departure rule in Colorado

1907“In behalf of the party responsible for the abstract, we confine our investigation to the matters which we find in it, unless some reason more cogent than any appearing here, requires a departure from the rule.” — Strassheim v. Cole, 14 Colo. App. 164 ; Slaughter v. Strouse, 20 Colo. App. 484 .

1905“In behalf of the party responsible for the abstract, we confine our investigation to matters which we find in it, unless some reason more cogent than any appearing here requires a departure from the rule.” — Strassheim v. Cole, 14 Colo. App. 164 -166, and cases cited.

1912Without such direction the order in suit is absolutely void in the hands of the plaintiff, or of any other person. * * * The idea that a town officer can, without authority, issue a negotiable town order which, in the hands of a bona fide holder, will bind the town is not to be tolerated for a moment.” Hubbard v. Town of Lyndon, 28 Wis. The case of Presidio County v. Noel-Young Bond Co., 212 U. S., 58 , cited and relied on by the appellee, is not a departure from this rule, for there the commissioners’ court had statutory authority to issue such bonds as may be necessary for court house and ja

1912Without such direction the order in suit is absolutely void in the hands of the plaintiff, or of any other person. * * * The idea that a town officer can, without authority, issue a negotiable town order which, in the hands of a bona fide holder, will bind the town is not to be tolerated for a moment.” Hubbard v. Town of Lyndon, 28 Wis. The case of Presidio County v. Noel-Young Bond Co., 212 U. S., 58 , cited and relied on by the appellee, is not a departure from this rule, for there the commissioners’ court had statutory authority to issue such bonds as may be necessary for court house and ja

1899Otto v. Hill, 11 Colo. App. 481; Kelly v. Doyle, 12 Colo. App. 38 ; Johnson v. Spohr, 12 Colo. App. 371 .

1899Otto v. Hill, 11 Colo. App. 481; Kelly v. Doyle, 12 Colo. App. 38 ; Johnson v. Spohr, 12 Colo. App. 371 .

2012Not least among the many reasons militating against a bar to the reconsideration of our holding in Salazar are the facts that it involves an interpretation of the state constitution, not subject to further refinement or modification by either the legislature or even the United States Supreme Court, see id., and that, due to its formal nature, affecting only the respective roles of the legislature and the courts, there can be no danger that a departure from the rule of Salazar might work a hardship or inequity on voters as the result of any reliance upon and ordering their behavior around it.

1981See Martinez v. Ashton, supra; Cf. Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260 , 90 P.2d 615 (1939). *804 Finally, defendant’s reliance on State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487 , 542 P.2d 832 (1975) cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6 , 546 P.2d 71 (1975) is misplaced.

1981See Martinez v. Ashton, supra; Cf. Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260 , 90 P.2d 615 (1939). *804 Finally, defendant’s reliance on State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487 , 542 P.2d 832 (1975) cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6 , 546 P.2d 71 (1975) is misplaced.

1981See Martinez v. Ashton, supra; Cf. Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260 , 90 P.2d 615 (1939). *804 Finally, defendant’s reliance on State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487 , 542 P.2d 832 (1975) cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6 , 546 P.2d 71 (1975) is misplaced.

1981See Martinez v. Ashton, supra; Cf. Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260 , 90 P.2d 615 (1939). *804 Finally, defendant’s reliance on State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487 , 542 P.2d 832 (1975) cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6 , 546 P.2d 71 (1975) is misplaced.

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1958In National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 , 53 N.E.2d 113, 124 , it was held that lesser powers to alter, amend, or withdraw principal, etc. are included in, and add nothing to the power to revoke.

1958In National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457 , 53 N.E.2d 113, 124 , it was held that lesser powers to alter, amend, or withdraw principal, etc. are included in, and add nothing to the power to revoke.

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1958No good reason appears to suggest a departure from the rule laid down in Brown v. International Trust Co. supra. There, our recent Chief Justice Moore, said: "A settlor may revoke a valid trust *671 where a power of revocation is validly reserved, but if a particular method of revocation is specified, that procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation effective. " (Emphasis supplied.) Numerous cases are cited in support of the rule there announced, and by that decision this state aligned itself with the Massachusetts rule as laid down in Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326

1944No. 14018: “ ‘It is one thing for a court to administer its own measure of damages in a case properly before it, and quite another thing to set aside the verdict of a jury because it exceeds that measure.’ “No case has been cited from this court and we know of none, wherein there has been a departure from the rule stated.” A portion of the above language was requoted, and the rule approved in the recent case of Riss v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78 , 114 P. (2d) 278 .

1944No. 14018: “ ‘It is one thing for a court to administer its own measure of damages in a case properly before it, and quite another thing to set aside the verdict of a jury because it exceeds that measure.’ “No case has been cited from this court and we know of none, wherein there has been a departure from the rule stated.” A portion of the above language was requoted, and the rule approved in the recent case of Riss v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78 , 114 P. (2d) 278 .

1931There has been no suggestion of a departure from the rule announced in Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552 , 212 Pac. 848 , cited in the majority opinion.

1931There has been no suggestion of a departure from the rule announced in Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552 , 212 Pac. 848 , cited in the majority opinion.

1907“In behalf of the party responsible for the abstract, we confine our investigation to the matters which we find in it, unless some reason more cogent than any appearing here, requires a departure from the rule.” — Strassheim v. Cole, 14 Colo. App. 164 ; Slaughter v. Strouse, 20 Colo. App. 484 .