Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lenaerts v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences2017See DeShazo, 638 A.2d at 1156 (noting that “scheduled benefit will be an appropriate, if arbitrary, compensation to offset wage losses that eventually can be anticipated”); Smith, 548 A.2d at 101 (quoting LARSON for proposition that “the schedule was never intended to be a departure from or an exception to the wage- loss principle”); Lenaerts v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1236-39 (D.C. 1988) (distinguishing between different and mutually exclusive formulas for calculating compensation for schedule and non-schedule work injuries). 2017See DeShazo, 638 A.2d at 1156 (noting that “scheduled benefit will be an appropriate, if arbitrary, compensation to offset wage losses that eventually can be anticipated”); Smith, 548 A.2d at 101 (quoting Larson for proposi *903 tion that “the schedule was never intended to be a departure from or an exception to the wage-loss principle”); Lenaerts v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1236-39 (D.C. 1988) (distinguishing between different and mutually exclusive formulas for calculating compensation for schedule and non-schedule work injuries). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences2017See DeShazo, 638 A.2d at 1156 (noting that “scheduled benefit will be an appropriate, if arbitrary, compensation to offset wage losses that eventually can be anticipated”); Smith, 548 A.2d at 101 (quoting LARSON for proposition that “the schedule was never intended to be a departure from or an exception to the wage- loss principle”); Lenaerts v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1236-39 (D.C. 1988) (distinguishing between different and mutually exclusive formulas for calculating compensation for schedule and non-schedule work injuries). 2017See DeShazo, 638 A.2d at 1156 (noting that “scheduled benefit will be an appropriate, if arbitrary, compensation to offset wage losses that eventually can be anticipated”); Smith, 548 A.2d at 101 (quoting Larson for proposi *903 tion that “the schedule was never intended to be a departure from or an exception to the wage-loss principle”); Lenaerts v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1236-39 (D.C. 1988) (distinguishing between different and mutually exclusive formulas for calculating compensation for schedule and non-schedule work injuries). | 1 | 3 |
Watkins v. Sowdersgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 , 347–49 (1981) (“the proper evaluation of evidence under the instructions of the trial judge is the very task our system must assume juries can perform”; “[w]here identification evidence is at issue . . . no . . . special considerations justify a departure from the presumption that juries will follow instructions” because “the time-honored process of cross- examination [is] the device best suited to determine the trustworthiness of testimonial evidence”). | 1 | 1 |
DeShazo v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence2017See DeShazo, 638 A.2d at 1156 (noting that “scheduled benefit will be an appropriate, if arbitrary, compensation to offset wage losses that eventually can be anticipated”); Smith, 548 A.2d at 101 (quoting Larson for proposi *903 tion that “the schedule was never intended to be a departure from or an exception to the wage-loss principle”); Lenaerts v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1236-39 (D.C. 1988) (distinguishing between different and mutually exclusive formulas for calculating compensation for schedule and non-schedule work injuries). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Bachgreen1 sentence2010While the Addams rule operates "presumptively,” the presumption may be overcome only by a showing of "extraordinary circumstances warranting a departure from the rule.” In re Bach, 966 A.2d 350, 365 (D.C.2009) (Board’s opinion, adopted by the court). | 1 | 1 |
Ladner v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958). 1997See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958). | 1 | 1 |
Luck v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1997In what I view as a departure from the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), my colleagues have declined to follow a key part of our decision in Luck v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 509, 515 (D.C. 1992) ( Luck I ), a case in which we held unambiguously that the interpretation by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) of the identical statutory provisions here at issue, and of the interplay between them, is entitled to "great weight." Finally, the majority has impermissibly construed a penal statute broadly beyond its text, to the prejudice of the liberty of the c 1997In what I view as a departure from the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), my colleagues have declined to follow a key part of our decision in Luck v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 509, 515 (D.C. 1992) (Luck I), a case in which we held unambiguously that the interpretation by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) of the identical statutory provisions here at issue, and of the interplay between them, is entitled to “great weight.” Finally, the majority has impermissibly construed a penal statute broadly beyond its text, to the prejudice of the liberty of the cit | 1 | 1 |
Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730green1 sentence1994See Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801 , 803 n. 5 (D.C.1984) (citation omitted); see also Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.1993) (relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is granted only in "exceptional circumstances” as a departure from the rule of "finality of judgments”) (citations omitted); Forgotson v. Shea, 491 A.2d 523, 528 (D.C.1985) ("where reconsideration is sought on the basis of 'newly discovered evidence,’ the movant must demonstrate it could not reasonably have been discovered in advance of trial and would likely produce | 1 | 1 |
Forgotson v. Sheagreen1 sentence1994See Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801 , 803 n. 5 (D.C.1984) (citation omitted); see also Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.1993) (relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is granted only in "exceptional circumstances” as a departure from the rule of "finality of judgments”) (citations omitted); Forgotson v. Shea, 491 A.2d 523, 528 (D.C.1985) ("where reconsideration is sought on the basis of 'newly discovered evidence,’ the movant must demonstrate it could not reasonably have been discovered in advance of trial and would likely produce | 1 | 1 |
Clement v. District of Columbia Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence1994See Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801 , 803 n. 5 (D.C.1984) (citation omitted); see also Clement v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.1993) (relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is granted only in "exceptional circumstances” as a departure from the rule of "finality of judgments”) (citations omitted); Forgotson v. Shea, 491 A.2d 523, 528 (D.C.1985) ("where reconsideration is sought on the basis of 'newly discovered evidence,’ the movant must demonstrate it could not reasonably have been discovered in advance of trial and would likely produce | 1 | 1 |
