departure rule in New Jersey

1991Ibid.

1984Princeton University Press v. Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961); Container Ring Co., Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 1 N.J.Tax 203, 208 (Tax Ct.1980), aff’d 4 N.J.Tax 527 (App.Div.1981), certif. den. 87 N.J. 416 (1981).

1991As we stated in Parker v. Goldstein, 78 N.J.Super. 472 , 189 A.2d 441 (App.Div. 1963), the obligation was upon the plaintiff to prove through expert testimony deviation by the defendant physician “from recognized standards as a basis for liability, [which] necessarily included a showing directly, or by legitimate inference, that the departure from a standard was causally connected with the death.” Id. at 480 , 189 A. 2d 441 .

1991As we stated in Parker v. Goldstein, 78 N.J.Super. 472 , 189 A.2d 441 (App.Div. 1963), the obligation was upon the plaintiff to prove through expert testimony deviation by the defendant physician “from recognized standards as a basis for liability, [which] necessarily included a showing directly, or by legitimate inference, that the departure from a standard was causally connected with the death.” Id. at 480 , 189 A. 2d 441 .

2026But the test the majority crafts is not found in the statutory text, its legislative history, or in Hardwicke, and although the test is purportedly derived from Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993), it is a significant departure from that standard, consisting of new elements and considerations.

2020As the Evers Court held, a defendant's status as a first-time offender, "family man," "breadwinner," and esteemed member of the community, however commendable and worthy of consideration in deciding the length of his term of incarceration, is not so extraordinary as to alter the conclusion that his imprisonment would not constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence. [ 175 N.J. at 400 .] A-2098-17T3 19 Thus, the factors found by the sentencing judge, related to the crime and defendants' character, evidenced by the numerous letters lauding defendants as respected members of

2020Defendants have not met the heavy burden necessary to satisfy the "serious injustice standard." See id. at 394-95 .

2000Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 3 N.J.

1992LUKE of MORRIS-TOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, be disbarred under the rule of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 , 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), for the knowing misappropriation of clients funds by withholding a client’s share of the proceeds of a settlement and invading those funds for his own purposes and by invading clients’ escrow funds in a real-estate matter in violation of In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21 , 504 A.2d 1174 (1985); and Respondent having candidly accepted the responsibility for his acts and raised as the only issue in the disciplinary proceedings below whether there

1992LUKE of MORRIS-TOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, be disbarred under the rule of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 , 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), for the knowing misappropriation of clients funds by withholding a client’s share of the proceeds of a settlement and invading those funds for his own purposes and by invading clients’ escrow funds in a real-estate matter in violation of In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21 , 504 A.2d 1174 (1985); and Respondent having candidly accepted the responsibility for his acts and raised as the only issue in the disciplinary proceedings below whether there

1992LUKE of MORRIS-TOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, be disbarred under the rule of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 , 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), for the knowing misappropriation of clients funds by withholding a client’s share of the proceeds of a settlement and invading those funds for his own purposes and by invading clients’ escrow funds in a real-estate matter in violation of In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21 , 504 A.2d 1174 (1985); and Respondent having candidly accepted the responsibility for his acts and raised as the only issue in the disciplinary proceedings below whether there

1992LUKE of MORRIS-TOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, be disbarred under the rule of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 , 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), for the knowing misappropriation of clients funds by withholding a client’s share of the proceeds of a settlement and invading those funds for his own purposes and by invading clients’ escrow funds in a real-estate matter in violation of In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21 , 504 A.2d 1174 (1985); and Respondent having candidly accepted the responsibility for his acts and raised as the only issue in the disciplinary proceedings below whether there

1992LUKE of MORRIS-TOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, be disbarred under the rule of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 , 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), for the knowing misappropriation of clients funds by withholding a client’s share of the proceeds of a settlement and invading those funds for his own purposes and by invading clients’ escrow funds in a real-estate matter in violation of In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21 , 504 A.2d 1174 (1985); and Respondent having candidly accepted the responsibility for his acts and raised as the only issue in the disciplinary proceedings below whether there

1992LUKE of MORRIS-TOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981, be disbarred under the rule of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 , 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), for the knowing misappropriation of clients funds by withholding a client’s share of the proceeds of a settlement and invading those funds for his own purposes and by invading clients’ escrow funds in a real-estate matter in violation of In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21 , 504 A.2d 1174 (1985); and Respondent having candidly accepted the responsibility for his acts and raised as the only issue in the disciplinary proceedings below whether there

1990Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 , 300 A. 2d 142 (1973). "[G]eneral public importance alone will warrant a departure from that rule." Brown v. Shaw, 174 N.J.

1990Super. 32, 39 , 415 A. 2d 360 (App.Div. 1980).

1989Our trial courts will continue to be controlled by trial judges, not by defendants." However, nothing in *577 McCombs can compel a departure from the rule in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 (1975), that before a defendant may be permitted to represent himself or herself, there must be a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.

1989Our trial courts will continue to be controlled by trial judges, not by defendants." However, nothing in *577 McCombs can compel a departure from the rule in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 (1975), that before a defendant may be permitted to represent himself or herself, there must be a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.

1984Princeton University Press v. Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961); Container Ring Co., Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 1 N.J.Tax 203, 208 (Tax Ct.1980), aff’d 4 N.J.Tax 527 (App.Div.1981), certif. den. 87 N.J. 416 (1981).

1984Princeton University Press v. Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961); Container Ring Co., Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 1 N.J.Tax 203, 208 (Tax Ct.1980), aff’d 4 N.J.Tax 527 (App.Div.1981), certif. den. 87 N.J. 416 (1981).

1983Defendants also rely on statements made by Justice Handler in his opinion for the Court in the recent case of State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983), as indicating a departure from the rule established in Manley .

1980Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. East Brunswick Tp., 60 N.J. 115 (1972).

1972Arlen of Nanuet, Inc. v. State of New York, 26 N.Y. 2d 346 , 310 N.Y.S. 2d 465 , 258 N.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1970).

1972Arlen of Nanuet, Inc. v. State of New York, 26 N.Y. 2d 346 , 310 N.Y.S. 2d 465 , 258 N.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1970).

1967Although the applicant had invested substantial sums in alterations of the property upon the basis of the previous grant of a building permit, apparently issued on the assumption that the use would be a home occupation allowed by the ordinance, the court in Keller v. Town of Westfield, supra (per Judge, now Justice, Francis) said: "A departure from the requirement for residence in such cases is authorized only when it would be consistent with the spirit of the zoning plan and in harmony with N.J.S.A. 40:55-39(d).

1954The relief against inequality of assessment secured by the Fourteenth Amendment requires the reduction of the aggrieved taxpayer’s assessment to the general level of assessments “even though this is a departure from the requirement of [state] statute,” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, supra, 260 U. S. 441, 446 , 43 S. Ct. 190, 192 , 67 L.

1954The relief against inequality of assessment secured by the Fourteenth Amendment requires the reduction of the aggrieved taxpayer’s assessment to the general level of assessments “even though this is a departure from the requirement of [state] statute,” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, supra, 260 U. S. 441, 446 , 43 S. Ct. 190, 192 , 67 L.

1891Cas.) 233; Young v. Young, supra. In my judgment the character of the property in shares of a corporation, as well as the distinctive qualities of a gift inter vivos, forbid a departure from the rule, that a valid gift of such property cannot be made by the delivery of the certificate of stock, without formal transfer, or an assignment and power in writing-to transfer the shares.