interpretation rule (Massachusetts) · Go Syfert
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interpretation rule in Massachusetts

28 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1863–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (20)

CaseFollowedCited
Carney v. Attorney Generalgreen
mass · 2006 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026A stringent interpretation of the requirement would "risk limiting initiative petitions to a single subject, a requirement rejected by the constitutional convention that approved art. 48." Weiner, supra. However, "[a]t some high level of abstraction, any two laws may be said to share a 'common purpose.'" Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 226 (2006), S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008).

11
Commonwealth v. Roucouletgreen
mass · 1992 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting from Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 652 (1992) ("when a criminal statute can 'plausibly be found to be ambiguous,' the rule of lenity applies, and we 'give the defendant the benefit of the ambiguity'").

11
Commonwealth v. Williamsongreen
mass · 2012 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting from Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 652 (1992) ("when a criminal statute can 'plausibly be found to be ambiguous,' the rule of lenity applies, and we 'give the defendant the benefit of the ambiguity'").

11
Cole v. Boston Edison Co.green
mass · 1959 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016To support its position the SRA relies on cases such as Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 666 (1959), quoting Miller, 317 U.S. at 379 ; and Connor v. Metropolitan Dist.

11
Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'ngreen
mass · 2012 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013See Eaton v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 462 Mass. 569, 589 (2012).

11
Lugtig v. Thomasgreen
ilnd · 1981 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See Lugtig, supra at 642 .

11
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fentongreen
mad · 1993 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003On constitutional grounds, the Federal court has held that “nothing in the CORI statute may be held to impose liability for the communication of information otherwise available at the time of the communication in a judicial record to which the public has access” and that it would violate the First Amendment to impose a sanction “for the communication of criminal record information contained in a judicial record open to the public at the time of the communication of such information.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, supra at 100, 101 .

11
Mello v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc.green
mass · 1988 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002“Our cases have not attempted in general terms to identify those principles of public policy that are sufficiently important and clearly defined to warrant recovery by an at-will employee who is discharged for engaging in .. . particular conduct.” Mello v. Stop & Shop, 402 Mass. 555, 557 (1988).

11
City of Lynn v. Thompsongreen
mass · 2001 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001We are not led into a discussion of the soundness or wisdom of the instant arbitrator’s decision about the proper interpretation of clause 3. 8 “We are thus bound by the arbitrator’s findings and conclusions in this case, no matter the extent to which we may believe that they are ‘grossly erroneous.’ ” Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 62 (2001), quoting from Trustees of Boston & Me.

11
Ciampa v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companiesgreen
massappct · 1988 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 941 (1988).

11
Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc.green
mass · 1995 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000U.S.A., Inc., 419 Mass. 572, 575 (1995).

11
King v. G & M REALTY CORP.green
mass · 1977 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
1 sentence

1996See King v. G&M Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658 , 659-60 n.3 (1977). 2 Accordingly, since Central Beef rested after presenting its motion for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiffs case, its timely-filed motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is properly here for review on the merits. 2.

11
Commonwealth v. Mottgreen
massappct · 1974 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390 (1987); Commonwealth v. Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (1974); Commonwealth v. Stovall, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739 (1986).

11
Commonwealth v. Barnesgreen
mass · 1987 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390 (1987); Commonwealth v. Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (1974); Commonwealth v. Stovall, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739 (1986).

11
Faretta v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390 (1987); Commonwealth v. Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (1974); Commonwealth v. Stovall, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739 (1986).

11
Commonwealth v. Stovallgreen
massappct · 1986 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390 (1987); Commonwealth v. Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (1974); Commonwealth v. Stovall, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739 (1986).

11
Locke v. Slatergreen
mass · 1982 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992Locke v. Slater, 387 Mass. 682, 685-6 , 442 N.E. 2d 732, 734 (1982).

1992Locke v. Slater, 387 Mass. 682, 685-6 , 442 N.E. 2d 732, 734 (1982).

11
Mailhot v. Travelers Insurancegreen
mass · 1978 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
1 sentence

1985Co. supra at 348.

11
Commonwealth v. Lockleygreen
mass · 1980 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981L. c. 261, § 27C, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 478, § 269) because there has been no showing that the interpretation of the test results was “reasonably necessary to prevent the party from being subjected to a disadvantage in preparing or presenting his case adequately.” Commonwealth v. Lockley, 381 Mass. 156, 160-161 (1980).

1981There was no error in the motion judge's denial of the defendant's request for "extra fees and costs" (G.L.c. 261, § 27C, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 478, § 269) because there has been no showing that the interpretation of the test results was "reasonably necessary to prevent the party from being subjected to a disadvantage in preparing or presenting his case adequately." Commonwealth v. Lockley, 381 Mass. 156, 160-161 (1980).

11
Thorner v. Stonegreen
mass · 1970 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975
1 sentence

1975The cases are governed by Thorner v. Stone, 357 Mass. 782, 783 (1970), in which “tax assessed” was interpreted to mean the tax as abated.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

CaseCitedYears
Carney v. Attorney General green
mass · 2008
1 sentence

2026A stringent interpretation of the requirement would "risk limiting initiative petitions to a single subject, a requirement rejected by the constitutional convention that approved art. 48." Weiner, supra. However, "[a]t some high level of abstraction, any two laws may be said to share a 'common purpose.'" Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 226 (2006), S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008).

