interpretation rule in Ohio

2022Id. “[W]hen a term in an agreement is unambiguous, then the words must be given their plain, ordinary and common meaning; however, when the term is not clear, parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the words.” Forstner v. Forstner, 68 Ohio App.3d 367 , 588 N.E.2d 285 (11th Dist. 1990).

2022Id. “[W]hen a term in an agreement is unambiguous, then the words must be given their plain, ordinary and common meaning; however, when the term is not clear, parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the words.” Forstner v. Forstner, 68 Ohio App.3d 367 , 588 N.E.2d 285 (11th Dist. 1990).

2025Land Bank of Louisville v. Wilcox, 74 Ohio App.3d 474, 478 (4th Dist. 1991), for the proposition “that payment of a judgment alone without other proof that the payment was a voluntary abandonment of the appeal is insufficient to dismiss an appeal.” (Saad BIO, p. 3.) This court, however, has specifically rejected the holding of Wilcox, stating that [the Wilcox] case has been criticized as being a liberal interpretation of the rule and “may contradict the Supreme Court of Ohio’s view on the matter.” See Poppa Builders, Inc. v. Campbell (1997) 118 Ohio App. 3d 251, 254 , 692 N.E.2d 647 ; Hagood v

2025Land Bank of Louisville v. Wilcox, 74 Ohio App.3d 474, 478 (4th Dist. 1991), for the proposition “that payment of a judgment alone without other proof that the payment was a voluntary abandonment of the appeal is insufficient to dismiss an appeal.” (Saad BIO, p. 3.) This court, however, has specifically rejected the holding of Wilcox, stating that [the Wilcox] case has been criticized as being a liberal interpretation of the rule and “may contradict the Supreme Court of Ohio’s view on the matter.” See Poppa Builders, Inc. v. Campbell (1997) 118 Ohio App. 3d 251, 254 , 692 N.E.2d 647 ; Hagood v

2025Land Bank of Louisville v. Wilcox, 74 Ohio App.3d 474, 478 (4th Dist. 1991), for the proposition “that payment of a judgment alone without other proof that the payment was a voluntary abandonment of the appeal is insufficient to dismiss an appeal.” (Saad BIO, p. 3.) This court, however, has specifically rejected the holding of Wilcox, stating that [the Wilcox] case has been criticized as being a liberal interpretation of the rule and “may contradict the Supreme Court of Ohio’s view on the matter.” See Poppa Builders, Inc. v. Campbell (1997) 118 Ohio App. 3d 251, 254 , 692 N.E.2d 647 ; Hagood v

2025Land Bank of Louisville v. Wilcox, 74 Ohio App.3d 474, 478 (4th Dist. 1991), for the proposition “that payment of a judgment alone without other proof that the payment was a voluntary abandonment of the appeal is insufficient to dismiss an appeal.” (Saad BIO, p. 3.) This court, however, has specifically rejected the holding of Wilcox, stating that [the Wilcox] case has been criticized as being a liberal interpretation of the rule and “may contradict the Supreme Court of Ohio’s view on the matter.” See Poppa Builders, Inc. v. Campbell (1997) 118 Ohio App. 3d 251, 254 , 692 N.E.2d 647 ; Hagood v

2024“The starting point for determining a rule’s meaning is its text, see Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc., 131 Ohio St.3d 316, 2012-Ohio-880, 964 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 16, which must be understood in its context, according to the rules of grammar and common usage, State ex rel.

2024“The starting point for determining a rule’s meaning is its text, see Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc., 131 Ohio St.3d 316, 2012-Ohio-880, 964 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 16, which must be understood in its context, according to the rules of grammar and common usage, State ex rel.

2010State v. Evans (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186 , 291 N.E.2d 466 .

2010State v. Evans (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186 , 291 N.E.2d 466 .

