16 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1862–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Countygreen2 sentences1978The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 373 (1965), quoting from Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, Nebraska, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923). 1975The taxpayers brought their appeal to the board on the theory that their property had been “disproportionately as sessed.” 4 Even if we were to assume arguendo (and we do not decide this point) that the exhibits did provide irrebuttable evidence of fair market value, the exhibits would not necessarily thwart the taxpayers’ claim of entitlement to an abatement on the ground that the assessment was disproportionate. “. . . [T]he right of the taxpayer whose, property alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others | 3 | 3 |
SHOPPERS'WORLD v. Board of Assessors of Framinghamgreen2 sentences1978The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 373 (1965), quoting from Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, Nebraska, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923). 1975The taxpayers brought their appeal to the board on the theory that their property had been “disproportionately as sessed.” 4 Even if we were to assume arguendo (and we do not decide this point) that the exhibits did provide irrebuttable evidence of fair market value, the exhibits would not necessarily thwart the taxpayers’ claim of entitlement to an abatement on the ground that the assessment was disproportionate. “. . . [T]he right of the taxpayer whose, property alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Howardgreen2 sentences1991However, because the search warrant application affidavit apparently provided misleading information concerning the white substance found in the defendant’s apartment, we assume, without deciding, that “this is a ‘case where the record indicates circumstances justifying a departure from the rule,’ ” Commonwealth v. Collins, supra at 132 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Howard, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 482 (1976), and we take into account, for purposes of discussion, Rogers’ trial testimony. 1981We do not consider whether this is a “case where the record indicates circumstances justifying a departure from the rule,” Commonwealth v. Howard, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 482 (1976), 6 nor do we reach any claims having *133 constitutional dimension. | 2 | 2 |
Virginia v. Blackgreen1 sentence2012Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365-367 (2003) (plurality opinion). 7 We recognize that this constitutes a departure from our analysis in Welch, supra at 94 n.14, where we declared that the “ ‘true threats’ exception is not applicable to the criminal harassment statute because the statute was enacted to criminalize those acts of harassment that do not rise to the level of threats.” The threat element in the criminal stalking statute that was omitted from the criminal harassment statute, however, required a “threat with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death or bodily injury” | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Halletgreen1 sentence2001Those notes, without alluding to Commonwealth v. Cronk, supra, state the following: “The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that a judge may rule on a new trial motion prior to the determination of an appeal from the conviction.” Even were we to accord binding effect to the Reporters’ Notes, see Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 269 , cert, denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), we would not interpret the combination of the missing statement with the use of the phrase “determination of an appeal” as reflecting a departure from the rule of Commonwealth v. Cronk , in view of the sentence prece | 1 | 1 |
Tamerlane Corp. v. Warwick Insurancegreen1 sentence1998Co., 412 Mass. 486, 489-490 (1992) (decisional law is generally applied retroactively, unless a departure from the rule is necessary to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties), because any error by the judge in approving special question 3B was harmless. | 1 | 1 |
Pongonis v. Saabgreen1 sentence1997Fish-man v. Brooks, supra at 647; Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005, 1005 (1985); Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., supra at 111. | 1 | 1 |
Colucci v. ROSEN, GOLDBERG, SLAVET, LEVENSONgreen1 sentence1997Fish-man v. Brooks, supra at 647; Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005, 1005 (1985); Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., supra at 111. | 1 | 1 |
Fishman v. Brooksgreen1 sentence1997Fish-man v. Brooks, supra at 647; Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005, 1005 (1985); Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., supra at 111. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Welch
green
1 sentence2012Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365-367 (2003) (plurality opinion). 7 We recognize that this constitutes a departure from our analysis in Welch, supra at 94 n.14, where we declared that the “ ‘true threats’ exception is not applicable to the criminal harassment statute because the statute was enacted to criminalize those acts of harassment that do not rise to the level of threats.” The threat element in the criminal stalking statute that was omitted from the criminal harassment statute, however, required a “threat with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death or bodily injury” | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Hyde
green
1 sentence2011Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594 , 599 & n.5 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271 , 280 n.7 (1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Levison v. Levison
green
1 sentence2011Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594 , 599 & n.5 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271 , 280 n.7 (1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Thorpe
