departure rule in Pennsylvania

1948The fact that it may have been difficult to apportion to each tortfeasor the harm done by him to plaintiff did not warrant a departure from this rule: Gallagher v. Kemmerer et al., 144 Pa. 509 .” The court then points out that in Pennsylvania we have departed radically from the early common-law practice.

1942The fact that it may have been difficult to apportion to each tort-feasor the harm done by him to plaintiff did not warrant a departure from this rule: Gallagher v. Kemmerer et al., 144 Pa. 509 .

2026In furtherance of this argument, Lee advances a departure claim under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), urging this Court to interpret our state charter’s prohibition against “cruel punishments” as providing greater protection to offenders than that afforded under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend.

2023Our Supreme Court’s decision in Welsh, supra, serves as an example of this.

2023Our Supreme Court’s decision in Welsh, supra, serves as an example of this.

2017Appellant also claims that the court improperly relied on “the number of victims … to justify the departure from the standard range sentence[,]” despite that “she was sentenced on each individual charge….” Id.

2009Michener v. Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau, 671 A.2d 285 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). [9] Section 607.1 was added by the Act of July 3, 1986, P.L. 35. [10] Because the upset sale was valid, this Court need not address Appellants argument that the trial court's decision to set aside the upset sale initially confirmed by the common pleas court was a departure from the rule that "judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each other's decision on the same issue." In re De Facto Condemnation and Taking of Lands of WBF Associates, L.P.

2005In so arguing she relies on this Court’s opinion in Bainhauer v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, 834 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Su *269 per.2003), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 693 , 860 A.2d 121 (2004). ¶ 13 In that case we reversed the trial court’s order precluding the introduction of expert opinion testimony that the administration of a certain drug to the hypertensive appellant as he underwent a severe and sustained drop in blood pressure during surgery was a departure from the standard of care.

2005In so arguing she relies on this Court’s opinion in Bainhauer v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, 834 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Su *269 per.2003), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 693 , 860 A.2d 121 (2004). ¶ 13 In that case we reversed the trial court’s order precluding the introduction of expert opinion testimony that the administration of a certain drug to the hypertensive appellant as he underwent a severe and sustained drop in blood pressure during surgery was a departure from the standard of care.

2005In so arguing she relies on this Court’s opinion in Bainhauer v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, 834 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Su *269 per.2003), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 693 , 860 A.2d 121 (2004). ¶ 13 In that case we reversed the trial court’s order precluding the introduction of expert opinion testimony that the administration of a certain drug to the hypertensive appellant as he underwent a severe and sustained drop in blood pressure during surgery was a departure from the standard of care.

2002Co., 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), a unanimous court squarely addressed the validity of the household exclusion outside the framework of analysis established in Marroquin and Paylor.

2002Co., 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), a unanimous court squarely addressed the validity of the household exclusion outside the framework of analysis established in Marroquin and Paylor.

2000In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); reviewed the determination in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-36 , 93 S.Ct. at 2051-52 , to the effect that, while the waiver analysis appropriately applies to safeguard constitutional guarantees involving the preservation of a fair trial of criminal defen

2000In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); reviewed the determination in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-36 , 93 S.Ct. at 2051-52 , to the effect that, while the waiver analysis appropriately applies to safeguard constitutional guarantees involving the preservation of a fair trial of criminal defen

2000In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); reviewed the determination in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-36 , 93 S.Ct. at 2051-52 , to the effect that, while the waiver analysis appropriately applies to safeguard constitutional guarantees involving the preservation of a fair trial of criminal defen

2000In Cleckley , this Court described the genesis of the voluntariness focus in the Fourth Amendment context, and the rationale supporting a departure from a waiver construct requiring "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); reviewed the determination in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-36 , 93 S.Ct. at 2051-52 , to the effect that, while the waiver analysis appropriately applies to safeguard constitutional guarantees involving the preservation of a fair trial of criminal defen

1996Appellant urges this Court to reconsider the traditional delineation of testimonial versus non-testimonial evidence which was formulated by the United states Supreme Court as early as 1910 in the decision of Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910).

1996Appellant urges this Court to reconsider the traditional delineation of testimonial versus non-testimonial evidence which was formulated by the United states Supreme Court as early as 1910 in the decision of Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 31 S.Ct. 2 , 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910).

1996See, Commonwealth v. Ragan, 438 Pa.Super. 505 , 652 A.2d 925 (1995); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 353 Pa.Super. 215 , 509 A.2d 413 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa.Super. 20 , 421 A.2d 383 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Super. 563 , 327 A.2d 375 (1974). 8 Finally, we turn to a consideration of any public policy concerns unique to our Commonwealth which would require a departure from the analysis offered by the United States Supreme Court and our sister states on the issue at bar.

1996See, Commonwealth v. Ragan, 438 Pa.Super. 505 , 652 A.2d 925 (1995); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 353 Pa.Super. 215 , 509 A.2d 413 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa.Super. 20 , 421 A.2d 383 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Super. 563 , 327 A.2d 375 (1974). 8 Finally, we turn to a consideration of any public policy concerns unique to our Commonwealth which would require a departure from the analysis offered by the United States Supreme Court and our sister states on the issue at bar.

1996See, Commonwealth v. Ragan, 438 Pa.Super. 505 , 652 A.2d 925 (1995); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 353 Pa.Super. 215 , 509 A.2d 413 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa.Super. 20 , 421 A.2d 383 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Super. 563 , 327 A.2d 375 (1974). 8 Finally, we turn to a consideration of any public policy concerns unique to our Commonwealth which would require a departure from the analysis offered by the United States Supreme Court and our sister states on the issue at bar.

1996See, Commonwealth v. Ragan, 438 Pa.Super. 505 , 652 A.2d 925 (1995); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 353 Pa.Super. 215 , 509 A.2d 413 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa.Super. 20 , 421 A.2d 383 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Super. 563 , 327 A.2d 375 (1974). 8 Finally, we turn to a consideration of any public policy concerns unique to our Commonwealth which would require a departure from the analysis offered by the United States Supreme Court and our sister states on the issue at bar.

1996See, Commonwealth v. Ragan, 438 Pa.Super. 505 , 652 A.2d 925 (1995); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 353 Pa.Super. 215 , 509 A.2d 413 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa.Super. 20 , 421 A.2d 383 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Super. 563 , 327 A.2d 375 (1974). 8 Finally, we turn to a consideration of any public policy concerns unique to our Commonwealth which would require a departure from the analysis offered by the United States Supreme Court and our sister states on the issue at bar.

1996See, Commonwealth v. Ragan, 438 Pa.Super. 505 , 652 A.2d 925 (1995); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 353 Pa.Super. 215 , 509 A.2d 413 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa.Super. 20 , 421 A.2d 383 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Super. 563 , 327 A.2d 375 (1974). 8 Finally, we turn to a consideration of any public policy concerns unique to our Commonwealth which would require a departure from the analysis offered by the United States Supreme Court and our sister states on the issue at bar.