2006This interpretation of the rule is proper in light of the state and federal constitutional significance which we recognize is placed upon the right to a trial by jury. {¶ 62} “Accordingly, it is reversible error for a trial court to order a prerecorded videotape trial over the objection of all parties in an action unless the court reflects in a journal entry that it has, pursuant to C.P.Sup.R. 12(B), consulted with the attorneys for the parties and considered the costs involved, the nature of the action and the nature and amount of testimony, that these factors taken together indicate a compel

2006This interpretation of the rule is proper in light of the state and federal constitutional significance which we recognize is placed upon the right to a trial by jury. {¶ 62} “Accordingly, it is reversible error for a trial court to order a prerecorded videotape trial over the objection of all parties in an action unless the court reflects in a journal entry that it has, pursuant to C.P.Sup.R. 12(B), consulted with the attorneys for the parties and considered the costs involved, the nature of the action and the nature and amount of testimony, that these factors taken together indicate a compel

2004Cf. State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590 , 594-595 .

2004Cf. State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590 , 594-595 .

2025Id. at 52 . {¶ 31} The right to cross-examine witnesses is a trial right, and the "ability to question adverse witnesses . . . does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Id. at 53 . "[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" Id., quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 - 11 - Butler CA2024-11- 130 U.S. 15 , at 20 (Emphasis in original.).

2025Id. at 52 . {¶ 31} The right to cross-examine witnesses is a trial right, and the "ability to question adverse witnesses . . . does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Id. at 53 . "[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" Id., quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 - 11 - Butler CA2024-11- 130 U.S. 15 , at 20 (Emphasis in original.).

2021State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197 , 2008-Ohio-3330 , 893 N.E.2d 163 .

2021State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197 , 2008-Ohio-3330 , 893 N.E.2d 163 .

2018And more fundamentally, this court should not abdicate its judicial authority and responsibility to "say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137 , 177, 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), by deferring to the commission's resolution of a question of law. {¶ 54} Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-09(F)(1) does not contain a specific and definite requirement that plainly apprises employers of a legal obligation to fasten lifelines to the structure where its employees are working on pitched roofs, and we ought not defer to an interpretation of that rule adding language to it.

2018And more fundamentally, this court should not abdicate its judicial authority and responsibility to "say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137 , 177, 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), by deferring to the commission's resolution of a question of law. {¶ 54} Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-09(F)(1) does not contain a specific and definite requirement that plainly apprises employers of a legal obligation to fasten lifelines to the structure where its employees are working on pitched roofs, and we ought not defer to an interpretation of that rule adding language to it.

2018Id. {¶12} We have previously held that the determination of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review.

2018Id. “[W]hen a term in an agreement is unambiguous, then the words must be given their plain, ordinary and common meaning; however, when the term is not clear, Morrow County, Case No. 2018CA0002 6 parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the words.” Forstner v. Forstner, 68 Ohio App.3d 366 , 588 N.E.2d 285 (11th Dist. 1990). {¶15} We have previously held that the determination of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review.

2018Croson Co. , 75 Ohio St.3d 77 , 79-80, 661 N.E.2d 724 (1996), and this straightforward reading of the text of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-09(F)(1) is consistent with the SHO's interpretation of the rule's requirements.

2018Croson Co. , 75 Ohio St.3d 77 , 79-80, 661 N.E.2d 724 (1996), and this straightforward reading of the text of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-09(F)(1) is consistent with the SHO's interpretation of the rule's requirements.

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2010Co., Inc., 446 F.3d at 643 . {¶ 33} This interpretation of the rule harmonizes (G)(2) with (G)(5), which specifies that when a woman qualifies for leave, the leave provided for childbearing must be reasonable.

2010Co., Inc., 446 F.3d at 643 . {¶ 33} This interpretation of the rule harmonizes (G)(2) with (G)(5), which specifies that when a woman qualifies for leave, the leave provided for childbearing must be reasonable.

