12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Seisinger v. Siebelgreen2 sentences2011Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 96, ¶ 42 , 203 P.3d 483, 494 (2009). 1 ¶4 The Adzona Supreme Court opined that the necessity of expert testimony in a medical malpractice action was a substantive component of the common law and that § 12-2604 modified the common law “to increase a plaintiffs burden of production ... [on] the defendant’s departure from the standard of care.” Id. at 95, ¶ 39, 203 P.3d at 493 . 2011Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 96, ¶ 42 , 203 P.3d 483, 494 (2009). 1 ¶4 The Adzona Supreme Court opined that the necessity of expert testimony in a medical malpractice action was a substantive component of the common law and that § 12-2604 modified the common law “to increase a plaintiffs burden of production ... [on] the defendant’s departure from the standard of care.” Id. at 95, ¶ 39, 203 P.3d at 493 . | 1 | 1 |
Huck v. Haralambiegreen2 sentences2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). 2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Ryangreen2 sentences2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). 2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Manzogreen2 sentences2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). 2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Rayesgreen2 sentences2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). 2004See Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 . ¶ 27 Given the presumption of innocence and the presumption in favor of bail, to afford the accused due process, he must be provided a hearing, Rayes, 206 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 11, 75 P.3d at 151 , during which he must be given "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 , 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2003State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471 , 481 ¶ 37, 65 P.3d 420, 430 (2003). 2003State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471 , 481 ¶ 37, 65 P.3d 420, 430 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1985Under these circumstances, “[w]e are reluctant to apply a constitutional rule of criminal procedure retroactively as ‘[t]o characterize a past proceeding as unconstitutional and therefore void reflects seriously on the integrity of the law, * * * weakens the confidence of those who trusted in the existence and validity of the rule and undermines the doctrine of the finality of prior determinations.’ ” State v. Ray, 114 Ariz. 380, 383 , 560 P.2d 1287, 1290 (App.1977) (quoting State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 321, 323 , 541 P.2d 918, 920 (1975)). 1985Under these circumstances, “[w]e are reluctant to apply a constitutional rule of criminal procedure retroactively as ‘[t]o characterize a past proceeding as unconstitutional and therefore void reflects seriously on the integrity of the law, * * * weakens the confidence of those who trusted in the existence and validity of the rule and undermines the doctrine of the finality of prior determinations.’ ” State v. Ray, 114 Ariz. 380, 383 , 560 P.2d 1287, 1290 (App.1977) (quoting State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 321, 323 , 541 P.2d 918, 920 (1975)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Raygreen2 sentences1985Under these circumstances, “[w]e are reluctant to apply a constitutional rule of criminal procedure retroactively as ‘[t]o characterize a past proceeding as unconstitutional and therefore void reflects seriously on the integrity of the law, * * * weakens the confidence of those who trusted in the existence and validity of the rule and undermines the doctrine of the finality of prior determinations.’ ” State v. Ray, 114 Ariz. 380, 383 , 560 P.2d 1287, 1290 (App.1977) (quoting State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 321, 323 , 541 P.2d 918, 920 (1975)). 1985Under these circumstances, “[w]e are reluctant to apply a constitutional rule of criminal procedure retroactively as ‘[t]o characterize a past proceeding as unconstitutional and therefore void reflects seriously on the integrity of the law, * * * weakens the confidence of those who trusted in the existence and validity of the rule and undermines the doctrine of the finality of prior determinations.’ ” State v. Ray, 114 Ariz. 380, 383 , 560 P.2d 1287, 1290 (App.1977) (quoting State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 321, 323 , 541 P.2d 918, 920 (1975)). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Hendersongreen2 sentences1952See also Henderson v. Henderson, 59 Ariz. 53 , 121 P.2d 437 . "* * * but the rule is not so absolutely fixed as to preclude the overruling of plainly erroneous decisions, where it is apparent that the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the rule will greatly exceed any disastrous effects likely to flow therefrom." 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 216, p. 398. 1952See also Henderson v. Henderson, 59 Ariz. 53 , 121 P.2d 437 . “ * * * but the rule is not so absolutely fixed as to preclude the overruling of plainly erroneous decisions, where it is apparent that the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the rule will greatly exceed any disastrous effects likely to flow therefrom.” 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 216, p. 398. | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Hendersongreen2 sentences1952See also Henderson v. Henderson, 59 Ariz. 53 , 121 P.2d 437 . "* * * but the rule is not so absolutely fixed as to preclude the overruling of plainly erroneous decisions, where it is apparent that the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the rule will greatly exceed any disastrous effects likely to flow therefrom." 