10 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCambridge v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Id. at 75. 2016Id. at 75 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. GRAIGgreen1 sentence2001See Craig, 562 N.W.2d at 636 (failure to accord defendant allocution not harmless error). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Schlenker
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Petition of Fenchel
green
1 sentence1981There may be exceptional cases justifying a departure from this rule although we “do *166 not foresee circumstances in which a dissolution court is justified in issuing its decree piecemeal.” Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d at 209 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Ormiston
green
2 sentences1932Again, discussing an indictment alleged by the defendant to be insufficient to charge a conspiracy, the court in State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa 143 , 23 N.W. 370 , 372 , said: "Another objection urged is that the indictment does not set out the means which the defendant intended to employ. 1932Again, discussing an indictment alleged by the defendant to be insufficient to charge a conspiracy, the court in State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa 143 , 23 N.W. 370 , 372 , said: "Another objection urged is that the indictment does not set out the means which the defendant intended to employ. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Kolka v. Jones
green
1 sentence1917St. 897]); but there is nothing in the case at bar justifying a departure from the doctrine of Wetmore v. Mellinger, supra. The authorities pro and con are reviewed in the case last cited, and in Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461 (66 Am. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Wetmore v. Mellinger
green
1 sentence1917St. 897]); but there is nothing in the case at bar justifying a departure from the doctrine of Wetmore v. Mellinger, supra. The authorities pro and con are reviewed in the case last cited, and in Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461 (66 Am. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Maples v. State
neutral
1 sentence1911It would be a departure from the rule, not necessary to give effect to the legislative intent, and not within it, to give the general words ‘or otherwise dispose of’ a meaning so loose and expansive as to include within them any act not akin to a sale or gift, not intended as, and not having in it any of the properties of, a parting with property by one person to another.” Again, in Maples v. State, 130 Ala. 121 ( 30 South. 428 ), the same court said: “The evidence upon the trial was that one Allison asked defendant if he thought he could get him some whisky, and, upon receiving an affirmative | 1 | 1911–1911 |
McCrary v. Tasker
neutral
1 sentence1895McCrary v. Tasker, 41 Iowa, 255 ; Creswell v. Slack, 68 Iowa, 110 ; Hadley v. Gregory, 57 Iowa, 157 ; Conger v. Cook, 56 Iowa, 117 ; It may be stated as a general rule that immediately upon the death of a testator seized of real estate the title passes to his devisees, subject to the right of creditors through the executor to subject it, if needed, to the payment of debts; and the action to' subject it to the payment of debts must be brought within, one year from the giving of notice, except under peculiar equitable circumstances which justify a departure from the rule by a court of equity. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Conger v. Cook
neutral
1 sentence1895McCrary v. Tasker, 41 Iowa, 255 ; Creswell v. Slack, 68 Iowa, 110 ; Hadley v. Gregory, 57 Iowa, 157 ; Conger v. Cook, 56 Iowa, 117 ; It may be stated as a general rule that immediately upon the death of a testator seized of real estate the title passes to his devisees, subject to the right of creditors through the executor to subject it, if needed, to the payment of debts; and the action to' subject it to the payment of debts must be brought within, one year from the giving of notice, except under peculiar equitable circumstances which justify a departure from the rule by a court of equity. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Hadley v. Gregory
neutral
1 sentence1895McCrary v. Tasker, 41 Iowa, 255 ; Creswell v. Slack, 68 Iowa, 110 ; Hadley v. Gregory, 57 Iowa, 157 ; Conger v. Cook, 56 Iowa, 117 ; It may be stated as a general rule that immediately upon the death of a testator seized of real estate the title passes to his devisees, subject to the right of creditors through the executor to subject it, if needed, to the payment of debts; and the action to' subject it to the payment of debts must be brought within, one year from the giving of notice, except under peculiar equitable circumstances which justify a departure from the rule by a court of equity. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Creswell v. Slack
neutral
1 sentence1895McCrary v. Tasker, 41 Iowa, 255 ; Creswell v. Slack, 68 Iowa, 110 ; Hadley v. Gregory, 57 Iowa, 157 ; Conger v. Cook, 56 Iowa, 117 ; It may be stated as a general rule that immediately upon the death of a testator seized of real estate the title passes to his devisees, subject to the right of creditors through the executor to subject it, if needed, to the payment of debts; and the action to' subject it to the payment of debts must be brought within, one year from the giving of notice, except under peculiar equitable circumstances which justify a departure from the rule by a court of equity. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.