66 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016Our Supreme Court has held that “[e]qual access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 513 ( 630 SE2d 377 ) (2006). 2016Our Supreme Court has held that “[e]qual access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 513 ( 630 SE2d 377 ) (2006). | 4 | 5 |
Dunbar v. Stategreen2 sentences2016This appeal by the State follows.1 At the outset, we note that an accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by filing a general or special demurrer.2 A general demurrer, as the trial court granted here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”3 But an indictment shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct to withstand a general demurrer if “it states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so 1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) (“An appeal may be taken by and on 2016This appeal by the State follows.1 At the outset, we note that an accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by filing a general or special demurrer.2 A general demurrer, as the trial court granted here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”3 But an indictment shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct to withstand a general demurrer if “it states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so 1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) (“An appeal may be taken by and on | 3 | 3 |
Wiggins v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Because no presumption arose in Walden that the owner/driver had exclusive possession of the cocaine, there was no basis for jury instructions on “equal access” which “is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” Johnson, 280 Ga. at 513 (citation and punctuation omitted); Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 ( 574 SE2d 896 ) (2002). 2013Because no presumption arose in Walden that the owner/driver had exclusive possession of the cocaine, there was no basis for jury instructions on “equal access” which “is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” Johnson, 280 Ga. at 513 (citation and punctuation omitted); Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 ( 574 SE2d 896 ) (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Stinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012A special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment, such as an allegation that a felony murder indictment is insufficient because it does not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault.2 This type of demurrer seeks specificity with regard to the predicate felony, and it must be filed within 10 days after the arraignment, unless the 2 See Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (2) ( 611 SE2d 52 ) (2005). 2 trial court extends the time for filing.3 A general demurrer, on the other hand, challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the 2012A special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment, such as an allegation that a felony murder indictment is insufficient because it does not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault.2 This type of demurrer seeks specificity with regard to the predicate felony, and it must be filed within 10 days after the arraignment, unless the 2 See Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (2) ( 611 SE2d 52 ) (2005). 2 trial court extends the time for filing.3 A general demurrer, on the other hand, challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the | 2 | 2 |
Palmer v. Stategreen2 sentences2012A special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment, such as an allegation that a felony murder indictment is insufficient because it does not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault.2 This type of demurrer seeks specificity with regard to the predicate felony, and it must be filed within 10 days after the arraignment, unless the 2 See Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (2) ( 611 SE2d 52 ) (2005). 2 trial court extends the time for filing.3 A general demurrer, on the other hand, challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the 2012A special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment, such as an allegation that a felony murder indictment is insufficient because it does not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault.2 This type of demurrer seeks specificity with regard to the predicate felony, and it must be filed within 10 days after the arraignment, unless the 2 See Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (2) ( 611 SE2d 52 ) (2005). 2 trial court extends the time for filing.3 A general demurrer, on the other hand, challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the | 2 | 2 |
