accused defense in Illinois

1977Defendant relies heavily upon People v. Jameson (1944), 387 Ill. 367 , 56 N.E.2d 790 , where the supreme court recognized that a trial court had discretion in deciding whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty but stated: ° ° this discretion will not ordinarily be disturbed unless 000 the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by the jury and the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury. [Citation.]” 387 Ill. 367, 374-75 , 56 N.E.2d 790, 793-94 .

1977Defendant relies heavily upon People v. Jameson (1944), 387 Ill. 367 , 56 N.E.2d 790 , where the supreme court recognized that a trial court had discretion in deciding whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty but stated: ° ° this discretion will not ordinarily be disturbed unless 000 the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by the jury and the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury. [Citation.]” 387 Ill. 367, 374-75 , 56 N.E.2d 790, 793-94 .

1976(People v. Ritcheson (1947), 396 Ill. 146 , 71 N.E.2d 30 .) We find no such prejudice in the instant case relating to defendant’s counsel.

1976(People v. Ritcheson (1947), 396 Ill. 146 , 71 N.E.2d 30 .) We find no such prejudice in the instant case relating to defendant’s counsel.

2023A defendant is allowed to withdraw a guilty plea and plead not guilty if 7 “ ‘it appears that the plea *** was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State’s Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury *** .’ ” People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991) (quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531-32

2023People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32 .

1975(People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39 , 230 N.E.2d 233 .) A motion to grant the withdrawal of a guilty plea should be allowed where it appeared that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or the law, or in consequence of a misrepresentation by counsel or the State’s attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury.

1975(People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39 , 230 N.E.2d 233 .) A motion to grant the withdrawal of a guilty plea should be allowed where it appeared that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or the law, or in consequence of a misrepresentation by counsel or the State’s attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury.

1954People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148 ; People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367 ; People v. Adams, 379 Ill. 323 .” The motion by defendants for leave to withdraw their pleas of guilty and enter pleas of not guilty should have been allowed.

1952(People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148 ; People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367 ; People v. Adams, 379 Ill. 323 .) In the application of the foregoing rule we have held that the least influence or surprise causing a defendant to plead guilty, when he has any defense at all, should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not guilty.

2020“To vacate a plea based on a misapprehension of law or fact, the defendant must establish that her mistaken beliefs or impressions were reasonably justified under all the circumstances when those circumstances are judged by an objective standard rather than by the defendant’s own -9- subjective impression.” People v. Christensen, 197 Ill.

2019“To vacate a plea based on a misapprehension of law or fact, the defendant must establish that her mistaken beliefs or impressions were reasonably justified under all the circumstances when those circumstances are judged by an objective standard rather than by the defendant’s own subjective impression.” People v. Christensen, 197 Ill.

2015Announcing the agreement in open court will deter or at least expose any prosecutive timidity, overreaching or other impropriety, as well as deter future unfounded claims by a defendant that an agreement entered into was not honored." Id. ¶ 28 Further, as the supreme court in Davis observed: “ ‘Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State's Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a d

2015Announcing the agreement in open court will deter or at least expose any prosecutive timidity, overreaching or other impropriety, as well as deter future unfounded claims by a defendant that an agreement entered into was not honored.” Id. ¶ 28 Further, as the supreme court in Davis observed: “ ‘Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State’s Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a d

2010The latter, on the other hand, involves distinguishing offenses in order to protect against multiple prosecutions for the same crime.” Baker, 456 So. 2d at 422 .

2010The latter, on the other hand, involves distinguishing offenses in order to protect against multiple prosecutions for the same crime.” Baker, 456 So. 2d at 422 .