green
1 sentence2011Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594 , 599 & n.5 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271 , 280 n.7 (1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. O'DELL
green
1 sentence2009It should be noted, however, that the O’Dell case illustrates an additional departure from the rule of noninterference, which is that courts will review a claim that “the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was impaired.” Id. at 449-450 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2001Those notes, without alluding to Commonwealth v. Cronk, supra, state the following: “The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that a judge may rule on a new trial motion prior to the determination of an appeal from the conviction.” Even were we to accord binding effect to the Reporters’ Notes, see Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 269 , cert, denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), we would not interpret the combination of the missing statement with the use of the phrase “determination of an appeal” as reflecting a departure from the rule of Commonwealth v. Cronk , in view of the sentence prece | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Tomargo v. United States
green
1 sentence2001Those notes, without alluding to Commonwealth v. Cronk, supra, state the following: “The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that a judge may rule on a new trial motion prior to the determination of an appeal from the conviction.” Even were we to accord binding effect to the Reporters’ Notes, see Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 269 , cert, denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), we would not interpret the combination of the missing statement with the use of the phrase “determination of an appeal” as reflecting a departure from the rule of Commonwealth v. Cronk , in view of the sentence prece | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Cronk
green
1 sentence2001Those notes, without alluding to Commonwealth v. Cronk, supra, state the following: “The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that a judge may rule on a new trial motion prior to the determination of an appeal from the conviction.” Even were we to accord binding effect to the Reporters’ Notes, see Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 269 , cert, denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), we would not interpret the combination of the missing statement with the use of the phrase “determination of an appeal” as reflecting a departure from the rule of Commonwealth v. Cronk , in view of the sentence prece | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Collins
green
1 sentence1991However, because the search warrant application affidavit apparently provided misleading information concerning the white substance found in the defendant’s apartment, we assume, without deciding, that “this is a ‘case where the record indicates circumstances justifying a departure from the rule,’ ” Commonwealth v. Collins, supra at 132 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Howard, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 482 (1976), and we take into account, for purposes of discussion, Rogers’ trial testimony. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Sargent
green
1 sentence1923In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Sargent, 235 Mass. 298, 303 , it was said that the determination of the rights and several interests in the life estate there considered required a departure from the rule, but was not to be taken as a precedent for such action. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Essgee Co. of China v. United States
green
1 sentence1923Apparently there has been considerable departure from right procedure as illustrated by the case at bar, See Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
City of Worcester v. Lakeside Manufacturing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1908Co. 174 Mass. 299 , 301 When the point is reached that a departure from the rule which obtains either at common law or in equity was intended, there is no stage in the proceeding which we can say was intended by the words of § 36 “ at any time before final decree ” short of the entry of the decree provided for by § 39. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Commonwealth v. Morse
green
1 sentence1871The decision in Commonwealth v. Morse, 14 Mass. 217 , seems to have been a departure from the rule at common law; and has been corrected by statute. | 1 | 1871–1871 |
Hall v. Phelps
neutral
1 sentence1862In Hall v. Phelps, 2 Johns. 451 , which was the case of a promissory note, the court discarded the rule altogether, and Spencer, J. said : “ The notion that the persons who attest an instrument are agreed upon to be the only witnesses to prove it is not conformable to the truth of transactions of this kind, and, to speak with all possible delicacy, is an absurdity.” But in Fox v. Reil, 3 Johns. 477 , which was an action upon a bond, this departure from the rule was limited to the case of contracts not under seal; and Chief Justice Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court, says that he conc | 1 | 1862–1862 |
Fox v. Reil
neutral
1 sentence1862In Hall v. Phelps, 2 Johns. 451 , which was the case of a promissory note, the court discarded the rule altogether, and Spencer, J. said : “ The notion that the persons who attest an instrument are agreed upon to be the only witnesses to prove it is not conformable to the truth of transactions of this kind, and, to speak with all possible delicacy, is an absurdity.” But in Fox v. Reil, 3 Johns. 477 , which was an action upon a bond, this departure from the rule was limited to the case of contracts not under seal; and Chief Justice Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court, says that he conc | 1 | 1862–1862 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.