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16 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
ASMC, LLC v. Northside Hosp., Inc.green2 sentences2024See Emory Univ., 364 Ga. App. at 589 (2) (b) (i) (citing ASMC, LLC v. Northside Hosp., 344 Ga. App. 576, 582 (810 SE2d 663) (2018) nothing more than a convenient litigating position” or a “post hoc rationaliza- tion” of past agency action (cleaned up)). 2024See Emory Univ., 364 Ga. App. at 589 (2) (b) (i) (citing ASMC, LLC v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 344 Ga. App. 576 , 582 ( 810 SE2d 663 ) (2018)) (noting that “judicial deference is to be af- forded the agency’s interpretation of rules and regulations it has en- acted” so that the “ultimate criterion is the administrative interpre- tation”); Cobb Hosp., Inc. v. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 349 Ga. App. 452 , 36 460 (1) (c) (ii) ( 825 SE2d 886 ) (2019) (explaining that “agencies pro- vide a high level of expertise” and cautioning that “their decisions are not to be taken lightly or minimized by the judici | 1 | 1 |
New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Ga. Dep't of Revenuegreen2 sentences2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) (664 SE2d 223) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-13- 2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) ( 664 SE2d 223 ) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-1 | 1 | 1 |
NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS PCS, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUEgreen2 sentences2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) (664 SE2d 223) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-13- 2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) ( 664 SE2d 223 ) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-1 | 1 | 1 |
Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia Department of Community Healthgreen2 sentences2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) (664 SE2d 223) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-13- 2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) (664 SE2d 223) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-13- | 1 | 1 |
Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement System of Georgiagreen2 sentences2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) (664 SE2d 223) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-13- 2024See id. at 802-803 (2).8 8 Our past decisions have indicated that even when a rule is ambiguous, other factors have mattered for whether an agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, such as whether the agency promulgated the rule “to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch,” Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health, 284 Ga. 158, 159 (2) (664 SE2d 223) (2008), whether the rule has “un- dergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass,” id. at 159-160 (2) (citing OCGA § 50-13- | 1 | 1 |
Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc. v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Centergreen2 sentences2019R. & Regs. 560-11 - 7 This interpretation of the exception at issue is consistent with our duty to construe a statute “in a way that square[s] with common sense and sound reasoning.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Palmyra Park Hosp., 310 Ga. App. at 491 (1). 2019In other words, our construction should not “result in unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. the Stategreen2 sentences2015Lucas v. State, 328 Ga. App. 741, 745 (2) ( 760 SE2d 257 ) (2014). *583 (a) Ponder first contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to reasonably challenge the State’s DNA evidence by calling an expert to rebut the State’s interpretation of the test results. 2015Lucas v. State, 328 Ga. App. 741, 745 (2) ( 760 SE2d 257 ) (2014). *583 (a) Ponder first contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to reasonably challenge the State’s DNA evidence by calling an expert to rebut the State’s interpretation of the test results. | 1 | 1 |
Wasilkoff v. Douglas Countygreen1 sentence2011See Wasilkoff, supra, 227 Ga. App. at 233-234 . | 1 | 1 |
Kaplan v. First City Mortgagegreen2 sentences2000See Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d 848 , 698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (1999); Kaplan v. First City Mtg., 183 Misc.2d 24 , 701 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (City Ct.1999). 2000See Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d 848 , 698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (1999); Kaplan v. First City Mtg., 183 Misc.2d 24 , 701 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (City Ct.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Kaplan v. Democrat & Chroniclegreen2 sentences2000See Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d 848 , 698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (1999); Kaplan v. First City Mtg., 183 Misc.2d 24 , 701 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (City Ct.1999). 2000See Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d 848 , 698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (1999); Kaplan v. First City Mtg., 183 Misc.2d 24 , 701 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (City Ct.