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18 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2013See State v. Garcia, 2002-NMCA-050, ¶ 12 , 132 2 N.M. 180 , 45 P.3d 900 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule that would render part of 3 the rule meaningless). 4 {4} With respect to Section 40-4-20, that statute permits the re-opening of a divorce 5 case where there remains undivided community property. 2013See State v. Garcia, 2002-NMCA-050, ¶ 12 , 132 2 N.M. 180 , 45 P.3d 900 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule that would render part of 3 the rule meaningless). 4 {4} With respect to Section 40-4-20, that statute permits the re-opening of a divorce 5 case where there remains undivided community property. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Astorgagreen1 sentence2019See State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 17, 20 , 343 P.3d 1245 (noting that the record is “frequently insufficient to establish whether an action taken by defense counsel was reasonable and refusing to speculate” as to the interpretation of defense counsel’s ambiguous statement regarding his failure to litigate a 10-8 call (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {48} During trial Agent Salcido testified that he and Sergeant Martinez knocked on Defendant’s front door while wearing plain clothes and not displaying their weapons. | 1 | 1 |
Madrid v. Village of Chamagreen1 sentence2013See State v. Garcia, 2002-NMCA-050, ¶ 12 , 132 2 N.M. 180 , 45 P.3d 900 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule that would render part of 3 the rule meaningless). 4 {4} With respect to Section 40-4-20, that statute permits the re-opening of a divorce 5 case where there remains undivided community property. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stephen F.green2 sentences2011See State v. Stephen F., 3 2006-NMSC-030, ¶ 7 , 140 N.M. 24 , 139 P.3d 184 ; State v. Maestas, 2007-NMCA- 4 155, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 104 , 173 P.3d 26 (holding that application of Supreme Court Rule 5 7-506 NMRA is reviewed de novo). 2011See State v. Stephen F., 3 2006-NMSC-030, ¶ 7 , 140 N.M. 24 , 139 P.3d 184 ; State v. Maestas, 2007-NMCA- 4 155, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 104 , 173 P.3d 26 (holding that application of Supreme Court Rule 5 7-506 NMRA is reviewed de novo). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lohbergergreen2 sentences2010See State v. Lohberger, 2008-NMSC-033, ¶ 18 , 144 N.M. 297 , 187 13 P.3d 162 . 14 Defendant’s docketing statement indicates that he was arrested on August 24, 15 2009, but the district attorney’s office was not served until September 4, 2009, eleven 16 days after the arrest. [DS 2-3; but see RP 125-26 (indicating that the district 17 attorney’s office was not served until September 8, 2009—fifteen days after the 18 arrest)] Defendant asserts that dismissal was required because the district attorney’s 19 office was not served within five days as required by the rule. [DS 3] 2 1 In this Court’s 2010See State v. Lohberger, 2008-NMSC-033, ¶ 18 , 144 N.M. 297 , 187 13 P.3d 162 . 14 Defendant’s docketing statement indicates that he was arrested on August 24, 15 2009, but the district attorney’s office was not served until September 4, 2009, eleven 16 days after the arrest. [DS 2-3; but see RP 125-26 (indicating that the district 17 attorney’s office was not served until September 8, 2009—fifteen days after the 18 arrest)] Defendant asserts that dismissal was required because the district attorney’s 19 office was not served within five days as required by the rule. [DS 3] 2 1 In this Court’s | 1 | 1 |
Holguin v. Tsay Corporationgreen2 sentences2010See R & R Deli, 2006-NMCA-020, ¶ 19 , 139 N.M. 85 , 128 P.3d 513 (holding that neither breach of contract nor tort claims constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact); see also Holguin, 2009-NMCA-056, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 346 , 210 P.3d 243 (holding that invasion of privacy claims and the alleged emotional injuries stemming from those claims do not constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact). 2010See R & R Deli, 2006-NMCA-020, ¶ 19 , 139 N.M. 85 , 128 P.3d 513 (holding that neither breach of contract nor tort claims constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact); see also Holguin, 2009-NMCA-056, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 346 , 210 P.3d 243 (holding that invasion of privacy claims and the alleged emotional injuries stemming from those claims do not constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact). | 1 | 1 |