12026–2026
Abdow v. Attorney General green
mass · 2014
1 sentence

2026Relatedness therefore 9 "cannot be defined so broadly that it allows the inclusion in a single petition of two or more subjects that have only a marginal relationship to one another, which might confuse or mislead voters, or which could place them in the untenable position of casting a single vote on two or more dissimilar subjects." Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499 .

12026–2026
United States v. Miller green
scotus · 1943
1 sentence

2016To support its position the SRA relies on cases such as Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 666 (1959), quoting Miller, 317 U.S. at 379 ; and Connor v. Metropolitan Dist.

12016–2016
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co. green
mass · 2008
1 sentence

2012Finally, the petitioner argues that since the Iannachino decision (Iannachino v. Ford Motor Company, 451 Mass. 623, 2008 ) the bar for effective pleading has been raised so high as to require a broader interpretation of the rule to permit its use in an expanded fashion to satisfy the higher standard of pleading.

12012–2012
Commonwealth v. Barbosa green
mass · 2010
2 sentences

2010We conclude that it did not. *484 In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, supra at 789 , we noted that without an expert's interpretation and analysis, the admission of the raw DNA testing results alone, even where the allele numbers match, is meaningless to a jury.

2010In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, supra at 789 , we noted that without an expert’s interpretation and analysis, the admission of the raw DNA testing results alone, even where the allele numbers match, is meaningless to a jury.

12010–2010
Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance green
mass · 2003
1 sentence

2007Id.

12007–2007
Commissioner of Revenue v. Carrigan green
massappct · 1998
1 sentence

2004The court relied on the decision by the Appeals Court in Carrigan, supra, in noting that prompt service after the expiration of the 90 days is not dispositive.

12004–2004
Riskin v. National Computer Analysts, Inc. green
nysupct · 1970
2 sentences

1979This interpretation of the rule would not only render the words "reasonable time” meaningless, but is not supported, as Inforex claims, by Riskin v. National Computer Analysts, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1970), modified, 37 App. Div. 2d 952 (N.Y. 1971).

1979While the Supreme Court of New York, in determining whether Riskin suffered damages, used the price on the date of refusal itself (September 23,1969) for the purpose of comparison with the price at the time of trial, it noted that "the shares ... sold since September 23,1969 ... for approximately the same price as the price at time of trial.” 62 Misc. 2d at 609 .

11979–1979
Taylor v. Gowetz green
mass · 1959
1 sentence

1965Taylor v. Gowetz, 339 Mass. 294, 300 ; Daley v. J.

11965–1965
Famigletti v. Neviackas green
mass · 1949
1 sentence

1960Rule 28 of the District Courts reads as follows: “A .copy of such draft report shall be delivered or mailed, postage prepaid by the party requesting the report to the trial justice and to the adverse party before the close of the next business day after such filing.” An interpretation of this rule is set forth in the case of Famigletti v. Neviackas, 324 Mass. 70 .

11960–1960
Hall v. Hall neutral
mass · 1911
11944–1944
Forbes v. Snow green
· 1921
11923–1923
Tibbetts v. Tomkinson neutral
· 1914
11918–1918
Knight v. Overman Wheel Co. green
· 1899
11911–1911
Babcock v. Wolf green
iowa · 1886
11908–1908
Johnston v. Ludlow neutral
· 1802
11863–1863

Where else courts name it

TX 117 (1913–2025) IL 109 (1877–2026) CA 93 (1912–2026) UT 83 (1988–2026) FL 81 (1959–2025) MI 68 (1949–2025) OR 67 (1893–2026) PA 65 (1897–2025) NY 48 (1896–2022) CO 45 (1952–2026) OH 45 (1926–2025) IA 37 (1941–2024) MN 37 (1967–2026) WI 35 (1923–2024) AR 35 (1929–2025) WA 34 (1918–2019) MD 34 (1943–2023) MO 32 (1899–2020) AZ 31 (1946–2024) CT 29 (1955–2023) NJ 28 (1869–2020) HI 28 (1978–2022) MA 28 (1863–2026) IN 26 (1941–2023) WV 25 (1913–2024) MS 22 (1895–2023) LA 21 (1937–2019) NC 20 (1912–2020) AL 19 (1885–2008) NM 18 (1939–2019) GA 16 (1909–2024) MT 16 (1890–2023) TN 15 (1942–2022) ND 15 (1974–2023) DC 14 (1975–2024) VT 14 (1915–2023) AK 12 (1975–2018) RI 10 (1968–2018) SD 10 (1897–2015) VA 10 (1962–2026) ID 10 (1975–2024) KS 10 (1904–2023) NH 7 (1978–2021) OK 7 (1919–2011) DE 7 (1920–2015) WY 7 (1933–2009) NE 7 (1922–2013) NV 6 (1971–2018) KY 5 (1917–2009) ME 5 (1958–2020) SC 4 (1936–2009) PR 4 (1930–1967)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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