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.red2 sentences1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff's departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) ("Assumed risk . . . [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. 1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff’s departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) (“Assumed risk ... [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1 |
National Marine Service Incorporated v. Petroleum Service Corporation v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporationgreen2 sentences1985To varying degrees, [both] . . . focus on the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct."); National Marine Services, Inc. v. Petroleum Services Corp., 736 F.2d 272, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1984) (in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, court holds that since "[e]xperience has demonstrated . . . the niceties of these theoretical distinctions [between assumption of risk and contributory negligence] are often lost in the practical application of these defenses," the court is "persuaded that no distinction should be made between [them], but that the plaintiff's conduct (whether theoretically mere contri 1985To varying degrees, [both] ... focus on the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s conduct.”); National Marine Services, Inc. v. Petroleum Services Corp., 736 F.2d 272, 276-77 (5th Cir.1984) (in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, court holds that since “[experience has demonstrated ... the niceties of these theoretical distinctions [between assumption of risk and contributory negligence] are often lost in the practical application of these defenses,” the court is “persuaded that no distinction should be made between [them], but that the plaintiff’s conduct (whether theoretically mere contributory | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Addams
green
1 sentence2011In Addams , we noted that mitigating factors “of the usual sort” “will suffice to overcome the presumption of disbarment only if they are especially strong *287 and, where there are aggravating factors, they substantially outweigh any aggravating factors as well.” Id. at 191 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County
green
2 sentences2007The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 , 43 S.Ct. 190 , 67 L.Ed. 340 (1923). 2007The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 , 43 S.Ct. 190 , 67 L.Ed. 340 (1923). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
M. A. P. v. Ryan
green
2 sentences1997In what I view as a departure from the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), my colleagues have declined to follow a key part of our decision in Luck v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 509, 515 (D.C. 1992) ( Luck I ), a case in which we held unambiguously that the interpretation by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) of the identical statutory provisions here at issue, and of the interplay between them, is entitled to "great weight." Finally, the majority has impermissibly construed a penal statute broadly beyond its text, to the prejudice of the liberty of the c 1997In what I view as a departure from the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), my colleagues have declined to follow a key part of our decision in Luck v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 509, 515 (D.C. 1992) (Luck I), a case in which we held unambiguously that the interpretation by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) of the identical statutory provisions here at issue, and of the interplay between them, is entitled to “great weight.” Finally, the majority has impermissibly construed a penal statute broadly beyond its text, to the prejudice of the liberty of the cit | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Garner
green
1 sentence1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Pritchard
green
2 sentences1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff's departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) ("Assumed risk . . . [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. 1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff’s departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) (“Assumed risk ... [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Thompson v. Kisen
green
2 sentences1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff's departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) ("Assumed risk . . . [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. 1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff’s departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) (“Assumed risk ... [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Griffith v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar
green
2 sentences1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff's departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) ("Assumed risk . . . [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. 1985Under this concept recovery is barred because of the plaintiff’s departure from the standard of reasonable conduct and notwithstanding the misconduct of the defendant”), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 , 86 S.Ct. 549 , 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984) (“Assumed risk ... [is] nothing more than [an] extreme variant[] of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Nunan v. Timberlake
green
1 sentence1980These cases, which admit for the establishment of a prima facie case evidence of the nature of medical treatment and the amount of the bill incurred, see Nunan, supra at 153 , 85 F.2d at 410 , represent a departure from the rule common in many jurisdictions requiring separate proof of the reasonableness of charges sought to be admitted as evidence of damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Hark
green
2 sentences1975That court relied on United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 , 64 S.Ct. 359 , 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), for the presumption that the formal order was intended to be the final one. 1975That court relied on United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 , 64 S.Ct. 359 , 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), for the presumption that the formal order was intended to be the final one. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Carl T. Lee and Darlene C. Humphries
green
1 sentence1975The government also urges that we follow a recent holding of the federal Circuit Court here that where . . . the District Judge sees fit to enter a formal order and does so before the time to file notice of appeal expires, we will presume, in the absence of any contrary showing, that she intended the formal order to be the final judgment from which the appeal may be taken. . . . [United States v. Lee, 501 F.2d 890 , 891 n. 1 (D.C.Cir. 1974).] While that holding does reflect a departure from the rule of strict application on notice of appeal timing, we are not persuaded by that court’s reasonin | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.