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 216, p. 398. 1952See also Henderson v. Henderson, 59 Ariz. 53 , 121 P.2d 437 . “ * * * but the rule is not so absolutely fixed as to preclude the overruling of plainly erroneous decisions, where it is apparent that the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the rule will greatly exceed any disastrous effects likely to flow therefrom.” 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 216, p. 398. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. HH Robertson Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2008In Jackson , the court held that res ipsa could be applied against multiple defendants even though it was “unclear which defendant was in control of the injurious instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligence.” Id. at 33 , 574 P.2d at 826 . ¶ 13 However, we decline to view Jackson as a departure from the rule that a claimant must identify, to a degree of probability, which of multiple defendants controlled the instrumentality that injured him. 2008In Jackson , the court held that res ipsa could be applied against multiple defendants even though it was “unclear which defendant was in control of the injurious instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligence.” Id. at 33 , 574 P.2d at 826 . ¶ 13 However, we decline to view Jackson as a departure from the rule that a claimant must identify, to a degree of probability, which of multiple defendants controlled the instrumentality that injured him. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Revels v. Pohle
green
1 sentence2024But the Court concluded that “laymen can say that in all cases where there [are] continual complaints of pain from a patient over a substantial period of time, that it is a departure from standard medical practice for the doctor to fail to examine the patient in any manner.” Id. at 211 . ¶57 Both Revels and this case involve situations that ordinarily require the exercise of medical judgment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State Ex Rel. Morrison v. Anway
green
1 sentence2003“A departure from this rule is to alter the statute and legislate, and not to interpret.” Id. ¶ 16 In the end, a statute’s language is the most reliable index of its meaning. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Zipkin v. Freeman
green
1 sentence1986Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, supra; Zipkin v. Freeman, supra. The doctors’ departure from standard practice during the course of treatment, their mishandling of the treatment is the essence of the claims. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Boyce v. Brown
green
2 sentences1966Thus it was that in Boyce v. Brown, siipra, 51 Ariz. at page 423 , 77 P.2d at page 458 , we held that “ * * * laymen cannot say that in all cases where there is some trouble with the internal organs that it is a departure from standard medical practice to fail to take an X-ray. * * * ”' But, we da believe that laymen can say that in all cases where there is continual complaints of pain from a patient over a substantial period of time, that it is a departure from standard medical practice for the doctor to fail tO' examine the patient in any manner. 1966Thus it was that in Boyce v. Brown, siipra, 51 Ariz. at page 423 , 77 P.2d at page 458 , we held that “ * * * laymen cannot say that in all cases where there is some trouble with the internal organs that it is a departure from standard medical practice to fail to take an X-ray. * * * ”' But, we da believe that laymen can say that in all cases where there is continual complaints of pain from a patient over a substantial period of time, that it is a departure from standard medical practice for the doctor to fail tO' examine the patient in any manner. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Jarnagin v. Edwards
neutral
2 sentences1950It seems to us that such a pronouncement is a complete departure from the rule as announced in the case of Jarnagin v. Edwards, 22 Ariz. 116 , 194 P. 1097 , 1098: “It is a well-settled rule of law that when parties reduce their contract to writing, and that writing is free from ambiguity and uncertainty, it may not be added to or taken from, altered, or varied, by any contemporaneous oral agreement or understanding, except for fraud or mistake. 1950It seems to us that such a pronouncement is a complete departure from the rule as announced in the case of Jarnagin v. Edwards, 22 Ariz. 116 , 194 P. 1097 , 1098: “It is a well-settled rule of law that when parties reduce their contract to writing, and that writing is free from ambiguity and uncertainty, it may not be added to or taken from, altered, or varied, by any contemporaneous oral agreement or understanding, except for fraud or mistake. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Bangs v. Sullivan
neutral
2 sentences1938Ed. 501 , the court says: “The general rule is, that the parties to the contract are the only proper parties to the suit for -its performance, and, except in the case of an assignment of the entire contract, there must be some special circumstances to authorize a departure from the rule.”' In the case of Bangs v. Sullivan, 33 Tex. Civ. 1938App. 30 , 73 S. W. 74, 78 , the question of the right of intervention is discussed, and the court says: “To confer upon a party the right to intervene in a pending suit, he must have such an interest in the subject-matter of litigation as makes it necessary or proper for him to come into the case for the protection of such right. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.