65 Pennsylvania opinions name it 11 courts 1897–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2023See Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1999). 2023See Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1999). | 4 | 4 |
Oxford Board of School Directors v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1984We note that the principle generally applicable is that the arbitrator is possessed of jurisdiction if “there is involved a dispute between the parties which arguably involves an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.” Oxford Board of School Directors v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 31 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 445 , 376 A.2d 1012, 1013 (1977) (emphasis in original). 1984We note that the principle generally applicable is that the arbitrator is possessed of jurisdiction if “there is involved a dispute between the parties which arguably involves an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.” Oxford Board of School Directors v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 31 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 445 , 376 A.2d 1012, 1013 (1977) (emphasis in original). | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Hanngreen2 sentences2024The interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure is “a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 65 (Pa. 2013). 2022See Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 65 (Pa. 2013). | 2 | 2 |
Kopytin v. Aschingergreen2 sentences2018When legal issues such as the interpretation of a rule are concerned, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” -7- J-S69035-18 Kopytin, 947 A.2d at 744 (citations omitted). [D]emonstrative evidence . . . is “tendered for the purpose of rendering other evidence more comprehensible to the trier of fact.” As in the admission of any other evidence, a trial court may admit demonstrative evidence whose relevance outweighs any potential prejudicial effect. 2015We further note that the object of all interpretation and construction of rules is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Supreme Court.” Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 2 (Pa. 2009). -8- J-A30011-15 Contrary to Appellants’ argument, there is nothing in the plain language of Rule 1311.1 that requires a trial court to permit a party offering a document into evidence under Rule 1311.1 to read the entirety of the document to the jury. | 2 | 2 |
Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2015When legal issues such as the interpretation of a rule are concerned, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 2006 PA Super 31 , 893 A.2d 776, 787 (Pa. Super. 2006). 2015When legal issues such as the interpretation of a rule are concerned, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 2006 PA Super 31 , 893 A.2d 776, 787 (Pa. Super. 2006). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Joint Bargaining Committeegreen2 sentences1986Id. at 206 , 475 A.2d at 1333, n. 4 . 1986Id. at 206 , 475 A.2d at 1333, n. 4 . | 2 | 2 |
Ringgold School District v. Abramskigreen2 sentences1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini 1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Bonomogreen2 sentences1975See, Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222 , 151 A.2d 441 (1959).” Commonwealth v. *223 Turner, supra, at 121, n. 3, 317 A.2d at 300 . 1975See, Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222 , 151 A.2d 441 (1959).” Commonwealth v. *223 Turner, supra, at 121, n. 3, 317 A.2d at 300 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Turnergreen2 sentences1980Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188 , 329 A.2d 204 (1974) (the constitutionality of a standardized inference invoked to establish an essential element of the crime charged must be judged by the reasonable doubt standard); Commonwealth v. Turner, 456 Pa. 116 , 121 n.3, 317 A.2d 298 , 300 n.3 (1974) (in a criminal case where the fact to be inferred is the guilt of the crime charged or one of the elements of that crime, any standard less than reasona *311 ble doubt would be repugnant to the interpretation of the presumption of innocence as understood in this jurisdiction). 1980Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188 , 329 A.2d 204 (1974) (the constitutionality of a standardized inference invoked to establish an essential element of the crime charged must be judged by the reasonable doubt standard); Commonwealth v. Turner, 456 Pa. 116 , 121 n.3, 317 A.2d 298 , 300 n.3 (1974) (in a criminal case where the fact to be inferred is the guilt of the crime charged or one of the elements of that crime, any standard less than reasona *311 ble doubt would be repugnant to the interpretation of the presumption of innocence as understood in this jurisdiction). | 1 | 2 |
Greer v. United States Steel Corp.green1 sentence2025Cf. Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 152 A.2d 887, 892 (Pa. 1959) (“To read the act so as to deny plaintiff his existing common-law remedy without permitting him to come within the protective coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act might well violate the mandate of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.”); Greer, 380 A.2d at 1222-23 (“It has even been pointed out that an attempt to bar recovery where no compensation recovery can be had might well violate Article I, Section 11, of the 21 Article I, Section 11 provides: “All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done h | 1 | 1 |