2005To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah. *** Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violate

2005To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah. *** Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violate

1993Whether to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn is within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Hillenbrand (1988), 121 Ill.2d 537, 545 , 118 Ill.Dec. 423 , 521 N.E.2d 900 .) Such discretion should be exercised liberally, particularly in capital cases, in favor of life and liberty. ( People v. King (1953), 1 Ill.2d 496, 500 , 116 N.E.2d 623 .) When it appears that the guilty plea was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused or where the accused

1993Whether to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn is within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Hillenbrand (1988), 121 Ill.2d 537, 545 , 118 Ill.Dec. 423 , 521 N.E.2d 900 .) Such discretion should be exercised liberally, particularly in capital cases, in favor of life and liberty. ( People v. King (1953), 1 Ill.2d 496, 500 , 116 N.E.2d 623 .) When it appears that the guilty plea was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused or where the accused

1990Dec. 489, 495 , 428 N.E.2d 1169, 1175 ; People v. Tarbill (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 286, 287 , 5 Ill.Dec. 650, 651 , 361 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 .) "Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State's Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court should permit the wi

1990Dec. 489, 495 , 428 N.E.2d 1169, 1175 ; People v. Tarbill (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 286, 287 , 5 Ill.Dec. 650, 651 , 361 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 .) "Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State's Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court should permit the wi

1981(People v. Coleman (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 466, 469 , 259 N.E.2d 269, 271 .) Where, however, the record shows that at trial the movant’s attorney appeared thoroughly prepared and conducted his representation with diligence and skill the courts have been reluctant to find such prejudice.

1981(People v. Coleman (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 466, 469 , 259 N.E.2d 269, 271 .) Where, however, the record shows that at trial the movant’s attorney appeared thoroughly prepared and conducted his representation with diligence and skill the courts have been reluctant to find such prejudice.

1980(People v. Clark, 9 Ill. 2d 46 .) Before it can be said that such motion has been improperly denied, it must appear that the refusal to grand additional time has in some manner embarrassed the accused in his defense and thereby prejudiced his rights. [Citations.]” (People v. Wilson (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 82, 92 , 193 N.E.2d 449 .) It is clear that, in the instant case, the defendant was not prejudiced at trial by the court’s denial of the requested continuance.

1963(People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 46 .) Before it can be said that such a motion has been improperly denied, it must appear that the refusal to grant additional time has in some manner embarrassed the accused in his defense and thereby prejudiced his rights.

1979On this point, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Beazell v. Ohio stated: “[I]t is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” ( 269 U.S. 167,170 , 70 L.

1979On this point, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Beazell v. Ohio stated: “[I]t is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.” ( 269 U.S. 167,170 , 70 L.

1973(People v. Hairston, 46 Ill.2d 348 ; People v. Kuczynski, 33 Ill.2d 412 .) This court has held that a motion for a substitution of judges constitutes a delay occasioned by the accused which will interrupt the running of the statutory period.

1970(People v. Kuczynski, 33 Ill.2d 412 ; People v. Rankins, 18 Ill.2d 260 ; People v. Hartman, 408 Ill. 133 ; People v. Stillman, 391 Ill. 227 ; Dougherty v. People, 124 Ill. 557 .) It is axiomatic that where a statute has been judicially construed and the construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court’s exposition of the legislative intent.

1970(People v. Solomon, 24 Ill.2d 586 ; People v. Ritcheson, 396 Ill. 146 .)” People v. Wilson, 29 Ill.2d 82, 92 , cert. denied, 377 U.S. 955 , 12 L.

1963(People v. Solomon, 24 Ill.2d 586 ; People v. Ritcheson, 396 Ill. 146 .) Where a motion for a continuance assigns no proper ground, the denial of the motion is not error and cannot be said to have coerced a plea of guilty.

1970Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel, or the State’s Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court should permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and allow the accused to plead not guilty. . . . “ ‘The mere fact, on the other hand, that an accused knowi

1967Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State’s Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court should permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and allow the accused to plead not guilty. *■ * * The mere fact, on the other hand, that an accused knowing

1954People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148 ; People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367 ; People v. Adams, 379 Ill. 323 .” The motion by defendants for leave to withdraw their pleas of guilty and enter pleas of not guilty should have been allowed.

1952(People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148 ; People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367 ; People v. Adams, 379 Ill. 323 .) In the application of the foregoing rule we have held that the least influence or surprise causing a defendant to plead guilty, when he has any defense at all, should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not guilty.