Motes v. Stategreen2 sentences2012A special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment, such as an allegation that a felony murder indictment is insufficient because it does not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault.2 This type of demurrer seeks specificity with regard to the predicate felony, and it must be filed within 10 days after the arraignment, unless the 2 See Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (2) ( 611 SE2d 52 ) (2005). 2 trial court extends the time for filing.3 A general demurrer, on the other hand, challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the 2012A special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment, such as an allegation that a felony murder indictment is insufficient because it does not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault.2 This type of demurrer seeks specificity with regard to the predicate felony, and it must be filed within 10 days after the arraignment, unless the 2 See Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (2) ( 611 SE2d 52 ) (2005). 2 trial court extends the time for filing.3 A general demurrer, on the other hand, challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the | 2 | 2 |
Lance v. Stategreen2 sentences2007“Equal access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” Lance v. State, 191 Ga. App. 701, 703 (2) ( 382 SE2d 726 ) (1989). 2007“Equal access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” Lance v. State, 191 Ga. App. 701, 703 (2) ( 382 SE2d 726 ) (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Since the presumption thus did not arise, the jury was not instructed on any presumption of possession. “[A] charge on equal access is appropriate to counter a jury instruction on presumption of possession, and is not necessary otherwise.” Id. at 513 ; see also Thompson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 74, 77 (3) ( 506 SE2d 201 ) (1998) (“Equal access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows. 2007Since the presumption thus did not arise, the jury was not instructed on any presumption of possession. “[A] charge on equal access is appropriate to counter a jury instruction on presumption of possession, and is not necessary otherwise.” Id. at 513 ; see also Thompson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 74, 77 (3) ( 506 SE2d 201 ) (1998) (“Equal access is merely a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows. | 2 | 2 |
Nation v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Johnson, P. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. 1 Jackson also pled guilty to theft by taking, but does not appeal that conviction. 2 Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga. App. 198 (1) ( 582 SE2d 173 ) (2003). 3 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Nunnally, supra. 5 Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 452, 453 (2) ( 576 SE2d 911 ) (2003). 6 Id. 7 276 Ga. 736, 738 (2) ( 585 SE2d 616 ) (2003). 8 See Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 166 (5) ( 539 SE2d 851 ) (2000). 9 269 Ga. 317, 320 (2) ( 496 SE2d 896 ) (1998). 10 Id. 11 Supra. 12 Leone was incarcerated on February 18, 2000, and was 2002“It is simply a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Nation v. State, 252 Ga. App. at 624 (5). | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See also Jackson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 842, 845 ( 456 SE2d 229 ) (1995) (the equal access rule is simply a defense to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows). 1999See also Jackson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 842, 845 ( 456 SE2d 229 ) (1995) (the equal access rule is simply a defense to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows). | 2 | 2 |
Croker v. Smithgreen2 sentences1972See Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529 (1) ( 169 SE2d 787 ); Cash v. Smith, 226 Ga. 318 (3) ( 175 SE2d 10 ).” Hatton v. Smith, 228 Ga. 378 (3) ( 185 SE2d 388 ). 2. 1972See Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529 (1) ( 169 SE2d 787 ); Cash v. Smith, 226 Ga. 318 (3) ( 175 SE2d 10 ).” Hatton v. Smith, 228 Ga. 378 (3) ( 185 SE2d 388 ). 2. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Corhengreen2 sentences2016This appeal by the State follows.1 At the outset, we note that an accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by filing a general or special demurrer.2 A general demurrer, as the trial court granted here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”3 But an indictment shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct to withstand a general demurrer if “it states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so 1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) (“An appeal may be taken by and on 2016This appeal by the State follows.1 At the outset, we note that an accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by filing a general or special demurrer.2 A general demurrer, as the trial court granted here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”3 But an indictment shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct to withstand a general demurrer if “it states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so 1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) (“An appeal may be taken by and on | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2007(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. 2005Johnson, P. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. 1 Jackson also pled guilty to theft by taking, but does not appeal that conviction. 2 Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga. App. 198 (1) ( 582 SE2d 173 ) (2003). 3 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Nunnally, supra. 5 Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 452, 453 (2) ( 576 SE2d 911 ) (2003). 6 Id. 7 276 Ga. 736, 738 (2) ( 585 SE2d 616 ) (2003). 8 See Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 166 (5) ( 539 SE2d 851 ) (2000). 9 269 Ga. 317, 320 (2) ( 496 SE2d 896 ) (1998). 10 Id. 11 Supra. 12 Leone was incarcerated on February 18, 2000, and was | 1 | 2 |