2010These materials include “ ‘the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any.’ ” Id. at 293 , 662 N.E.2d 264 , quoting Civ.R. 56(C). {¶ 7} Here, both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, stipulating that there were no factual issues in dispute and that the only issue before the court involved the interpretation of a clause that appears in the promissory note that states: The Borrowers agree that without prior consent they will not in any one calendar year

2010These materials include “ ‘the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any.’ ” Id. at 293 , 662 N.E.2d 264 , quoting Civ.R. 56(C). {¶ 7} Here, both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, stipulating that there were no factual issues in dispute and that the only issue before the court involved the interpretation of a clause that appears in the promissory note that states: The Borrowers agree that without prior consent they will not in any one calendar year

2010Salem, 164 Ohio App.3d 597 , 2005-Ohio-5537 , 843 N.E.2d 799, at ¶ 2-3 . {¶ 11} In its first assignment of error, the city argues that certain conditions were not met and that a correct interpretation of the rule leads to the conclusion that the director was not authorized to impose a specific limit on phosphorus.

2010Salem, 164 Ohio App.3d 597 , 2005-Ohio-5537 , 843 N.E.2d 799, at ¶ 2-3 . {¶ 11} In its first assignment of error, the city argues that certain conditions were not met and that a correct interpretation of the rule leads to the conclusion that the director was not authorized to impose a specific limit on phosphorus.

2009Id. {¶ 67} The Seventh Circuit also noted that the association’s interpretation of the rule seemed to change with the situation at hand and seemed designed to allow the association to declare students ineligible or to achieve a pre-ordained result.

2009Id.

2008To be sure, the transmission of data in MIB was initiated by an inquiry from one of MIB’s members, but in stark contrast to the present case, MIB’s members “[sought] access to MIB’s objective information database,” and there was, in MIB , “no evidence that the members are given an interpretation or analysis of that information.” MIB, Inc. v. Tracy (June 6, 1997), BTA No. 1995-B-109, 1997 WL 1909666 , *11, affirmed (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 154 , 699 N.E.2d 44 .

2008To be sure, the transmission of data in MIB was initiated by an inquiry from one of MIB’s members, but in stark contrast to the present case, MIB’s members “[sought] access to MIB’s objective information database,” and there was, in MIB , “no evidence that the members are given an interpretation or analysis of that information.” MIB, Inc. v. Tracy (June 6, 1997), BTA No. 1995-B-109, 1997 WL 1909666 , *11, affirmed (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 154 , 699 N.E.2d 44 .

2006How the majority can conclude that a sweeping decision to mandate prerecorded videotape trials in over 400 asbestos-related workers’ compensation cases lies within the boundaries of our prior case law is beyond comprehension. {¶ 64} The majority’s reliance on Moffitt, 133 Vt. 366 , 340 A.2d 39 , is equally unavailing.

2006How the majority can conclude that a sweeping decision to mandate prerecorded videotape trials in over 400 asbestos-related workers’ compensation cases lies within the boundaries of our prior case law is beyond comprehension. {¶ 64} The majority’s reliance on Moffitt, 133 Vt. 366 , 340 A.2d 39 , is equally unavailing.

2006Leonard v. Leonard (Aug. 17, 1992), Butler App. No. CA91-08-143, 7-8, citing Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ohio, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 321 , 322 . {¶ 9} The parties disagree over the interpretation of the clause in the separation agreement that provides for a cost of living adjustment.

2006State v. Ford, 2002-Ohio-662 (Shelby App.), and State v. Colgrove, 140 Ohio App. 3d 306 (Cuyahoga App.), and, especially, 2002-Ohio-1825 , when the same case was remanded for re-sentencing a second time because, although the trial court had explained how the consecutive sentences imposed were proportionate to the danger to the public, it had failed to explain how they were proportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct. {¶ 18} Of course, any ambiguity in the construction of a statute defining criminal penalties must be construed strictly against the State.

2000In State v. Hannah (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 84 , 90 , a bare majority of the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's comment upon the absence of testimony from a potential alibi witness whose name was furnished by the defense on a discovery list was "a clear violation of Crim.R. 16(C)(3)[.]" This holding was delivered without any analysis of the alternative interpretation of the rule.