interpretation rule in California

2015Falk Construction, *729 Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391-392 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 , 266 P.3d 1022 ] (Rossa); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ]) and for substantial evidence to the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 479 P.2d 362 ]).

2015Falk Construction, *729 Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391-392 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 , 266 P.3d 1022 ] (Rossa); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ]) and for substantial evidence to the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 479 P.2d 362 ]).

2015Service, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1405-1406 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 , 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ] (Andreini).) The second question we review de novo to the extent it proffers an interpretation of the rule (Rossa v. D.L.

2015Service, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1405-1406 (Andreini).) The second question we review de novo to the extent it proffers an interpretation of the rule (Rossa v. D.L.

2000This interpretation of rule 62(a) is particularly consistent with the fact that ‘[c]ases are transferred to the Court of Appeal under rules 61-69, not primarily for the benefit of the party who lost in the superior court, but “to secure uniformity of decision or to settle important questions of law.” ’ (Corcoran v. Universal Guardian Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 904, 910 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 421 ].)” (Dupuis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 700 , italics in original.) Dupuis's broad interpretation of the intermediate appellate court’s discretion to order transfer was followed by Kaiser Foundation Health P

2000This interpretation of rule 62(a) is particularly consistent with the fact that ‘[c]ases are transferred to the Court of Appeal under rules 61-69, not primarily for the benefit of the party who lost in the superior court, but “to secure uniformity of decision or to settle important questions of law.” ’ (Corcoran v. Universal Guardian Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 904, 910 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 421 ].)” (Dupuis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 700 , italics in original.) Dupuis's broad interpretation of the intermediate appellate court’s discretion to order transfer was followed by Kaiser Foundation Health P

1995County Flood Control Dist., supra, 25 Cal.2d 384, 391 ].) Recognizing that a broad interpretation of this doctrine of noncompensable loss would completely vitiate the constitutional requirement of just compensation [citation], the courts have narrowly circumscribed the types of emergency that will exempt the public entity from liability. [Fn. omitted.]" ( Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 305 , italics added; see also Varjabedian v. City of Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d 285, 297 [noting "those core cases of direct physical invasion which indisputably require compensation"].) In a footno

1995County Flood Control Dist., supra, 25 Cal.2d 384, 391 ].) Recognizing that a broad interpretation of this doctrine of noncompensable loss would completely vitiate the constitutional requirement of just compensation [citation], the courts have narrowly circumscribed the types of emergency that will exempt the public entity from liability. [Fn. omitted.]" ( Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 305 , italics added; see also Varjabedian v. City of Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d 285, 297 [noting "those core cases of direct physical invasion which indisputably require compensation"].) In a footno

1995County Flood Control Dist., supra, 25 Cal.2d 384, 391 ].) Recognizing that a broad interpretation of this doctrine of noncompensable loss would completely vitiate the constitutional requirement of just compensation [citation], the courts have narrowly circumscribed the types of emergency that will exempt the public entity from liability. [Fn. omitted.]” (Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 305 , italics added; see also Varjabedian v. City of Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d 285, 297 [noting “those core cases of direct physical invasion which indisputably require compensation”].) In a footnot

1995County Flood Control Dist., supra, 25 Cal.2d 384, 391 ].) Recognizing that a broad interpretation of this doctrine of noncompensable loss would completely vitiate the constitutional requirement of just compensation [citation], the courts have narrowly circumscribed the types of emergency that will exempt the public entity from liability. [Fn. omitted.]" ( Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 305 , italics added; see also Varjabedian v. City of Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d 285, 297 [noting "those core cases of direct physical invasion which indisputably require compensation"].) In a footno

2015(See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1, 12 ; Clean Energy Fuels Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 641, 649 .) And the means chosen by the Commission to fulfill its constitutional and statutory authority are to receive a liberal construction (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th 893, 915 ), which, we believe, reasonably translates as a measure of judicial deference to what the PUC deems appropriate to police its jurisdiction.

2007(Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12 .) A few of these factors favoring judicial deference are indeed present here.

