interpretation rule in Indiana

2011Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 , 467 n. 4 (Ind.2009).

2011Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 , 467 n. 4 (Ind.2009).

2007In following Storey, the Diesel court maintained “T.R. 75(A)(2) places venue in the county where the chattel [ ] is located if there is a claim for injuries to the chattel [ ] or if there is a claim relating to the chattel [ ].” (Emphasis added.) Diesel, 634 N.E.2d at 1353 .

1994In Diesel, the “injury” requirement of Burris and its progeny 1 was rejected in favor of a broad interpretation of the rule as set forth in Storey Oil v. American States Ins. (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 232, 235 (T.R. 75(A)(2) is not limited to claims affecting ownership, possessory, or security interest in land; in action between insurer and insured, preferred venue lies in county where insured’s land which gives rise to insurance claim is located). . 634 N.E.2d at 1354 .

1987The seminal Indiana case, Baker v. Compton, recognized this: 'Although the interpretation placed upon the statute by an administrative agency of this state may not be binding upon this court if the interpretation is incorrect, such interpretation as has been made and applied in a number of previous adoptions, is entitled to considerable weight. ...' General Foods, 427 N.E.2d at 671 (quoting Baker v. Compton, 211 N.E.2d at 164 ) (citations omitted).

1981The seminal Indiana case, Baker v. Compton, (1965) 247 Ind. 39 , 211 N.E.2d 162, 164 , recognized this: “Although the interpretation placed upon the statute by an administrative agency of the state may not be binding upon this Court if the interpretation is incorrect, such interpretation as has been made and applied in a number of previous adoptions, is entitled to considerable weight . . . . ”

1963“In Hayworth v. Bromwell (1959), 239 Ind. 430, 437 , 158 N. E. 2d 285, 288 , we said: “ ‘Under the rule prevailing prior to the adoption or Rule 1-8A, supra, a jury trial could be demanded on the morning the trial was to begin.

1963“In Hayworth v. Bromwell (1959), 239 Ind. 430, 437 , 158 N. E. 2d 285, 288 , we said: “ ‘Under the rule prevailing prior to the adoption or Rule 1-8A, supra, a jury trial could be demanded on the morning the trial was to begin.

2019Id. [25] Walters argues the certification used to authenticate the 6065 Phone records was not self-authenticating, reliable, or trustworthy because it was executed approximately eighteen months after production of the records, it was not notarized, the affidavit did not include the number of pages certified, and it did not "include any identification information by which anyone outside of possibly the proponent, Verizon, could tie the records to the phone number listed on the search warrant." (Br. of Appellant at 10.) The State counters that the certificate is a proper authentication for the p

2017In essence, J.G.’s entire argument amounts to the fact that client was not left alone when J.G. left the residence to purchase food because the hospice nurse was present to provide supervision. [24] J.G. likens her situation to Reed v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 32 N.E.3d 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2014“Although a rule adopted by the Supreme Court is not a statute, it has the same binding force as any formally promulgated statute,” and thus when we interpret rules of court “we follow the same rules of construction as when we interpret statutes.” Ind. Newspapers, Inc. v. Miller, 980 N.E.2d 852, 860 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), ajfd on reh’g, vacated on trans., 987 N.E.2d 70 (Ind.2013), trans. vacated and opinion reinstated, 994 N.E.2d 731 (Ind.2013).

2007See, e.g., Manzon v. Stant Corp., 138 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1114 (S.D.Ind.2001); Schwartz, 762 N.E.2d at 197-98 .

2000Id. at 1223 .

1997See Valentin v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (Friedlander, J., concurring in result) (because the text of Article 1, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution has not changed, neither does the interpretation or analysis); Sharp v. State, 684 N.E.2d 544 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (concluding that Games v. State disapproved Indiana’s former double jeopardy analysis).

1997Corp. v. Garrett Corp. (1977) D.Md., 437 F.Supp. 1301 , affd, (1979) 4th Cir., 601 F.2d 155 , the court noted that despite a contract clause selecting state law to govern contract interpretation, federal law should be consulted with respect to the interpretation of standard government procurement regulations incorporated into the contract.

1997Corp. v. Garrett Corp. (1977) D.Md., 437 F.Supp. 1301 , affd, (1979) 4th Cir., 601 F.2d 155 , the court noted that despite a contract clause selecting state law to govern contract interpretation, federal law should be consulted with respect to the interpretation of standard government procurement regulations incorporated into the contract.

1992In particular, he looked to rule 54(A) which defined "judgment" as a "decree and any order from which an appeal lies." 450 U.S. at 370-371 , 101 S.Ct. at 1159 , 67 L.Ed.2d at 804 .

1992In particular, he looked to rule 54(A) which defined "judgment" as a "decree and any order from which an appeal lies." 450 U.S. at 370-371 , 101 S.Ct. at 1159 , 67 L.Ed.2d at 804 .

1991Article I, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." Fordyce and the ICLU urge that this court adopt an interpretation of this clause similar to that reached by the Oregon supreme court in State v. Robertson (1982), 293 Or. 402 , 649 P.2d 569 .

1991Article I, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." Fordyce and the ICLU urge that this court adopt an interpretation of this clause similar to that reached by the Oregon supreme court in State v. Robertson (1982), 293 Or. 402 , 649 P.2d 569 .

1987The seminal Indiana case, Baker v. Compton, recognized this: 'Although the interpretation placed upon the statute by an administrative agency of this state may not be binding upon this court if the interpretation is incorrect, such interpretation as has been made and applied in a number of previous adoptions, is entitled to considerable weight. ...' General Foods, 427 N.E.2d at 671 (quoting Baker v. Compton, 211 N.E.2d at 164 ) (citations omitted).

1987We hold the trial court's ruling on the dismissal of the second petition, as set out above, is adequate to comply with the rule and is in compliance with the interpretation of that rule as set out in Mosley v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 867 .

1965The mere citation of authorities does not comply with the interpretation of the rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana in the cases of Ball v. McPheeters (1937), 211 Ind. 157 , 5 N. E. 2d 885 and Deming Hotel Co. v. Sisson (1940), 216 Ind. 587 , 24 N. E. 2d 912 .

1965The mere citation of authorities does not comply with the interpretation of the rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana in the cases of Ball v. McPheeters (1937), 211 Ind. 157 , 5 N. E. 2d 885 and Deming Hotel Co. v. Sisson (1940), 216 Ind. 587 , 24 N. E. 2d 912 .

1965Witte v. Witte et al. (1953), 123 Ind. App. 644 , 113 N. E. 2d 166 .

1965Witte v. Witte et al. (1953), 123 Ind. App. 644 , 113 N. E. 2d 166 .

1965The above is further exemplified as an interpretation of the rule in Joslin et al. v. Ketcham, Admr. etc. (1959), 130 Ind. App. 446, at pp. 450-451 , 161 N. E. 2d 445 : “It must be remembered that the purpose of an appellant’s brief is to permit each Judge of this Court to intelligently consider the questions presented from the brief alone.

1965The above is further exemplified as an interpretation of the rule in Joslin et al. v. Ketcham, Admr. etc. (1959), 130 Ind. App. 446, at pp. 450-451 , 161 N. E. 2d 445 : “It must be remembered that the purpose of an appellant’s brief is to permit each Judge of this Court to intelligently consider the questions presented from the brief alone.