departure standard in Washington

2026RCW 9.94A.585(4)(a); State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 94 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005).

2026RCW 9.94A.585(4)(a); State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 94 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005).

2025Law, 154 Wn.2d at 93 (quoting Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2018Id. at 847, 846, 940 P.2d 633 (emphasis added). ¶ 13 Eleven years after Light-Roth's sentencing, this court, in O'Dell , again addressed whether youthfulness may be considered to support a departure from the standard sentencing range.

2025We reverse if “under a clearly erroneous standard, there is insufficient evidence in the record” to support the exceptional sentence; “under a de novo standard, the reasons supplied by the sentencing court do not justify a departure from the standard range”; or “under an abuse of discretion standard, the sentence is clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.” France, 176 Wn. App. at 469 .

2021To reverse an exceptional sentence, we must conclude that: (1) under a clearly erroneous standard, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence; (2) under a de novo standard, the reasons supplied by the sentencing court do not justify a departure from the standard range; or (3) under an abuse of discretion standard, the sentence is clearly excessive or clearly too lenient. 6 State v. France, 176 Wn. App. 463, 469 , 308 P.3d 812 (2013); RCW 9.94A.585(4).

1999RCW 9.94A.210(4); State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 855-56 , 947 P.2d 1192 , (1997) (citing State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 815 P.2d 752 (1991)); State v. Morris, 87 Wn.

1999RCW 9.94A.210(4); State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 855-56 , 947 P.2d 1192 , (1997) (citing State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 815 P.2d 752 (1991)); State v. Morris, 87 Wn.

1993State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207 , *336 218, 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1988).

1993State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207 , *336 218, 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1988).

2003State v. Scott, 72 Wash.App. 207, 213 , 866 P.2d 1258 (1993), aff'd sub nom.

2003State v. Scott, 72 Wn.

1993State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207 , *336 218, 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1988).

1993State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1988).

2001Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d at 856 .

2000Jeannotte, 133 Wash.2d at 856 , 947 P.2d 1192 .

2008Id. at 418 , 823 P.2d 1078 ; Myers, 105 Wash.2d at 262 , 714 P.2d 303 (observing "the clear limitation imposed on the Board's discretion by RCW 9.95.009(2)"). ¶ 74 To comply with RCW 9.95.009(2) the ISRB must provide adequate reasons to justify imposing an exceptional minimum term sentence, and the departure from the standard sentence must be proportionate to its reasoning.

2008Id. at 418 , 823 P.2d 1078 ; Myers, 105 Wash.2d at 262 , 714 P.2d 303 (observing "the clear limitation imposed on the Board's discretion by RCW 9.95.009(2)"). ¶ 74 To comply with RCW 9.95.009(2) the ISRB must provide adequate reasons to justify imposing an exceptional minimum term sentence, and the departure from the standard sentence must be proportionate to its reasoning.

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: "Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted."); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App.3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 703 (1972) (Upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: "`If the victim is induced to part with money or

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2007See, e.g., State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 381 , 396 P.2d 5 (1964) (adopting the rule of no requirement of pecuniary loss so long as the victim has parted with his property: “Once the victim has parted with his property in reliance on a false representation, it is immaterial whether whatever he got in return is equal in exchange value to that with which he parted.”); People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 195 , 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972) (upholding the rule where used car dealer had rolled back odometer and subsequently sold those cars to dealerships: “ Tf the victim is induced to part with money o

2004When the court identifies "more than one justification for an exceptional sentence and each ground is an independent justification, we may affirm the sentence if one of the grounds is valid." State v. Zatkovich, 113 Wash.App. 70, 78 , 52 P.3d 36 (2002).

2004When the court identifies “more than one justification for an exceptional sentence and each ground is an independent justifi cation, we [may] affirm the sentence if one of the grounds is valid.” State v. Zatkovich, 113 Wn.

2003Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) [12] ; State v. Taitt, 93 Wash.App. 783, 788 , 970 P.2d 785 (1999) (error to impose an exceptional sentence without making a finding of substantial and compelling reasons to justify a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines).

2003Former RCW 9.94A.120(2); 12 State v. Taitt, 93 Wn.

2002Because the trial court found that these aggravating circumstances also supported a departure from the standard range, the exceptional sentence is justified as a matter of law. 3 State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (an appellate court may uphold an exceptional sentence if satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence without the prohibited aggravating factor).

2002Because the trial court found that these aggravating circumstances also supported a departure from the standard range, the exceptional sentence is justified as a matter of law. 3 State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (an appellate court may uphold an exceptional sentence if satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence without the prohibited aggravating factor).

2002Former RCW *597 9.94A.210(4) (1989); [3] State v. Overvold, 64 Wash.App. 440, 444 , 825 P.2d 729 (1992).

2002Former RCW 9.94A.210(4) (1989); 3 State v. Overvold, 64 Wn.

1996Copeland's challenge to whether the reasons justify a departure from the standard range is reviewed as a "matter of law." Id. at 705 , 861 P.2d 460 .

1996Copeland's challenge to whether the reasons justify a departure from the standard range is reviewed as a "matter of law." Id. at 705 , 861 P.2d 460 .

1994When age is an element of the crime, it may be used to justify a departure from standard range sentence only "if the extreme youth of the victim in fact distinguishes the victim significantly from other victims of the same crime." State v. Garibay, 67 Wn.

1994When age is an element of the crime, it may be used to justify a departure from standard range sentence only "if the extreme youth of the victim in fact distinguishes the victim significantly from other victims of the same crime.” State v. Garibay, 67 Wn.

1988State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 517-18 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). (2) Do the reasons justify a departure from the standard range?

1988State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 517-18 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). (2) Do the reasons justify a departure from the standard range?

2026State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 418 , 773 P.2d 898 (1989); State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wn. App. 514, 518 , 799 P.2d 736 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1010 (1991). - 17 - Russell contends that any homicide by abuse must necessarily be deliberately cruel because the statute requires a pattern or practice of assault or torture and extreme indifference to human life.

2026State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 418 , 773 P.2d 898 (1989); State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wn. App. 514, 518 , 799 P.2d 736 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1010 (1991). - 17 - Russell contends that any homicide by abuse must necessarily be deliberately cruel because the statute requires a pattern or practice of assault or torture and extreme indifference to human life.

2026State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 418 , 773 P.2d 898 (1989); State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wn. App. 514, 518 , 799 P.2d 736 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1010 (1991). - 17 - Russell contends that any homicide by abuse must necessarily be deliberately cruel because the statute requires a pattern or practice of assault or torture and extreme indifference to human life.

2026State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 418 , 773 P.2d 898 (1989); State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wn. App. 514, 518 , 799 P.2d 736 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1010 (1991). - 17 - Russell contends that any homicide by abuse must necessarily be deliberately cruel because the statute requires a pattern or practice of assault or torture and extreme indifference to human life.

2026Pursuant to RCW 9.94A.505(6) and In re Personal Restraint of Costello, 131 Wn. App. 828, 832 , 129 P.3d 827 (2006), she is entitled to credit for time served after resentencing, in addition to any earned good time credit pursuant to RCW 9.94A.728. 7 Washington appellate courts review de novo whether the reasons supplied by the sentencing court justify a departure from the standard sentencing range.

2026Pursuant to RCW 9.94A.505(6) and In re Personal Restraint of Costello, 131 Wn. App. 828, 832 , 129 P.3d 827 (2006), she is entitled to credit for time served after resentencing, in addition to any earned good time credit pursuant to RCW 9.94A.728. 7 Washington appellate courts review de novo whether the reasons supplied by the sentencing court justify a departure from the standard sentencing range.