Page v. Dennisongreen1 sentence2025Page, 1 Grant at 383 (Lowrie, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Majority’s interpretation of the presumption by stating, “If this is not judicial legislation, then I do not understand the term”). | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. Linton's Lunchgreen1 sentence2025Cf. Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 152 A.2d 887, 892 (Pa. 1959) (“To read the act so as to deny plaintiff his existing common-law remedy without permitting him to come within the protective coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act might well violate the mandate of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.”); Greer, 380 A.2d at 1222-23 (“It has even been pointed out that an attempt to bar recovery where no compensation recovery can be had might well violate Article I, Section 11, of the 21 Article I, Section 11 provides: “All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done h | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Widger, K.green1 sentence2024“Due process requires a criminal statute to give fair warning of the conduct prescribed, and the criminal information must provide fair notice of every crime of which a criminal defendant is accused.” Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1164 (Pa. Super. ____________________________________________ 11 Benson quotes a prior version of Rule 564, but the rule was amended in 2016 to the above-quoted language “to more accurately reflect the interpretation of this rule” by our Supreme Court and this Court since the passage of the Rule in 1974. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Simsgreen1 sentence2024Pa.R.Crim.P. 564, cmt. - 23 - J-A06040-24 2020); see also Commonwealth v. Sims, 919 A.2d 931, 939 (Pa. 2007) (“Such notice ensures that, if the Commonwealth prevails at trial, the defendant’s conviction is not arbitrary or oppressive.”). | 1 | 1 |
DNB First, N.A. v. Fretzgreen1 sentence2024“The Rules of Criminal Procedure are to ‘be construed in consonance with the rules of statutory construction,’ Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C), which requires us to interpret the provisions in accord with the plain meaning of their terms.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 107 A.3d 709, 716 (Pa. 2014) (brackets omitted). ____________________________________________ 2 “[B]oth this Court and the Commonwealth Court have jurisdiction to decide an appeal involving a motion for the return of property filed pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 588.” Commonwealth v. Durham, 9 A.3d 641 , 642 n.1 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sinclairgreen1 sentence2021Thus, under either version, our review is the same. -9- J-S01024-21 prejudice by prohibiting the last minute addition of alleged criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed.” Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Grekisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lenau, N. v. Co-Exprise, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| McKinney v. Carolusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Finn v. City of Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jenkins v. Hospital of the Medical College of Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fisher v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Klugman v. Gimbel Bros.green | 1 | 1 |
| LeDonne v. Kesslergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Watersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Transnational Consumer Discount Co. v. Kefauvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Grocegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ottavi v. Timothy Burke Stripping Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Sutherland
green
2 sentences2016This interpretation of the rule was "premised on the idea that it would be unfair to accept a guilty plea which was induced in part by a recommendation of a lenient sentence and then impose a greater sentence." Sutherland, 340 A.2d at 584 . 1991This interpretation of the rule was "premised on the idea that it would be unfair to accept a guilty plea which was induced in part by a recommendation of a lenient sentence and then impose a greater sentence." Commonwealth v. Sutherland, supra, 234 Pa.Superior Ct. at 524, 340 A.2d at 584 . | 2 | 1991–2016 |
Donnellan v. Mt. Lebanon School District
green
2 sentences1982Lebanon School District, supra 32 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 35 , 377 A.2d at 1056 . 1982Lebanon School District, supra 32 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 35 , 377 A.2d at 1056 . | 2 | 1982–1982 |
North Star School District v. P.L.R.B.
green
2 sentences1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini 1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Ass'n
green
2 sentences1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it "arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement," Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a "misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement," Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , "arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini 1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Shippensburg Area Education Ass'n v. Shippensburg Area School District
green
2 sentences1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini 1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Appeal of Ortenzi
green
2 sentences1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it "arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement," Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a "misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement," Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , "arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini 1982Thus, a dispute is arbitrable if it “arose out of the interpretation or application of a provision of the agreement,” Shippensburg Area Education Association v. Shippensburg Area School District, supra 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 132 , 400 A.2d at 1333 , involved a “misinterpretation or misapplication of the provisions of th[e] collective bargaining agreement,” Carmichaels Area School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association, supra 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 145 , 389 A.2d at 1206 , “arguably involve[d] an interpretation or violation of one of the provisions of the collective bargaini | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Tower Estate
green