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Grogan v. Stategreen2 sentences1990I write separately because I cannot agree with the majority's interpretation of the hearing requirement under Superior Court Rule 31.3 Concerning the interplay between Rules 31.2 and 31.3, the Court of Appeals in Grogan v. State, 192 Ga. App. 234, 236 ( 384 SE2d 441 ) (1989) held: Thus, the Rules construed in harmony contemplate that "generally" the mandated hearing will appropriately be held before trial, for obvious reasons of fairness and economy. 1990I write separately because I cannot agree with the majority's interpretation of the hearing requirement under Superior Court Rule 31.3 Concerning the interplay between Rules 31.2 and 31.3, the Court of Appeals in Grogan v. State, 192 Ga. App. 234, 236 ( 384 SE2d 441 ) (1989) held: Thus, the Rules construed in harmony contemplate that "generally" the mandated hearing will appropriately be held before trial, for obvious reasons of fairness and economy. | 1 | 1 |
Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Leegreen2 sentences1988A right of action has its inception from the time there has been a breach of duty; and this would entitle the party to file a suit for the breach, without regard to whether any actual damage had in fact resulted.’ ” Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 806 ( 273 SE2d 16 ) (1980); Adams v. Emory Univ. 1988A right of action has its inception from the time there has been a breach of duty; and this would entitle the party to file a suit for the breach, without regard to whether any actual damage had in fact resulted.’ ” Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 806 ( 273 SE2d 16 ) (1980); Adams v. Emory Univ. | 1 | 1 |
Rutledge v. Hudsongreen2 sentences1973There was no error in the refusal of the court to allow the case ... to be read to the jury, in view of the provisions of the 3d common law rule of practice in the superior courts, which declares that, 'In all civil cases, questions of law shall be argued exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury.’ ” Among the authorities supporting this interpretation of the rule are: Rutledge v. Hudson, 80 Ga. 266, 267 ( 5 SE 93 ); Rome R. 1973There was no error in the refusal of the court to allow the case ... to be read to the jury, in view of the provisions of the 3d common law rule of practice in the superior courts, which declares that, `In all civil cases, questions of law shall be argued exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury.'" Among the authorities supporting this interpretation of the rule are; Rutledge v. Hudson, 80 Ga. 266, 267 ( 5 SE 93 ); Rome R. | 1 | 1 |
Rome Railroad v. Barnettgreen2 sentences1973Co. v. Barnett, 94 Ga. 446, 447 ( 20 SE 355 ); Central of Ga. R. 1973Co. v. Barnett, 94 Ga. 446, 447 ( 20 SE 355 ); Central of Ga. R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Saul
green
2 sentences1939The recent decision of this court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Saul , 189 Ga. 1 ( 5 S.E.2d 214 ), is not in conflict with this interpretation of the rule, which was there recognized. 1939The recent decision of this court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Saul , 189 Ga. 1 ( 5 S.E.2d 214 ), is not in conflict with this interpretation of the rule, which was there recognized. | 2 | 1939–1939 |
ADVENTURE MOTORSPORTS REINSURANCE, LTD v. INTERSTATE NATIONAL DEALER SERVICES, INC. (Two Cases)
green
1 sentence2022The arbitrator has simply made a legal mistake,” and the legal standard for manifestly disregarding the law has not been 3 (Punctuation omitted.) AMS II, 313 Ga. at 20 . 4 See AMS I, 356 Ga. App. at 240. 3 met.5 The Court further observed, in support of its conclusion that the arbitrator had not disregarded the law: The arbitration award referenced applicable aspects of Georgia law of contract construction — that, where the governing contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract should be enforced according to its plain terms, and that contractual ambiguities are to be construed against the | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Tousley
green
2 sentences2018Certainly, the Court of Appeals has stated that [t]o show that the officer substantially performed the HGN test in an acceptable manner, the State may have the arresting officer testify both as a fact witness, regarding how he or she administered and interpreted the test, and as an expert witness, giving an opinion that he or she administered and interpreted the test properly under law enforcement guidelines. [Cits.] Id. at 880 , 611 S.E.2d 139 . 2018Certainly, the Court of Appeals has stated that [t]o show that the officer substantially performed the HGN test in an acceptable manner, the State may have the arresting officer testify both as a fact witness, regarding how he or she administered and interpreted the test, and as an expert witness, giving an opinion that he or she administered and interpreted the test properly under law enforcement guidelines. [Cits.] Id. at 880 , 611 S.E.2d 139 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
MAGISTRATE COURT DEKALB COUNTY v. Fleming
