departure requirement in Nebraska

2022MOSER Cite as 312 Neb. 757 taxed at 100 [percent] of its true value is to have [the] assess- ment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of the statute.” 44 Sioux City Bridge is readily distinguishable from this case.

2022MOSER Cite as 312 Neb. 757 taxed at 100 [percent] of its true value is to have [the] assess- ment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of the statute.” 44 Sioux City Bridge is readily distinguishable from this case.

1984Ed. 340 (1923), and quoted with approval in Konicek v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 648 , 324 N.W.2d 815 (1982), “This Court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 per cent, of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute.

1984Ed. 340 (1923), and quoted with approval in Konicek v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 648 , 324 N.W.2d 815 (1982), “This Court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 per cent, of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute.

2017The Liming court noted that while it had not previously revisited the holding in Giese (and Shiers), this court, in Paulsen v. Paulsen, 11 Neb.

2017The Nebraska Supreme Court in Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534 , 723 N.W.2d 89 (2006), characterized the holding in Giese as a departure from the exception to the acceptance of benefits rule set forth in Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812 , 135 N.W.2d 704 (1965).

2017The Nebraska Supreme Court in Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534 , 723 N.W.2d 89 (2006), characterized the holding in Giese as a departure from the exception to the acceptance of benefits rule set forth in Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812 , 135 N.W.2d 704 (1965).

2017The Nebraska Supreme Court in Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534 , 723 N.W.2d 89 (2006), characterized the holding in Giese as a departure from the exception to the acceptance of benefits rule set forth in Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812 , 135 N.W.2d 704 (1965).

2017The Nebraska Supreme Court in Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534 , 723 N.W.2d 89 (2006), characterized the holding in Giese as a departure from the exception to the acceptance of benefits rule set forth in Kassebaum v. Kassebaum, 178 Neb. 812 , 135 N.W.2d 704 (1965).

1987The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standards of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Id. at 304 , 344 N.W.2d at 626 , quoting Konicek v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 648, 324 N.W.2d 815 (1982).

1987The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standards of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Id. at 304 , 344 N.W.2d at 626 , quoting Konicek v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 648, 324 N.W.2d 815 (1982).

1976In Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 , 66 S. Ct. 445 , 90 L.

1976In Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 , 66 S. Ct. 445 , 90 L.

1967The departure from principle appears most noticeable in Elliott v. City of Auburn, 172 Neb. 1 , 108 N. W. 2d 328 .

1967The departure from principle appears most noticeable in Elliott v. City of Auburn, 172 Neb. 1 , 108 N. W. 2d 328 .

1963On the contrary, in Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433 , 78 S. Ct. 1287 , 2 L.

1963On the contrary, in Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433 , 78 S. Ct. 1287 , 2 L.

1955Dist., 144 Neb. 308 , 13 N. W. *629 2d 160, 160 A. L.

1909The holding that the district court jjlid not err in permitting the witnesses to testify in rebuttal on the part of the state, that Mackay did not tell them about Jarmer’s request for “knock-out drops,” is in no sense a departure from the rule, nor a violation of any of the reasons for its adoption. 1 Wharton, Law of Evidence (3d. ed.), sec. 561: “It has been held that a witness may be asked whether he has not a strong bias or interest in the case, and, if he denies such interest or bias, that he may be contradicted by evidence of his own statements, or of other implicatory acts. * * * It is t

1902In the first of these cases, Grube v. Wells, 34 Ia., 148 , was before this court, being cited by the unsuccessful party; and the departure from its doctrine may, therefore, be considered as an express disapproval of it.