Castillo v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817 (2) ( 305 SE2d 629 ) (1983). 1989Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817 (2) ( 305 SE2d 629 ) (1983). | 1 | 2 |
Early v. Stategreen2 sentences1914See Early v. State, 14 Ga. App. 467 ( 81 S. E. 385 ), and cases cited; Everett v. State, 15 Ga. App. 390 ( 83 S. E. 428 ) ; Cartledge v. State, 15 Ga. App. 396 ( 83 S. E. 430 ). 'The definition of the word “doubt,” given in the foregoing extract from the chárge of the court is practically the identical definition given by the trial judge in the case of Everett v. State, supra, and approved by this court; and in fact somewhat similar definitions have been given by trial judges from time immemorial in this State. 1914See Early v. State, 14 Ga. App. 467 ( 81 S. E. 385 ), and cases cited; Everett v. State, 15 Ga. App. 390 ( 83 S. E. 428 ) ; Cartledge v. State, 15 Ga. App. 396 ( 83 S. E. 430 ). 'The definition of the word “doubt,” given in the foregoing extract from the chárge of the court is practically the identical definition given by the trial judge in the case of Everett v. State, supra, and approved by this court; and in fact somewhat similar definitions have been given by trial judges from time immemorial in this State. | 1 | 2 |
The State v. Harlachergreen2 sentences2021Cf. Leonard, 275 Ga. App. at 669 (“Because evidence supported its determination that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial in [defendant’s] first trial.” (emphasis supplied)). 21 An accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by “filing a general or special demurrer.”34 Indeed, a general demurrer, which Marshall sought here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”35 Nevertheless, an indictment shall be “deeme 2021Cf. Leonard, 275 Ga. App. at 669 (“Because evidence supported its determination that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial in [defendant’s] first trial.” (emphasis supplied)). 21 An accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by “filing a general or special demurrer.”34 Indeed, a general demurrer, which Marshall sought here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”35 Nevertheless, an indictment shall be “deeme | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Cf. Leonard, 275 Ga. App. at 669 (“Because evidence supported its determination that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial in [defendant’s] first trial.” (emphasis supplied)). 21 An accused may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment by “filing a general or special demurrer.”34 Indeed, a general demurrer, which Marshall sought here, “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.”35 Nevertheless, an indictment shall be “deeme | 1 | 1 |
Bradeen v. Stategreen1 sentence2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Stategreen2 sentences2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that 2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that 2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that | 1 | 1 |
King v. the Stategreen2 sentences2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that 2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that | 1 | 1 |
Carlson v. Carlsongreen2 sentences2016See Carlson v. Carlson, 324 Ga. App. 214, 216-217 (1) ( 748 SE2d 304 ) (2013). 2016See Carlson v. Carlson, 324 Ga. App. 214, 216-217 (1) ( 748 SE2d 304 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 50, 52 (2) ( 718 SE2d 1 ) (2011). 2016See Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 50, 52 (2) ( 718 SE2d 1 ) (2011). | 1 | 1 |
| McLean v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bitting v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Eubanksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ramirez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daugherty v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sedlak v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farmer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yeomans v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woodard v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baugh v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sterling v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Akins v. State
green
2 sentences1995Because (in the case sub judice) the State did not show the indicia giving rise to the presumption, that is, ownership or exclusive control of the vehicle, no presumption arose and therefore there was no triggering of the equal access defense." (Cit.)' Akins v. State, 184 Ga.App. 441 (1) ( 361 SE2d 707 ) (1987)." Bowen v. State, 203 Ga.App. 371 (1), 417 S.E.2d 18 (1992). 1995Because (in the case sub judice) the State did not show the indicia giving rise to the presumption, that is, ownership or exclusive control of the vehicle, no presumption arose and therefore there was no triggering of the equal access defense." (Cit.)' Akins v. State, 184 Ga.App. 441 (1) ( 361 SE2d 707 ) (1987)." Bowen v. State, 203 Ga.App. 371 (1), 417 S.E.2d 18 (1992). | 4 | 1989–1995 |
Patterson v. State
green
