 751 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (error “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant” must be no more than “some harm to the accused from the error” to warrant reversal); Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (“the presence of any harm, regardless of degree ... is sufficient to require a reversal”)(modifying Almanza); Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 731-32 .

1999See to Rule 81(b)(2); Haynie v. State, 751 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (error "calculated to injure the rights of the defendant" must be no more than "some harm to the accused from the error" to warrant reversal); Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) ("the presence of any harm, regardless of degree ... is sufficient to require a reversal")(modifying Almanza ); Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 731-32.

2023See San Fratello v. United States, 343 F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1965) (op. on reh’g) (explaining that “courts have always frowned on the practice of compelling a spouse of an accused to claim testimonial privilege in the presence of the jury” and that “any genuine doubt about the availability of such testimony to the prosecution can always be settled by a preliminary interrogation of the witness under oath in the absence of the jury”). 14 “This court has the power to correct and reform the judgment of the court below to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and informat

1991San Fratello v. United States, 343 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.1965) (“Courts have always frowned on the practice of compelling a spouse of an accused to claim testimonial privilege in the presence of the jury.... any genuine doubt about the availability of such testimony to the prosecution can always be settled by a preliminary interrogation of the witness [spouse] under oath in the absence of the jury.”); Melton v. United States, 398 F.2d 321, 322 (10th Cir.1968) (“The prosecution should not call a witness in the presence of the jury when it knows and concedes that the witness will invoke a valid mari

2021See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 75 .

2019Those procedural 14 safeguards include advising the accused of the warnings spelled out in Miranda. 384 U.S. at 444 , 467–73; see Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 75 .