green
1 sentence2012In response, the majority opinion concluded that “[t]his is not a declaratory judgment action” because the district attorney was not seeking guidance, but instead “sought an order prohibiting [the magistrate court] from applying its hearsay evidentiary rule and mandating that the interpretation of the rule set forth by Fleming be used.” Id. at 458-459 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mobley v. Murray County
green
2 sentences1988This interpretation of the rule that a statute of limitation begins to run on the date a cause of action on a claim accrues is not in compliance with the test adopted by the Georgia appellate courts as set forth in Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388 ( 173 SE 680 ), to-wit: “[T]he true test to determine when the cause of action accrued is ‘to ascertain the time when the plaintiff could first have maintained his action to a successful result’ ... 1988This interpretation of the rule that a statute of limitation begins to run on the date a cause of action on a claim accrues is not in compliance with the test adopted by the Georgia appellate courts as set forth in Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388 ( 173 SE 680 ), to-wit: “[T]he true test to determine when the cause of action accrued is ‘to ascertain the time when the plaintiff could first have maintained his action to a successful result’ ... | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hannon v. . Grizzard
neutral
2 sentences1973There was no error in the refusal of the court to allow the case ... to be read to the jury, in view of the provisions of the 3d common law rule of practice in the superior courts, which declares that, 'In all civil cases, questions of law shall be argued exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury.’ ” Among the authorities supporting this interpretation of the rule are: Rutledge v. Hudson, 80 Ga. 266, 267 ( 5 SE 93 ); Rome R. 1973There was no error in the refusal of the court to allow the case ... to be read to the jury, in view of the provisions of the 3d common law rule of practice in the superior courts, which declares that, `In all civil cases, questions of law shall be argued exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury.'" Among the authorities supporting this interpretation of the rule are; Rutledge v. Hudson, 80 Ga. 266, 267 ( 5 SE 93 ); Rome R. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Cook v. Parks
green
2 sentences1964Applying the rule relating to negotiable instruments in Code § 14-906 that any material alteration of the instrument without the assent of all the parties thereon will void it without regard to fraudulent intent, 2 and taking the narrow interpretation of this rule- laid down in Cook v. Parks, 46 Ga. App. 749 ( 169 SE 208 ) and Williams v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 67 Ga. App. 711 (2) ( 21 SE2d 849 ) to the effect that the procuring of a witness to sign an instrument is a material alteration regardless of any other circumstances, the question remains whether the overruling of the plea, if error, 1964Applying the rule relating to negotiable instruments in Code § 14-906 that any material alteration of the instrument without the assent of all the parties thereon will void it without regard to fraudulent intent, 2 and taking the narrow interpretation of this rule- laid down in Cook v. Parks, 46 Ga. App. 749 ( 169 SE 208 ) and Williams v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 67 Ga. App. 711 (2) ( 21 SE2d 849 ) to the effect that the procuring of a witness to sign an instrument is a material alteration regardless of any other circumstances, the question remains whether the overruling of the plea, if error, | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Williams v. F. S. Royster Guano Co.
neutral
1 sentence1964Applying the rule relating to negotiable instruments in Code § 14-906 that any material alteration of the instrument without the assent of all the parties thereon will void it without regard to fraudulent intent, 2 and taking the narrow interpretation of this rule- laid down in Cook v. Parks, 46 Ga. App. 749 ( 169 SE 208 ) and Williams v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 67 Ga. App. 711 (2) ( 21 SE2d 849 ) to the effect that the procuring of a witness to sign an instrument is a material alteration regardless of any other circumstances, the question remains whether the overruling of the plea, if error, | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Mathis v. Jones
green
1 sentence1942J., in Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804 .” There can be no doubt that the interpretation of this clause of the constitution announced in Mathis v. Jones has been the law since that opinion was rendered. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Mayor of Savannah v. State ex rel. Green
neutral
1 sentence1909Touching the constitutional provision under consideration it is said in the case of the Mayor &c. v. State, 4 Ga. 26 : “ The true interpretation of this clause has become too well settled, by the usage and practice of every department of the State government, to he now disturbed. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.