2 sentences1967The same interpretation and principle is enunciated in Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297 , 77 A. 2d 390 ; Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 248 , 159 A. 2d 883 (and eleven eases cited therein) ; and in Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389 , 189 A. 2d 870 . “. . .: ‘. . . 1967The same interpretation and principle is enunciated in Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297 , 77 A. 2d 390 ; Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 248 , 159 A. 2d 883 (and eleven eases cited therein) ; and in Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389 , 189 A. 2d 870 . “. . .: ‘. . . | 2 | 1966–1967 |
Howlett Estate
green
2 sentences1967The same interpretation and principle is enunciated in Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297 , 77 A. 2d 390 ; Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 248 , 159 A. 2d 883 (and eleven eases cited therein) ; and in Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389 , 189 A. 2d 870 . “. . .: ‘. . . 1967The same interpretation and principle is enunciated in Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297 , 77 A. 2d 390 ; Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 248 , 159 A. 2d 883 (and eleven eases cited therein) ; and in Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389 , 189 A. 2d 870 . “. . .: ‘. . . | 2 | 1966–1967 |
Holton Estate
green
2 sentences1967The same interpretation and principle is enunciated in Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297 , 77 A. 2d 390 ; Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 248 , 159 A. 2d 883 (and eleven eases cited therein) ; and in Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389 , 189 A. 2d 870 . “. . .: ‘. . . 1967The same interpretation and principle is enunciated in Howlett Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297 , 77 A. 2d 390 ; Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 248 , 159 A. 2d 883 (and eleven eases cited therein) ; and in Tower Estate, 410 Pa. 389 , 189 A. 2d 870 . “. . .: ‘. . . | 2 | 1966–1967 |
Marshall's Estate
green
2 sentences1951In Knerr’s Estate, 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 383 , Judge Parker, later to become a justice of the Supreme Court, referring to the application of the rule, stated on page 389: “The court below fell into a common error which is clearly pointed out in the interpretation of this principle by Chief Justice Brown in Marshall’s Estate, 262 Pa. 145 , 149 . . . followed in Groninger’s Estate, 268 Pa. 184 ,191 . . . where he said: ‘. . . yet if such gift or distribution appears to be postponed for the convenience of the fund or property, or where the gift is only postponed to let in some other interest, the 1937The implication of the one is an accessory of the other, and it consequently follows the nature of its principal; whence it results that there can he no separate and independent legacy which is not given in express terms.” The court below fell into a common error which is clearly pointed out in the interpretation of this principle by Chief Justice Brown in Marshall’s Estate, 262 Pa. 145, 149 ,105 A. 63—followed in Groninger’s Estate, 268 Pa. 184, 191 , 110 A. 465 — where he said: “ ‘Though there be no other gift than in the direction to pay or distribute in futuro, yet if such gift or distribu | 2 | 1937–1951 |
Groninger's Estate
green
2 sentences1951In Knerr’s Estate, 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 383 , Judge Parker, later to become a justice of the Supreme Court, referring to the application of the rule, stated on page 389: “The court below fell into a common error which is clearly pointed out in the interpretation of this principle by Chief Justice Brown in Marshall’s Estate, 262 Pa. 145 , 149 . . . followed in Groninger’s Estate, 268 Pa. 184 ,191 . . . where he said: ‘. . . yet if such gift or distribution appears to be postponed for the convenience of the fund or property, or where the gift is only postponed to let in some other interest, the 1937The implication of the one is an accessory of the other, and it consequently follows the nature of its principal; whence it results that there can he no separate and independent legacy which is not given in express terms.” The court below fell into a common error which is clearly pointed out in the interpretation of this principle by Chief Justice Brown in Marshall’s Estate, 262 Pa. 145, 149 ,105 A. 63—followed in Groninger’s Estate, 268 Pa. 184, 191 , 110 A. 465 — where he said: “ ‘Though there be no other gift than in the direction to pay or distribute in futuro, yet if such gift or distribu | 2 | 1937–1951 |
Commonwealth v. Durham
green
1 sentence2024“The Rules of Criminal Procedure are to ‘be construed in consonance with the rules of statutory construction,’ Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C), which requires us to interpret the provisions in accord with the plain meaning of their terms.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 107 A.3d 709, 716 (Pa. 2014) (brackets omitted). ____________________________________________ 2 “[B]oth this Court and the Commonwealth Court have jurisdiction to decide an appeal involving a motion for the return of property filed pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 588.” Commonwealth v. Durham, 9 A.3d 641 , 642 n.1 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
FedEx Corporate Services v. Costume Gallery
green
1 sentence2024Tecce’s arguments implicate the interpretation of rule 4009.21. “[W]hen the issue before us involves ‘the proper interpretation of the language of our rules of civil procedure,’ the question is a pure matter of law, and ‘our standard of review is de novo.’” FedEx Corp. Servs. v. Costume Gallery, Inc., 320 A.3d 129 , 132 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Touloumes v. E.S.C. Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Inc., 899 A.2d 343 , 346 n.4 (Pa. 2006). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Commonwealth v. Page green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Com. v. NEDAB green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Grieff v. Reisinger green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Neuhard v. