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14 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1891–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Snyder v. Labor Commissiongreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Snyder v. Labor Comm’n, 405 P.3d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (“[A] party that fails to adequately brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry [his] burden of persuasion on appeal”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 5 The Form 11 Claim for 2021 Ciceu raises one claim that, although waived for the reasons stated above, merits additional discussion because, while the error it points to is readily apparent, it is harmless for reasons that are not. | 1 | 1 |
Anicet v. Gantgreen2 sentences2000Legal scholars and authorities recognize that it is “impossible to ascribe either the volition implicit in an intentional tort, the departure from the standard of a ‘reasonable’ person which defines an act of ordinary negligence, or indeed any concept of ‘fault’ at all to one who ... is by definition unable to control his [or her] own actions through any exercise of reason.” Anicet v. Gant, 580 So.2d 273, 275 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (citations omitted). 2000Legal scholars and authorities recognize that it is "impossible to ascribe either the volition implicit in an intentional tort, the departure from the standard of a `reasonable' person which defines an act of ordinary negligence, or indeed any concept of `fault' at all to one who . . . is by definition *664 unable to control his [or her] own actions through any exercise of reason." Anicet v. Gant, 580 So.2d 273, 275 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Presbyterian Church in US v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 447 , 89 S.Ct. at 605 . 2003Id. at 447 , 89 S.Ct. at 605 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rosenbalm v. Winski
green
2 sentences1988This court also recognized a departure from the rule in Rosenbalm v. Winski (1975), 165 Ind.App. 378 , 382 N.E.2d 249 , trans. denied. 1988This court also recognized a departure from the rule in Rosenbalm v. Winski (1975), 165 Ind. App. 378 , 332 N.E.2d 249 , trans. denied. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1983It may be noted at this point that all these decisions of the Court of Appeals represent a departure from the rule established in an earlier decision of that Court, Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Company, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 692 , 326 N.E.2d 629 . 1983It may be noted at this point that all these decisions of the Court of Appeals represent a departure from the rule established in an earlier decision of that Court, Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturing Company, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 692 , 326 N.E.2d 629 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. SMITH ET UX.
green
1 sentence1973This does not appear to be a substantial departure from the rule announced by this Court in State v. Smith, supra: “* * * if the value of the appellees’ residual land is enhanced because the location of the new highway has made it desirable for purposes other than farming, such enhanced value is a special benefit to them, although other landowners along the highway may be similarly benefited; * * * .” 237 Ind. at 79 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Anderson v. State
green
2 sentences1970In Anderson v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 372 , 156 N.E.2d 384 , the Court in holding that it was not error to deny the defendant's motion to produce police reports containing statements of prosecuting witnesses said: "We do not here decide that under no circumstances may the accused inspect statements made by witnesses which are a part of such file, as where it is first shown that such statements are in direct conflict with the testimony of the witnesses in open court and that such prior statements would prove the innocence of the accused. 1970In Anderson v. State (1959), 289 Ind. 372 , 156 N. E. 2d 384 , the Court in holding that it was not error to deny the defendant’s motion to produce police reports containing statements of prosecuting witnesses said: “We do not here decide that under no circumstances may the accused inspect statements made by witnesses which are a part of such file, as where it is first shown that such statements are in direct conflict with the testimony of the witnesses in open court and that such prior statements would prove the innocence of the accused. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Hadley
green
1 sentence1957Co. v. Hadley (1907), 170 Ind. 204 , 40 Ind. App. 731 , 82 N. E. 1025 , 84 N. E. 13 ; The Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Hadley
neutral
2 sentences1957Co. v. Hadley (1907), 170 Ind. 204 , 40 Ind. App. 731 , 82 N. E. 1025 , 84 N. E. 13 ; The Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. 1957Co. v. Hadley (1907), 170 Ind. 204 , 40 Ind. App. 731 , 82 N. E. 1025 , 84 N. E. 13 ; The Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Murphy v. Daly
green
2 sentences1943The language of the Cutsinger case, supra, was not designed to indicate a departure from the rule an *411 nounced in Murphy v. Daly (1934), 206 Ind. 179 , 188 N. E. 769 , and its use in connection with a different question was unnecessary. 1943The language of the Cutsinger case, supra, was not designed to indicate a departure from the rule an *411 nounced in Murphy v. Daly (1934), 206 Ind. 179 , 188 N. E. 769 , and its use in connection with a different question was unnecessary. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Ellingham v. Dye
green
2 sentences1919Ellingham v. Dye (1912), 178 Ind. 336 , 99 N. E. 1, 29 , Ann. 1919Ellingham v. Dye (1912), 178 Ind. 336 , 99 N. E. 1, 29 , Ann. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Spencer v. Merchant
green
1 sentence1918Most of the later cases on the subject follow the rule announced in Spencer v. Merchant (1887), 125 U. S. 345 , 8 Sup. Ct. 921, 31 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Hartranft v. Sheppard
green
1 sentence1918Most of the later cases on the subject follow the rule announced in Spencer v. Merchant (1887), 125 U. S. 345 , 8 Sup. Ct. 921, 31 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Shaw v. Merchants National Bank
neutral
1 sentence1894The true theory is that there must be a decision by a court of original jurisdiction to be reviewed by the appellate tribunal, for unless this be so, the appellate court becomes a trial court.” It has been held by this court that “a pleading which is insufficient on demurrer may, in some instances, in the absence of a demurrer, be cured by the verdict. ” Shaw v. Merchants’ Nat’l Bank, 60 Ind. 83 ; Indianapolis, etc., R. | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Houk v. Allen
neutral
2 sentences1892The statement is immaterial to the opinion and was made in view of the fact that counsel for appellee had filed four separate briefs in the case, and three of them were devoted almost exclusively to an attack upon the decision in the case of Houk v. Allen, supra, insisting that it was not sound in reason, and was a departure from the rule as declared by this court in earlier cases, and that it should be overruled, which is regarded as clearly ah implied admission that the case was decisive of the question and must be overruled in order to avoid a reversal of the judgment in this case, and for 1892We are still inclined to adhere to the decision in Houk v. Allen, supra, and to hold that it is decisive of the question presented in this case in relation to the misconduct of the jury. | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Patterson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence1891The opinions in the cases of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 , and Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 , were written by the same great judge, Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinions in Patterson v. Kentucky, supra, and in Smith v. Alabama, etc., Co., supra, and there is not in them the slightest intimation of a departure from the doctrine of the former cases ; on the contrary, those doctrines are adhered to, and the meat inspection laws were condemned because they discriminated against the citizens of other States. | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Minnesota v. Barber
green
1 sentence1891The opinions in the cases of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 , and Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 , were written by the same great judge, Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinions in Patterson v. Kentucky, supra, and in Smith v. Alabama, etc., Co., supra, and there is not in them the slightest intimation of a departure from the doctrine of the former cases ; on the contrary, those doctrines are adhered to, and the meat inspection laws were condemned because they discriminated against the citizens of other States. | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Brimmer v. Rebman
green
1 sentence1891The opinions in the cases of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 , and Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 , were written by the same great judge, Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinions in Patterson v. Kentucky, supra, and in Smith v. Alabama, etc., Co., supra, and there is not in them the slightest intimation of a departure from the doctrine of the former cases ; on the contrary, those doctrines are adhered to, and the meat inspection laws were condemned because they discriminated against the citizens of other States. | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.