R & R DELI, INC. v. Santa Ana Star Casinogreen2 sentences2010See R & R Deli, 2006-NMCA-020, ¶ 19 , 139 N.M. 85 , 128 P.3d 513 (holding that neither breach of contract nor tort claims constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact); see also Holguin, 2009-NMCA-056, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 346 , 210 P.3d 243 (holding that invasion of privacy claims and the alleged emotional injuries stemming from those claims do not constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact). 2010See R & R Deli, 2006-NMCA-020, ¶ 19 , 139 N.M. 85 , 128 P.3d 513 (holding that neither breach of contract nor tort claims constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact); see also Holguin, 2009-NMCA-056, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 346 , 210 P.3d 243 (holding that invasion of privacy claims and the alleged emotional injuries stemming from those claims do not constitute property damage as contemplated by the Compact). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences2010We thus do not agree with the State that the plain meaning of the rule requires a different interpretation of the rule than given by the district court. {13} As to the intent of the rule, the State argues that the Supreme Court intended the rule to address the concern of the Legislature, as reflected in NMSA 1978, Section 31-ll-l(E) (1988) (providing eligibility for bail if a probation revocation hearing is not brought to court within sixty days), and of this Court, as stated in State v. Chavez, 102 N.M. 279, 281 , 694 P.2d 927, 929 (Ct.App.1985) (stating that probation revocation proceedings 2010We thus do not agree with the State that the plain meaning of the rule requires a different interpretation of the rule than given by the district court. {13} As to the intent of the rule, the State argues that the Supreme Court intended the rule to address the concern of the Legislature, as reflected in NMSA 1978, Section 31-ll-l(E) (1988) (providing eligibility for bail if a probation revocation hearing is not brought to court within sixty days), and of this Court, as stated in State v. Chavez, 102 N.M. 279, 281 , 694 P.2d 927, 929 (Ct.App.1985) (stating that probation revocation proceedings | 1 | 1 |
Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 453 , 212 P.3d 341 . {7} Rule 11-606(B) states: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith. 2009See Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 13 , 146 N.M. 453 , 212 P.3d 341 . {7} Rule 11-606(B) states: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Couchgreen2 sentences2008This interpretation of defense of habitation is supported by Couch, where the defendant fired a shotgun from within his home at an intruder who was outside, pelting the home with rocks. 52 N.M. at 130 , 193 P.2d at 406 . 2008This interpretation of defense of habitation is supported by Couch, where the defendant fired a shotgun from within his home at an intruder who was outside, pelting the home with rocks. 52 N.M. at 130 , 193 P.2d at 406 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2008In a letter opinion, it ruled that State v. Lucas, 110 N.M. 272, 274 , 794 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Ct.App.1990), encourages a common-sense, as opposed to a technical, reading of the rule, and therefore Defendant’s acting in such a way as to require the issuance of a bench warrant for his arrest, which caused the vacation of the trial date, was sufficient to begin the six-month rule anew pursuant to Rule 5-604(B)(5). 2008In a letter opinion, it ruled that State v. Lucas, 110 N.M. 272, 274 , 794 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Ct.App.1990), encourages a common-sense, as opposed to a technical, reading of the rule, and therefore Defendant’s acting in such a way as to require the issuance of a bench warrant for his arrest, which caused the vacation of the trial date, was sufficient to begin the six-month rule anew pursuant to Rule 5-604(B)(5). | 1 | 1 |
Williamson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999“The basis of the exception is the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one’s interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect, and is thus sufficiently sanctioned, though oath and cross-examination are wanting.” 5 Wigmore, supra, § 1457, at 329; accord Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ; 4 Christopher B. 1999“The basis of the exception is the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one’s interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect, and is thus sufficiently sanctioned, though oath and cross-examination are wanting.” 5 Wigmore, supra, § 1457, at 329; accord Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ; 4 Christopher B. | 1 | 1 |
Wineman v. Kelly's Restaurantgreen2 sentences1999See Wineman v. Kelly’s Restaurant, 113 N.M. 184, 185 , 824 P.2d 324, 325 (Ct.App.1991) (applying a canon of construction used to interpret statutes to an interpretation of a rule adopted by the Workers’ Compensation Administration). 1999See Wineman v. Kelly’s Restaurant, 113 N.M. 184, 185 , 824 P.2d 324, 325 (Ct.App.1991) (applying a canon of construction used to interpret statutes to an interpretation of a rule adopted by the Workers’ Compensation Administration). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. LeMaster
green
1 sentence2012At least 4 twice during each calendar year, the court shall review all actions 5 governed by this paragraph. 6 The proper interpretation of this rule is a question of law that we review de novo. 7 Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 11 , 267 P.3d 806 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Maestas
