8 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1967–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yates v. Stategreen2 sentences2020"Any expression of opinion on the guilt of an accused is a violation of prosecutorial ethics." Yates v. State, 103 Nev. 200, 203 , 734 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1987). 2020"Any expression of opinion on the guilt of an accused is a violation of prosecutorial ethics." Yates v. State, 103 Nev. 200, 203 , 734 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1987). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jay Kerrgreen1 sentence2020"The prosecution may not vouch for a witness; such vouching occurs when the prosecution places 'the prestige of the government behind the witness by providing 'personal assurances of [the] witness's veracity."' Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 359 , 91 P.3d 39, 48 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Browning v. Stategreen2 sentences2020"The prosecution may not vouch for a witness; such vouching occurs when the prosecution places 'the prestige of the government behind the witness by providing 'personal assurances of [the] witness's veracity."' Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 359 , 91 P.3d 39, 48 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2020"The prosecution may not vouch for a witness; such vouching occurs when the prosecution places 'the prestige of the government behind the witness by providing 'personal assurances of [the] witness's veracity."' Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 359 , 91 P.3d 39, 48 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Pate v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden 2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Stategreen1 sentence2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927-28 , 803 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1990) (holding that a prosecutorial statement that a defense witness is a liar is not a proper argument); Witherow v. State, 104 Nev. 721, 724 , 765 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1988) (stating that it is improper argument to characterize a witness as a liar). 2002See Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927-28 , 803 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1990) (holding that a prosecutorial statement that a defense witness is a liar is not a proper argument); Witherow v. State, 104 Nev. 721, 724 , 765 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1988) (stating that it is improper argument to characterize a witness as a liar). | 1 | 1 |
Lisle v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 540, 553 , 937 P.2d 473, 481 (1997) (vouching for the credibility of a witness is impermissible because it invades the jury’s function of assessing credibility); Yates v. State, 103 Nev. 200, 203 , 734 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1987) (“Any expression of opinion on the guilt of an accused is a violation of prosecutorial ethics.”). 2002See Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 540, 553 , 937 P.2d 473, 481 (1997) (vouching for the credibility of a witness is impermissible because it invades the jury’s function of assessing credibility); Yates v. State, 103 Nev. 200, 203 , 734 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1987) (“Any expression of opinion on the guilt of an accused is a violation of prosecutorial ethics.”). | 1 | 1 |
Witherow v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927-28 , 803 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1990) (holding that a prosecutorial statement that a defense witness is a liar is not a proper argument); Witherow v. State, 104 Nev. 721, 724 , 765 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1988) (stating that it is improper argument to characterize a witness as a liar). 2002See Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927-28 , 803 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1990) (holding that a prosecutorial statement that a defense witness is a liar is not a proper argument); Witherow v. State, 104 Nev. 721, 724 , 765 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1988) (stating that it is improper argument to characterize a witness as a liar). | 1 | 1 |
Tomarchio v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See Tomarchio v. State, 99 Nev. 572 , 665 P.2d 804 (1983). 1995See Tomarchio v. State, 99 Nev. 572 , 665 P.2d 804 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Harold W. Greenwell v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1967Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Melchor-Gloria v. State
green
2 sentences2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden 2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Morales v. State
green
2 sentences2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden 2008We further conclude that Fergusen’s argument under EDCR 1.48 is without merit because Department 5 was not acting as a criminal division master in making competency determinations. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 116 Nev. 19 , 992 P.2d 252 (2000). 99 Nev. 174 , 660 P.2d 109 (1983). 116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986), and Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev at 180, 660 P.2d at 113 ); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (holding that the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing as to the competency of the accused to stand trial in a case in which the eviden | 1 | 2008–2008 |
McGuire v. State
green
2 sentences1987McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153 , 677 P.2d 1060 (1984); see ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8(b) (2nd ed. 1982) 2 ; see also ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(c)(4) (1980). 3 *204 The reason that such expressions cannot be tolerated has been expressed recently by the United States Supreme Court: The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known 1987McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153 , 677 P.2d 1060 (1984); see ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8(b) (2nd ed. 1982) 2 ; see also ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(c)(4) (1980). 3 *204 The reason that such expressions cannot be tolerated has been expressed recently by the United States Supreme Court: The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
1 sentence1971Here there was a primary duty upon the municipal court to apprise the accused of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination which is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963)), and the right to confront one’s accusers (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)), and to require an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made before accepting it (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1968)). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
1 sentence1971Here there was a primary duty upon the municipal court to apprise the accused of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination which is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963)), and the right to confront one’s accusers (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)), and to require an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made before accepting it (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1968)). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Pointer v. Texas
green
1 sentence1971Here there was a primary duty upon the municipal court to apprise the accused of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination which is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963)), and the right to confront one’s accusers (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)), and to require an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made before accepting it (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1968)). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Brown v. Justice's Court of Carson Township
green
2 sentences1969In Brown v. Justice Court, 83 Nev. 272 , 428 P.2d 376 (1967), this court held that the right of an arrested person to be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay following his arrest is statutory in nature and does not per se import any direct federal constitutional guaranty, and that one of the primary reasons for a speedy arraignment by a judicial officer is to inform the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination; his right to a speedy trial; his right to due process of law and to assure that he is not left to languish in jail. 1969In Brown v. Justice Court, 83 Nev. 272 , 428 P.2d 376 (1967), this court held that the right of an arrested person to be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay following his arrest is statutory in nature and does not per se import any direct federal constitutional guaranty, and that one of the primary reasons for a speedy arraignment by a judicial officer is to inform the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination; his right to a speedy trial; his right to due process of law and to assure that he is not left to languish in jail. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.