departure standard in Montana

2024Howlett, ¶ 18 (citing Norris v. Fritz, 2012 MT 27, ¶ 44 , 364 Mont. 63 , 270 P.3d 79 ). ¶15 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2024Howlett, ¶ 18 (citing Norris v. Fritz, 2012 MT 27, ¶ 44 , 364 Mont. 63 , 270 P.3d 79 ). ¶15 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2012We have repeatedly recognized that a plaintiffs failure to provide this expert testimony “is fatal to the plaintiffs claim.” Griffin v. Moseley, 2010 MT 132, ¶ 31 , 356 Mont. 393 , 234 P.3d 869 (citing Montana Deaconess Hosp. v. Gratton, 169 Mont. 185, 189 , 545 P.2d, 670, 672 (1976)). ¶19 Plaintiffs may not meet these requirements by offering CDC recommendations after their lone expert has been excluded.

2012We have repeatedly recognized that a plaintiffs failure to provide this expert testimony “is fatal to the plaintiffs claim.” Griffin v. Moseley, 2010 MT 132, ¶ 31 , 356 Mont. 393 , 234 P.3d 869 (citing Montana Deaconess Hosp. v. Gratton, 169 Mont. 185, 189 , 545 P.2d, 670, 672 (1976)). ¶19 Plaintiffs may not meet these requirements by offering CDC recommendations after their lone expert has been excluded.

2001Wagner, 208 Mont. at 380 , 679 P.2d at 758 . ¶19 The facts in the present case do not compel a similar result.

2001Wagner, 208 Mont. at 380 , 679 P.2d at 758 . ¶19 The facts in the present case do not compel a similar result.

1998Estate of Nielsen, 265 Mont. at 473 , 878 P.2d at 235-36 ; Hunter v. Missoula Community Hosp. (1988), 230 Mont. 300, 301 , 750 P.2d 106, 106 ; Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton (1976), 169 Mont. 185, 189 , 545 P.2d 670, 672 .

1998Estate of Nielsen, 265 Mont. at 473 , 878 P.2d at 235-36 ; Hunter v. Missoula Community Hosp. (1988), 230 Mont. 300, 301 , 750 P.2d 106, 106 ; Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton (1976), 169 Mont. 185, 189 , 545 P.2d 670, 672 .

1990In DOR of Revenue v. State Tax Appeal Board (1980), 188 Mont. 244, 249 , 613 P.2d 691, 694 , we quoted the United States Supreme Court saying: “This Court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 percent of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute.

1990In DOR of Revenue v. State Tax Appeal Board (1980), 188 Mont. 244, 249 , 613 P.2d 691, 694 , we quoted the United States Supreme Court saying: “This Court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 percent of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute.

1980This conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” (Emphasis added.) Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 446 , 43 S.Ct. at 192 , 67 L.Ed. 343 . *250 This disposes the Department’s argument that the appraisals could not be reduced, even though unequal, if they resulted in an assessment at true market value, or 100 percent of market value as required by section 15-8-111(1), MCA.

1980This conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law.” (Emphasis added.) Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 446 , 43 S.Ct. at 192 , 67 L.Ed. 343 . *250 This disposes the Department’s argument that the appraisals could not be reduced, even though unequal, if they resulted in an assessment at true market value, or 100 percent of market value as required by section 15-8-111(1), MCA.

1943S., Corporations, sec. 567; Sioux Falls Taxpayers Ass’n. v. Sioux Falls, S. D. 1942, 7 N. W. (2d) 136 .) Because of the questions of public policy involved and because of the far reaching effect of this departure from the doctrine so long followed by this court, I deem it advisable to review both the facts shown by the record herein and the rules of law applicable to those facts.

1921(Smith v. Barnes, 51 Mont. 202 , Ann.

1915(Williams’ Estate, 50 Mont. 142 , 145 Pac. 957 ; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 76 .) This is true, and its effect is to deprive the verdict of any support in consequence of the -order; but it does not authorize a departure from the rule [4] that, in an action at law, the verdict of the jury, based upon substantial, though conflicting, evidence, will not be disturbed by this court on appeal. 2.

1915(Williams’ Estate, 50 Mont. 142 , 145 Pac. 957 ; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 76 .) This is true, and its effect is to deprive the verdict of any support in consequence of the -order; but it does not authorize a departure from the rule [4] that, in an action at law, the verdict of the jury, based upon substantial, though conflicting, evidence, will not be disturbed by this court on appeal. 2.

1915(Williams’ Estate, 50 Mont. 142 , 145 Pac. 957 ; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 76 .) This is true, and its effect is to deprive the verdict of any support in consequence of the -order; but it does not authorize a departure from the rule [4] that, in an action at law, the verdict of the jury, based upon substantial, though conflicting, evidence, will not be disturbed by this court on appeal. 2.

1915(Williams’ Estate, 50 Mont. 142 , 145 Pac. 957 ; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 76 .) This is true, and its effect is to deprive the verdict of any support in consequence of the -order; but it does not authorize a departure from the rule [4] that, in an action at law, the verdict of the jury, based upon substantial, though conflicting, evidence, will not be disturbed by this court on appeal. 2.

1893From an examination of the Indiana cases cited by respondents, we are of opinion that the departure from the rule asserted in Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 556 , has been occasioned by the legislation in Indiana since the decision in 6 Wall. 556 .

1893From an examination of the Indiana cases cited by respondents, we are of opinion that the departure from the rule asserted in Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 556 , has been occasioned by the legislation in Indiana since the decision in 6 Wall. 556 .

1887In a Georgia case, the supreme court says: “ "Where a discrimination can be properly made and the injunction can be dissolved in part and retained as to the remainder, if the answer satisfactorily denies a portion of the equity of the bill, a dissolution may be allowed fro tanto.” Edwards v. Perryman, 18 Ga. 374 .

1887And it has been said in Alabama, as it has been often said before, that “ where the allegations of the answer are full and responsive to the bill, and fully deny its equity, the injunction will be dissolved unless apparent irreparable mischief is likely to ensue from its dissolution, or unless some peculiar circumstances exist to warrant a departure from the rule.” Satterfield, v. John, 53 Ala. 127 .