7 Nebraska opinions name it 1 courts 1922–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Keith Gibb v. John Scott, Keith Gibb v. World Book, Inc.green1 sentence2013Nebraska Advance Sheets 980 285 NEBRASKA REPORTS “‘[m]ost courts . . . view “matters outside the pleading” as including any written or oral evidence in support of or in oppo- sition to the pleading that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings.’”12 This interpretation of the rule by the Eighth Circuit is “‘appropriate in light of our prior decisions indicating a 12(b)(6) motion will succeed or fail based upon the allegations contained in the face of the complaint.’”13 [9-11] For purposes of a motion to dismiss, “‘the court generally must igno | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Allengreen1 sentence2000App. 359, 375 , 659 A.2d 411, 419 (1995), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated: “[R]ule [27] was not intended to serve as a discovery device to provide prospective plaintiffs with an opportunity to secure information in order to frame a complaint.” We decline to adopt a more liberal interpretation of rule 27(a)(1) than that of the federal courts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Chadron State College
green
2 sentences2002Collins filed her action in district court on November 29, 2000. *272 Under a strict interpretation of the rule set forth in Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491 , 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991), and Hullinger v. Board of Regents, supra, Collins had 6 months from the first day on which her claim could have been withdrawn from the claims board in which to file suit. 2002Collins filed her action in district court on November 29, 2000. *272 Under a strict interpretation of the rule set forth in Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491 , 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991), and Hullinger v. Board of Regents, supra, Collins had 6 months from the first day on which her claim could have been withdrawn from the claims board in which to file suit. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Interest of JS
green
1 sentence1990In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., supra, required proof of willful noncompliance only when termination resulted from “parental noncompliance with a court-ordered rehabilitative plan.” Id. at 267, 417 N.W.2d at 158 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Alyea v. State
neutral
2 sentences1982The correct interpretation of the rule is demonstrated by the following quotation from Alyea v. State, 62 Neb. 143 , 86 N.W. 1066 (1901), in which the defendant was charged with assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury. 1982The correct interpretation of the rule is demonstrated by the following quotation from Alyea v. State, 62 Neb. 143 , 86 N.W. 1066 (1901), in which the defendant was charged with assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Whitaker v. Keogh
green
2 sentences1963The proper interpretation of the rule requiring seeing a vehicle within the limits of danger, as it relates to the direction of a verdict against a party not seeing a vehicle, is stated in Sekora v. Mangers, supra, at p. 877: “‘The rules in this state are: “* * * when a person enters an intersection of two streets or highways he is obligated to look *141 for approaching ears and to see those within that radius which denotes the limit of danger. * * * If he fails to see an automobile not shown to be in a favorable position, the presumption is that its driver will respect his right of way and th 1963The proper interpretation of the rule requiring seeing a vehicle within the limits of danger, as it relates to the direction of a verdict against a party not seeing a vehicle, is stated in Sekora v. Mangers, supra, at p. 877: “‘The rules in this state are: “* * * when a person enters an intersection of two streets or highways he is obligated to look *141 for approaching ears and to see those within that radius which denotes the limit of danger. * * * If he fails to see an automobile not shown to be in a favorable position, the presumption is that its driver will respect his right of way and th | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Elliott v. Swift & Co.
green
2 sentences1963The proper interpretation of the rule requiring seeing a vehicle within the limits of danger, as it relates to the direction of a verdict against a party not seeing a vehicle, is stated in Sekora v. Mangers, supra, at p. 877: “‘The rules in this state are: “* * * when a person enters an intersection of two streets or highways he is obligated to look *141 for approaching ears and to see those within that radius which denotes the limit of danger. * * * If he fails to see an automobile not shown to be in a favorable position, the presumption is that its driver will respect his right of way and th 1963The proper interpretation of the rule requiring seeing a vehicle within the limits of danger, as it relates to the direction of a verdict against a party not seeing a vehicle, is stated in Sekora v. Mangers, supra, at p. 877: “‘The rules in this state are: “* * * when a person enters an intersection of two streets or highways he is obligated to look *141 for approaching ears and to see those within that radius which denotes the limit of danger. * * * If he fails to see an automobile not shown to be in a favorable position, the presumption is that its driver will respect his right of way and th | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Ripp v. Riesland
green
2 sentences1963The proper interpretation of the rule requiring seeing a vehicle within the limits of danger, as it relates to the direction of a verdict against a party not seeing a vehicle, is stated in Sekora v. Mangers, supra, at p. 877: “‘The rules in this state are: “* * * when a person enters an intersection of two streets or highways he is obligated to look *141 for approaching ears and to see those within that radius which denotes the limit of danger. * * * If he fails to see an automobile not shown to be in a favorable position, the presumption is that its driver will respect his right of way and th 1963The proper interpretation of the rule requiring seeing a vehicle within the limits of danger, as it relates to the direction of a verdict against a party not seeing a vehicle, is stated in Sekora v. Mangers, supra, at p. 877: “‘The rules in this state are: “* * * when a person enters an intersection of two streets or highways he is obligated to look *141 for approaching ears and to see those within that radius which denotes the limit of danger. * * * If he fails to see an automobile not shown to be in a favorable position, the presumption is that its driver will respect his right of way and th | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Cunningham v. State
green
1 sentence1922In some of the decisions, and, we believe, with a proper interpretation of the rule in McNaghten’s Case, the courts have stated that the rule as to insane delusions is simply a different manner of stating the rule generally with regard to the defense of insanity (Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269 ), and that in all cases the element cannot be eliminated which requires the jury to pass upon the question whether the accused understood the nature of the act and Avas able to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to it. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.