departure rule in Louisiana

1964A departure from the rule might easily result in serious hurt and injustice to one of the litigants.” Lloveras v. Reichert, 197 La. 49 , 200 So. 817 .

1964A departure from the rule might easily result in serious hurt and injustice to one of the litigants.” Lloveras v. Reichert, 197 La. 49 , 200 So. 817 .

1955Welsbach Co. v. State, 206 Cal. 556 , 275 P. 436 .

1955Welsbach Co. v. State, 206 Cal. 556 , 275 P. 436 .

1991The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the "plain error" rule; State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44 (La.1987); State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La.1982); except in unusual circumstances as in State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980), where the error involved the very definition of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and State v. Green, 493 So.2d 588 (La.1986), where the court considered that the omission of an instruction that the defendant's prior theft conviction could be considered only for the purpose of sentence enhancement and not for the purpose of determining defendant's gu

1991The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the "plain error" rule; State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44 (La.1987); State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La.1982); except in unusual circumstances as in State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980), where the error involved the very definition of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and State v. Green, 493 So.2d 588 (La.1986), where the court considered that the omission of an instruction that the defendant's prior theft conviction could be considered only for the purpose of sentence enhancement and not for the purpose of determining defendant's gu

1991The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the "plain error" rule; State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44 (La.1987); State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La.1982); except in unusual circumstances as in State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980), where the error involved the very definition of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and State v. Green, 493 So.2d 588 (La.1986), where the court considered that the omission of an instruction that the defendant's prior theft conviction could be considered only for the purpose of sentence enhancement and not for the purpose of determining defendant's gu

1991The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the "plain error" rule; State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44 (La.1987); State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La.1982); except in unusual circumstances as in State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980), where the error involved the very definition of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and State v. Green, 493 So.2d 588 (La.1986), where the court considered that the omission of an instruction that the defendant's prior theft conviction could be considered only for the purpose of sentence enhancement and not for the purpose of determining defendant's gu

1985There was a departure from this principle, however, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

1985There was a departure from this principle, however, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

1985There was a departure from this principle, however, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

1985There was a departure from this principle, however, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

1983The contracts being merely malum prohibitum, and not malum in se, and in view of the other circumstances hereinafter pointed out, we are forced to a conclusion that constitutes a slight departure from the doctrine of the Fox case and one that is not entirely in keeping with the expressed prevailing view." In accord see: Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9 , 43 So.2d 18 (La.1949); Marquette v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 137 So.2d 374 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1962); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So.2d 444 (La.1974).

1983The contracts being merely malum prohibitum, and not malum in se, and in view of the other circumstances hereinafter pointed out, we are forced to a conclusion that constitutes a slight departure from the doctrine of the Fox case and one that is not entirely in keeping with the expressed prevailing view." In accord see: Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9 , 43 So.2d 18 (La.1949); Marquette v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 137 So.2d 374 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1962); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So.2d 444 (La.1974).

1983The contracts being merely malum prohibitum, and not malum in se, and in view of the other circumstances hereinafter pointed out, we are forced to a conclusion that constitutes a slight departure from the doctrine of the Fox case and one that is not entirely in keeping with the expressed prevailing view." In accord see: Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9 , 43 So.2d 18 (La.1949); Marquette v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 137 So.2d 374 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1962); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So.2d 444 (La.1974).

1983The contracts being merely malum prohibitum, and not malum in se, and in view of the other circumstances hereinafter pointed out, we are forced to a conclusion that constitutes a slight departure from the doctrine of the Fox case and one that is not entirely in keeping with the expressed prevailing view." In accord see: Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9 , 43 So.2d 18 (La.1949); Marquette v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 137 So.2d 374 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1962); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So.2d 444 (La.1974).

1975Matthews v. Henderson, La., 292 So.2d 496 (1974) was not intended as a departure from that rule.

1970This statement of the proposition shows that each case must, to a great extent, be passed upon in view of its own special facts * * In State v. Rives, 193 La. 186 , 190 So. 374 (1939), we reiterated with approval the cautionary restrictions emphasized in State v. Bates about the reception of evidence of offenses other than which the accused is charged, further reiterating, 190 So. 379 : “It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury

1970This statement of the proposition shows that each case must, to a great extent, be passed upon in view of its own special facts * * In State v. Rives, 193 La. 186 , 190 So. 374 (1939), we reiterated with approval the cautionary restrictions emphasized in State v. Bates about the reception of evidence of offenses other than which the accused is charged, further reiterating, 190 So. 379 : “It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury

1941As pointed out in Blake v. Kearney, 30 La.Ann. 388 , the decision in Soye v. Price, “is to the effect that the natural tutors of minor children, may as such take possession of and administer the estates of the deceased parents of such children, unless and until creditors or heirs of age demand the appointment of an administrator.” In Blake v. Kearney, which was decided by the same Court (through the same Justice *362 as the organ of the Court) that decided the case of Soye v. Price, it was expressly held that "a succession is an ideal being, a unity.

1935In deciding the case we said (Soniat v. White, 153 La. 425 , 96 So. 20 ) that we affirmed the rule that evidence is not admissible “for the p'urpose of deciding the exception of no cause of action.” That decision, therefore, was not a departure from the rule that evidence is not admissible on the hearing of an exception of no cause of action.

1920In the case of the City of Shreveport v. Wilson et al., 145 La. 906 , 83 South. 186 , the defendants, who had lived together in concubinage, were prosecuted for violating a municipal ordinance making it “unlawful for any person to use or occupy any house or room for the purpose of prostitution, assignation or other lewd or indecent act.” The ruling was that concubinage was not prostitution or assignation, within the ordinary meaning of the words, and that, in so far as the statute undertook to punish for any “other lewd or indecent act,” the language was too vague and indefinite to inform a pa

1920In the case of the City of Shreveport v. Wilson et al., 145 La. 906 , 83 South. 186 , the defendants, who had lived together in concubinage, were prosecuted for violating a municipal ordinance making it “unlawful for any person to use or occupy any house or room for the purpose of prostitution, assignation or other lewd or indecent act.” The ruling was that concubinage was not prostitution or assignation, within the ordinary meaning of the words, and that, in so far as the statute undertook to punish for any “other lewd or indecent act,” the language was too vague and indefinite to inform a pa

1848Speculation upon events are devoid of equity, although minors may be parties to them ; and there is nothing in the circumstances of the controversy which could justify a departure from the rule settled in the cases of Michel’s heirs and Lalanne’s heirs, 11 La. 149 . 13 La. 432 .