interpretation rule in Florida

2018In Beach Community Bank v. City of Freeport, Florida, 150 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2014), the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in City of Freeport v. Beach Community Bank, 108 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2018In Beach Community Bank v. City of Freeport, Florida, 150 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2014), the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in City of Freeport v. Beach Community Bank, 108 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2018In Beach Community Bank v. City of Freeport, Florida, 150 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2014), the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in City of Freeport v. Beach Community Bank, 108 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2018In Beach Community Bank v. City of Freeport, Florida, 150 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2014), the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in City of Freeport v. Beach Community Bank, 108 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2018I’m just letting [the plaintiff] proceed and it’s denied, period.” Although I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi) and its reliance on Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Sosa, 215 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), I recognize that we are bound by this Court’s precedent in Pozos and Calonge.

2018In reaching this interpretation the majority: (1) relies on this Court’s opinion in Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Sosa, 215 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), wherein this Court found it had no jurisdiction to address Citizens’ interlocutory appeal because the record unequivocally reflected that the trial court did not even reach the issue of sovereign immunity; (2) avoids addressing the language found in two Florida Supreme Court cases that conflict with the majority’s interpretation of the rule; and (3) relies on case law involving workers’ compensation immunity, which, as will be discusse

1983While the absence of a comma would lend itself to the interpretation that the clause was merely descriptive of the word "appeals," the use of the comma sets off the clause and emphasizes that "such appeals may be taken as a matter of right." Lastly, we have difficulty with the contention that while case law interprets the predecessor to this section of the constitution as conferring a right of appeal in civil cases, Crownover v. Shannon, 170 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1964), the identical language means something else in criminal cases.

1983While the absence of a comma would lend itself to the interpretation that the clause was merely descriptive of the word “appeals,” the use of the comma sets off the clause and emphasizes that “such appeals may be taken as a matter of right.” Lastly, we have difficulty with the contention that while case law interprets the predecessor to this section of the constitution as conferring a right of appeal in civil cases, Crownover v. Shannon, 170 So.2d 299 (Fla.1964), the identical language means something else in criminal cases.

1982This interpretation of the rule gains additional support from the Committee Note to Rule 9.331 which states: “The ground, maintenance of uniformity in the court’s decisions, is the equivalent of decisional conflict as developed by Supreme Court precedent in the exercise of its conflict cer-tiorari jurisdiction.” 9 ’ 10 Of the many statements attempting to define “decisional conflict” in order to activate the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, perhaps the most articulate comes from Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla.1960), where it is stated: While conceivably there m

1982This interpretation of the rule gains additional support from the Committee Note to Rule 9.331 which states: "The ground, maintenance of uniformity in the court's decisions, is the equivalent of decisional conflict as developed by Supreme Court *915 precedent in the exercise of its conflict certiorari jurisdiction." [9] , [10] Of the many statements attempting to define "decisional conflict" in order to activate the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, perhaps the most articulate comes from Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1960), where it is stated: While conceivabl

1972In re: Aron’s Estate, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 546 ; Clar v. Dade County, Fla.App.1960, 116 So.2d 34 ; Dade County v. Philbrick, Fla.1964, 162 So.2d 266 .

1960As pointed out in Davies v. Davies, Fla.App. 1959, 113 So.2d 250 , and the subsequent case of Clar v. Dade County, Fla.App. 1959, 116 So.2d 34 , we will adhere to a strict interpretation of the rule for certification of questions to the appellate court.

1960As pointed out in Davies v. Davies, Fla.App. 1959, 113 So.2d 250 , and the subsequent case of Clar v. Dade County, Fla.App. 1959, 116 So.2d 34 , we will adhere to a strict interpretation of the rule for certification of questions to the appellate court.

1959Pursuant to Rule 4.6, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 Fla. Stat., F.S.A., the circuit court has certified to this court the following question, which it feels is determinative of the cause and is without controlling precedent in this state: "May the right of action for wrongful death conferred by the statute (§ 768.02, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.) upon a minor child of the deceased, be waived or assigned to the Administrator?" As was pointed out by this court in Davies v. Davies, Fla.App. 1959, 113 So.2d 250 , the Supreme Court of Florida has consistently given a strict interpretation to the rule for certi

2025As Justice Scalia explained, Rule 60(b) “merely reflects and confirms the courts’ own inherent and discretionary power, ‘firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic,’ to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 , 233–34 (1995) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)).

2025Co., 515 So. 2d 1305 , 1307 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see also Vitiello v. State, 281 So. 3d 554 , 560 n.8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“When a Florida rule is based on a similar federal rule, we may look to federal cases as persuasive authority in the interpretation of the rule.”). 7 Those cases confirm that Rule 60(b) is the modern embodiment of old common law equitable remedies.

2022In my view, the majority’s interpretation of the rule conflicts with Jeff–Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), which held that the failure to attach an assignment “would support dismissal of the action based on failure to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130.” Id. at 886 .

2022In my view, the majority’s interpretation of the rule conflicts with Jeff–Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), which held that the failure to attach an assignment “would support dismissal of the action based on failure to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130.” Id. at 886 .

2018Nor do we believe that relaxed compliance with rule 2.516 is authorized by Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama, 202 So. 3d 391 (Fla. 2016).