2016“There is a strict interpretation of the rule of forfeiture under which a probationer ‘who contends a condition of probation is constitutionally flawed still has an obligation to object to the condition on that basis in the trial court in order to preserve the claim on appeal.’ [Citation.] Gardineer's rule requires not only objection but a listing of any constitutional grounds for the objection.” (People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, 572 (Brandão), quoting People v. Gardineer (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 148, 151 .) Here, minor’s counsel merely objected to the probation condition because he

2016(Id. at p. 576 [courts may not forbid probationers from having contact with any person or entity that could conceivably tempt an individual to stray from the path of the straight and narrow].) Brandão noted however, “There is a strict interpretation of the rule of forfeiture under which a probationer ‘who contends a condition of probation is constitutionally flawed still has an obligation to object to the condition on that basis in the trial court in order to preserve the claim on appeal.’ (People v. Gardineer (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 148, 151 .) Gardineer’s rule requires not only [an] objection

2015Falk Construction, *729 Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391-392 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 , 266 P.3d 1022 ] (Rossa); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ]) and for substantial evidence to the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 479 P.2d 362 ]).

2015Falk Construction, *729 Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391-392 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 , 266 P.3d 1022 ] (Rossa); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ]) and for substantial evidence to the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 479 P.2d 362 ]).

2015Falk Construction, *729 Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391-392 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 , 266 P.3d 1022 ] (Rossa); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ]) and for substantial evidence to the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 479 P.2d 362 ]).

2015Falk Construction, *729 Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391-392 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329 , 266 P.3d 1022 ] (Rossa); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ]) and for substantial evidence to the extent it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 479 P.2d 362 ]).

1986(See cases cited in Sullivan v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 745, 764 [ 214 P.2d 82 ].) As said in Kelso v. Board of Education, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d 415 [ 109 P.2d 29 ], the purpose of requiring the filing of a claim ‘as a condition precedent to bringing a suit against public entities, boards, commissions, etc., is simply to enable such public officials to make a proper investigation concerning the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit, if settlement should be shown to be proper.’ (P. 421.) In our case, while no claim for special damages

1986(See cases cited in Sullivan v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 745, 764 [ 214 P.2d 82 ].) As said in Kelso v. Board of Education, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d 415 [ 109 P.2d 29 ], the purpose of requiring the filing of a claim ‘as a condition precedent to bringing a suit against public entities, boards, commissions, etc., is simply to enable such public officials to make a proper investigation concerning the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit, if settlement should be shown to be proper.’ (P. 421.) In our case, while no claim for special damages

1971Only in the most unenlightened age could such a so-called trial be countenanced.’ ” In People v. Guillory (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 854 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 415 , 80 A.L.R.2d 1077 ], where a deaf defendant appeared in court without batteries for his hearing aid, the reasoning of People v. Rogers, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 403 , was followed.

1960Only in the most unenlightened age could such a so-called trial be countenanced." The facts of that case are summarized in People v. Rogers, 150 Cal.App.2d 403, 411 [ 309 P.2d 949 ], as follows: "That was a murder case and it appeared that the defendant was at times during her trial ‘woozy,’ ‘dizzy,’ ‘not clear in her mental behavior,’ ‘not alert,’ ‘listless and apathetic,’ and suffered numerous fainting spells.

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2026Thus, former CALJIC 8.71 required a juror who had a reasonable doubt about appellant’s guilt of first degree murder to nonetheless convict appellant of that crime because another juror disagreed, even though disagreement should lead to no worse outcome than a hung jury.” We have rejected this interpretation of the instruction as “tortured.” (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 247 .) As we stated in Salazar, “[i]f anything, [the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 8.71] 53 PEOPLE v. BARRERA Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. skewed the deliberations in [the defendant’s] favor. [It] could reasonably be und

2026No logical reading of the instruction[] leads to a compelled verdict of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 247; accord, e.g., Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 429 ; Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 420 [“We also rejected the very interpretation advanced by defendant here — that the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof by making first degree murder the default verdict”]; Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [“From that point, the instruction redounded to the benefit of the defendant; uncertainty about the degree of the offense would not make first degr

2022(See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 55 [courts should ordinarily reject interpretations that render particular terms of a statute mere surplusage; courts should instead give every word some significance].) 7. 2.

2022“The common- law forfeiture rule was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’” ( Giles, supra, 554 U.S. 353 at p. 374 , citing Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 834 (Davis).) “[O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing,” whatever the 22 nature of the wrongdoing, “forfeits the constitutional right to confront[]” that witness.