2 sentences2017Indeed, in Patterson , although we held that one accused of possessing marijuana may be constitutionally entitled to have the suspected marijuana examined by his own expert, we explained that “the defendant does not have an absolute, unqualified right to examine such evidence.” 238 Ga. at 206 . 2017Indeed, in Patterson, although we held that 5 one accused of possessing marijuana may be constitutionally entitled to have the suspected marijuana examined by his own expert, we explained that “the defendant does not have an absolute, unqualified right to examine such evidence.” 238 Ga. at 206 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2005Johnson, P. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. 1 Jackson also pled guilty to theft by taking, but does not appeal that conviction. 2 Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga. App. 198 (1) ( 582 SE2d 173 ) (2003). 3 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Nunnally, supra. 5 Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 452, 453 (2) ( 576 SE2d 911 ) (2003). 6 Id. 7 276 Ga. 736, 738 (2) ( 585 SE2d 616 ) (2003). 8 See Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 166 (5) ( 539 SE2d 851 ) (2000). 9 269 Ga. 317, 320 (2) ( 496 SE2d 896 ) (1998). 10 Id. 11 Supra. 12 Leone was incarcerated on February 18, 2000, and was 1981If there is no satisfactory explanation of the defendant’s possession, then the “proof of these facts beyond a reasonable doubt creates a presumption or permissible inference of defendant’s guilt.” Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 29 ( 234 SE2d 831 ) (1977). (b) In Jackson v. Virginia, supra, the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutional underpinnings of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (80 SC 624, 4 LE2d 654) (1960) and In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (90 SC 1068, 25 LE2d 368) (1970) in order to determine the appropriate standard for evaluating the evidence on review in a fede | 2 | 1981–2005 |
Wright v. State
green
2 sentences1995(Cit.)' Wright v. State, 194 Ga.App. 739 (2) ( 391 SE2d 791 ) (1990). `"It is simply a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows. 1995(Cit.)' Wright v. State, 194 Ga.App. 739 (2) ( 391 SE2d 791 ) (1990). `"It is simply a defense available to the accused to whom a presumption of possession flows. | 2 | 1992–1995 |
Cash v. Smith
green
2 sentences1972See Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529 (1) ( 169 SE2d 787 ); Cash v. Smith, 226 Ga. 318 (3) ( 175 SE2d 10 ).” Hatton v. Smith, 228 Ga. 378 (3) ( 185 SE2d 388 ). 2. 1972See Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529 (1) ( 169 SE2d 787 ); Cash v. Smith, 226 Ga. 318 (3) ( 175 SE2d 10 ).” Hatton v. Smith, 228 Ga. 378 (3) ( 185 SE2d 388 ). 2. | 2 | 1971–1972 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2018"A general demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Corhen , supra at 496-497 , 700 S.E.2d 912 . "[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish a violation of a criminal statute." Jackson v. State , 301 Ga. 137 , 141 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356 (2017). 2018"A general demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Corhen , supra at 496-497 , 700 S.E.2d 912 . "[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish a violation of a criminal statute." Jackson v. State , 301 Ga. 137 , 141 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lopez v. Texas
green
1 sentence2017(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 276-277 (6) (b) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (applying OCGA § 17-8-58), cert. denied, 137 SCt 62 , 196 LE2d 60 (2016). 4 See King v. State, 336 Ga.App. 531, 540-541 (4) ( 784 SE2d 875 ) (2016) (Where the witness identified the defendant, by pointing to him in the courtroom, as the person who confessed to him while they were incarcerated together, the prosecutor stated, “[l]et the record reflect he’s identified the defendant!,]” and “the trial court used the customary language!,]” that is, “so noted,” “to let the record reflect that | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Lascelles v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Stapleton v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Hood v. Carsten green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Nunnally v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Noggle v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Bowen v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ware v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Johnston green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Thompson v. City of Louisville green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Wood v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Stonaker green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Bird v. Terrell green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Dobbs v. Mayor of Buford green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Hopkins v. State neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Hatton v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Johnson v. New Jersey green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Hayes v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Foskey v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Roberts v. State green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.