green
2 sentences2011See State v. Stephen F., 3 2006-NMSC-030, ¶ 7 , 140 N.M. 24 , 139 P.3d 184 ; State v. Maestas, 2007-NMCA- 4 155, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 104 , 173 P.3d 26 (holding that application of Supreme Court Rule 5 7-506 NMRA is reviewed de novo). 2011See State v. Stephen F., 3 2006-NMSC-030, ¶ 7 , 140 N.M. 24 , 139 P.3d 184 ; State v. Maestas, 2007-NMCA- 4 155, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 104 , 173 P.3d 26 (holding that application of Supreme Court Rule 5 7-506 NMRA is reviewed de novo). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Benally
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 1233 . {14} To the extent that Plaintiff encourages this Court to adopt a broader interpretation of the rule's exception, we decline to do so. 2009Id. at 1233 . {14} To the extent that Plaintiff encourages this Court to adopt a broader interpretation of the rule’s exception, we decline to do so. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Massengill
green
2 sentences2005Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, ¶ 14 , 133 N.M. 263 , 62 P.3d 354 . 2005Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, ¶ 14 , 133 N.M. 263 , 62 P.3d 354 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Trujillo
green
1 sentence2005The Supreme Court concluded that adopting the narrow interpretation of the rule articulated in Barela “would deprive [a factfinder] of reliable probative evidence relevant to the [factfinder’s] truth-seeking role.” Id. {20} Because Rule 11-803(X) is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception, statements offered under this exception must demonstrate sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Uhden v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
green
2 sentences1999In applying this canon, we are also mindful of the holding in Uhden v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Comm’n, 112 N.M. 528 , 817 P.2d 721 (1991), which relied on principles of due process to conclude that notice had been constitutionally deficient. {18} In reaching its holding, the Uhden court noted that “[t]he essence of justice is largely procedural.” Id. at 530 , 817 P.2d at 723 . 1999In applying this canon, we are also mindful of the holding in Uhden v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Comm’n, 112 N.M. 528 , 817 P.2d 721 (1991), which relied on principles of due process to conclude that notice had been constitutionally deficient. {18} In reaching its holding, the Uhden court noted that “[t]he essence of justice is largely procedural.” Id. at 530 , 817 P.2d at 723 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Newton
green
2 sentences1998Finally, the court noted that "a narrow interpretation of the rule would apply equally to statements offered by a defendant to exculpate the defendant . . . [,] thereby making it more difficult for a defendant to present relevant evidence supporting a theory of noninvolvement in the alleged crime." Id. 1998Finally, the court noted that “a narrow interpretation of the rule would apply equally to statements offered by a defendant to exculpate the defendant ... [,] thereby making it more difficult for a defendant to present relevant evidence supporting a theory of non-involvement in the alleged crime.” Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Flores
green
2 sentences1986The supreme court case of State v. Flores, 99 N.M. 44 , 653 P.2d 875 (1982) is analogous to the case at bar. 1986The supreme court case of State v. Flores, 99 N.M. 44 , 653 P.2d 875 (1982) is analogous to the case at bar. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Edmonds v. United States
green
1 sentence1983Edmonds v. United States, 148 F.Supp. 185 (D.C.E.D.Wis.1957). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Ellison
green
2 sentences1939“The question for the jury was, did the defendant commit the crime as charged?” State v. Ellison, supra. In view of a somewhat confused situation that has arisen through the years in disagreement of counsel in the interpretation of the rule respecting corroboration as we have treated the'subject from the earliest cases until now, it might be well to clearly and definitely state that we do not consider that Justice Parker, in the language used in State v. Ellison, 19 N.M. at page 449 , 144 P. at page 17 , laid down or announced a rule of law, when he said: “It is of course true, in a sense the 1939“The question for the jury was, did the defendant commit the crime as charged?” State v. Ellison, supra. In view of a somewhat confused situation that has arisen through the years in disagreement of counsel in the interpretation of the rule respecting corroboration as we have treated the'subject from the earliest cases until now, it might be well to clearly and definitely state that we do not consider that Justice Parker, in the language used in State v. Ellison, 19 N.M. at page 449 , 144 P. at page 17 , laid down or announced a rule of law, when he said: “It is of course true, in a sense the | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.