14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Romanskygreen2 sentences2022In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (“[W]hat may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty.” (quoting In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990))). 2022In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (“[W]hat may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty.” (quoting In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990))). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Shortergreen2 sentences2022In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (“[W]hat may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty.” (quoting In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990))). 2022In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (“[W]hat may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty.” (quoting In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990))). | 2 | 2 |
Yasser Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLCgreen1 sentence2018See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1339-1341 (dismissing complaint with prejudice under Rule 12 (b)(6) for failure to state a claim). 49 bears remembering that the fact that a defendant can make a threshold showing that the claim arises from activities “in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest,” D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Freemangreen1 sentence2014To begin with, although the text of Rule 1 and the accompanying form petition do not say so explicitly, we heretofore have held that the Rule requires a petitioner to name the PERB (or the Office of Employee Appeals, as the case may be) as the respondent in the caption of his petition for review.13 A petition that fails to name the PERB in the caption, and that instead names the opposing party in the agency proceeding as the respondent, is noncompliant even if the petition elsewhere correctly identifies the PERB as the 12 See Gibson v. Freeman, 941 A.2d 1032, 1034-35 (D.C. 2008). 13 District o | 1 | 1 |
Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Services, Inc.green1 sentence2002Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 305 (D.Kan.1996); see also MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 33 — 105[3], at 33-79 (3d ed.1997) (noting the interpretation of rule by one court as requiring the responding party “to list exact documents or even indicate the page or paragraphs that are responsive to the interrogatory”). | 1 | 1 |
Ferreira v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1998“The presumption is ‘designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute’ and ‘reflects a strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable eases.’ ” Spartin v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 584 A.2d 564, 572 (D.C.1990) (quoting Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1987) (internal citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Spartin v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1998“The presumption is ‘designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute’ and ‘reflects a strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable eases.’ ” Spartin v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 584 A.2d 564, 572 (D.C.1990) (quoting Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1987) (internal citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER COMPANY v. Covingtongreen1 sentence1992The “settled rule” in this jurisdiction is that a motion for a continuance is “addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and a ruling thereon will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Covington, 323 A.2d 718, 722 (D.C.1974). | 1 | 1 |
Underwood v. Capital Transit Co.green2 sentences1975Moreover, in Martin v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 298 , 225 F.2d 945, 949 (1955), the court stated: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, does no more than establish a prima facie case based on an inference by virtue of which the plaintiff is enabled to escape the possibility of having the court direct a verdict against him. . . . [quoting Underwood v. Capital Transit Co., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 69-70 , 183 F.2d 822, 823 (1950) (emphasis in original).] 1975Moreover, in Martin v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 298 , 225 F.2d 945, 949 (1955), the court stated: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, does no more than establish a prima facie case based on an inference by virtue of which the plaintiff is enabled to escape the possibility of having the court direct a verdict against him. . . . [quoting Underwood v. Capital Transit Co., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 69-70 , 183 F.2d 822, 823 (1950) (emphasis in original).] | 1 | 1 |
Annie M. Martin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1975Moreover, in Martin v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 298 , 225 F.2d 945, 949 (1955), the court stated: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, does no more than establish a prima facie case based on an inference by virtue of which the plaintiff is enabled to escape the possibility of having the court direct a verdict against him. . . . [quoting Underwood v. Capital Transit Co., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 69-70 , 183 F.2d 822, 823 (1950) (emphasis in original).] 1975Moreover, in Martin v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 298 , 225 F.2d 945, 949 (1955), the court stated: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, does no more than establish a prima facie case based on an inference by virtue of which the plaintiff is enabled to escape the possibility of having the court direct a verdict against him. . . . [quoting Underwood v. Capital Transit Co., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 69-70 , 183 F.2d 822, 823 (1950) (emphasis in original).] | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Mance
green
2 sentences2024Accordingly, we “announce this interpretation of the rule for the first time.” In re Mance, 980 A.2d at 1199 . 2024In bar disciplinary cases like this, we have seen fit to apply such holdings “prospectively.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Jackson v. United States
green
1 sentence2017However, Harris’s affidavits informed the court that the results of each of these tests are “susceptible to error” and have “an associated degree of uncertainty.” Specifically, Harris averred that “other plant species unrelated to marijuana share similar morphological charaeteris-tics” on microscopic review; that the D-L test is expected to sometimes yield false positives, both because it is a screening test and because the analysts must interpret the colors the test produces; and that false positive results can be obtained on the GC/MS test because of sample contamination or “[ijncorrect or o | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Duvall v. United States
green
2 sentences2010As we noted in Duvall, supra, "the Supreme Court 'did not reach' the question whether the error in admitting the forensic analyst certificates was harmless." 975 A.2d at 844 n. 5. 15 . 2010As we noted in Duvall, supra, "the Supreme Court 'did not reach' the question whether the error in admitting the forensic analyst certificates was harmless." 975 A.2d at 844 n. 5. 15 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp.
green
2 sentences2003He cites Doerr, 774 So.2d at 134-36 , in which the court indicated that a number of different factors should be considered in the determination whether an insured is a “polluter.” This approach, according to our dissenting colleague, denies the exclusion its requisite clarity. 43 But it is the court’s duty to determine whether or not the situation before it — here Ms. Richardson’s inhalation of carbon monoxide fumes from an apartment house furnace — falls within the absolute pollution exclusion in REO’s policy 44 We must make that determination on the basis of the language of the exclusion and 2003He cites Doerr, 774 So.2d at 134-36 , in which the court indicated that a number of different factors should be considered in the determination whether an insured is a "polluter." This approach, according to our dissenting colleague, denies the exclusion its requisite clarity. [43] But it is the court's duty to determine whether or not the situation before ithere Ms. Richardson's inhalation of carbon monoxide fumes from an apartment house furnacefalls within the absolute pollution exclusion in REO's policy. [44] We *340 must make that determination on the basis of the language of the exclusi | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Glass v. Smith
green
2 sentences1981Courts, in fact, have applied the liberal interpretation rule with vigor in both procedural 40 and substantive contexts. 41 For example, in Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632 , 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951), the Texas Supreme Court stated in a well-considered opinion that it would impose on the initiative right only those limitations expressed in the law or “clear[ly] and compelling[ly]” implied. 1981Courts, in fact, have applied the liberal interpretation rule with vigor in both procedural 40 and substantive contexts. 41 For example, in Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632 , 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951), the Texas Supreme Court stated in a well-considered opinion that it would impose on the initiative right only those limitations expressed in the law or “clear[ly] and compelling[ly]” implied. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stone v. Powell
green
2 sentences1979We are cognizant of the need to promote this certainty and orderliness, but we see no reason to hold that Rule 47-I(c) does not address the appearance of substituted counsel where, as here, there is no basis to conclude that the substitution was for the purpose of evading the ten-day limit. 2 This interpretation of the rule is consistent with its language and the need to insure a full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claims, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), and other issues raised by the counsel who ultimately bears the responsibility 1979We are cognizant of the need to promote this certainty and orderliness, but we see no reason to hold that Rule 47-I(c) does not address the appearance of substituted counsel where, as here, there is no basis to conclude that the substitution was for the purpose of evading the ten-day limit. 2 This interpretation of the rule is consistent with its language and the need to insure a full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claims, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), and other issues raised by the counsel who ultimately bears the responsibility | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.