interpretation standard in Virginia

2026See, e.g., Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989) (interpreting a prohibition on landlord retaliation against tenants to apply in cases when retaliation was not the sole motive for an action); Wright v. Brady, 889 P.2d 105, 109 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (same); Elk Creek Mgmt.

2026See, e.g., Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989) (interpreting a prohibition on landlord retaliation against tenants to apply in cases when retaliation was not the sole motive for an action); Wright v. Brady, 889 P.2d 105, 109 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (same); Elk Creek Mgmt.

2023See Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498 (2005) (“[W]e have a duty, whenever possible, ‘to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.’” (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of Cnty.

2015Even if the trial court’s ruling was erroneous . . . [that does] not provide a basis for the exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”); Commonwealth v. Ragland, 7 Va. App. 452, 453 , 374 S.E.2d 183, 183 (1988) (holding that appeals by the Commonwealth are limited to the issues delineated in the statute).

2015Even if the trial court’s ruling was erroneous . . . [that does] not provide a basis for the exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”); Commonwealth v. Ragland, 7 Va. App. 452, 453 , 374 S.E.2d 183, 183 (1988) (holding that appeals by the Commonwealth are limited to the issues delineated in the statute).

2010Looking to federal case law, we find additional guidance, as this same requirement or standard for justification of a governmental agency’s position is used in the parallel federal fee-shifting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and there we find an established interpretation of this standard. 10 As recently explained in United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir.2009): The government’s position is substantially justified if it is “ ‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. U

2010Looking to federal case law, we find additional guidance, as this same requirement or standard for justification of a governmental agency’s position is used in the parallel federal fee-shifting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and there we find an established interpretation of this standard. 10 As recently explained in United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir.2009): The government’s position is substantially justified if it is “ ‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. U

2010Looking to federal case law, we find additional guidance, as this same requirement or standard for justification of a governmental agency’s position is used in the parallel federal fee-shifting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and there we find an established interpretation of this standard. 10 As recently explained in United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir.2009): The government’s position is substantially justified if it is “ ‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. U

2010Looking to federal case law, we find additional guidance, as this same requirement or standard for justification of a governmental agency's position is used in the parallel federal fee-shifting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and there we find an established interpretation of this standard. [10] As recently explained in United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009): The government's position is substantially justified if it is "`justified in substance or in the main'—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." Pierce v.

2008See, e.g., Lay v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 330 , 336 n. 3, 649 S.E.2d 714 , 716 n. 3 (2007); Selph v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 426 , 434, 632 S.E.2d 24 , 28 (2006), vacated on other grounds, 51 Va.App. 238 , 656 S.E.2d 425 (2008).

2008See, e.g., Lay v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 330 , 336 n. 3, 649 S.E.2d 714 , 716 n. 3 (2007); Selph v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 426 , 434, 632 S.E.2d 24 , 28 (2006), vacated on other grounds, 51 Va.App. 238 , 656 S.E.2d 425 (2008).

2004Cf. Long, 7 Va. App. at 505-06 , 375 S.E.2d at 369 (where document was received by clerk’s office after due date but official postmark showed timely mailing, holding submission not timely filed under Rule 5A:3(c) because it was sent via first class mail rather than certified or registered mail).

2004Cf. Long, 7 Va. App. at 505-06 , 375 S.E.2d at 369 (where document was received by clerk’s office after due date but official postmark showed timely mailing, holding submission not timely filed under Rule 5A:3(c) because it was sent via first class mail rather than certified or registered mail).

1962The defendant Carlton has cited no case supporting the interpretation of the rule that he urges, in Pointer v. Green, 193 Va. 757, 761 , 71 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1952), the Supreme Court of Appeals applied the rule just as it was written.

1962The defendant Carlton has cited no case supporting the interpretation of the rule that he urges, in Pointer v. Green, 193 Va. 757, 761 , 71 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1952), the Supreme Court of Appeals applied the rule just as it was written.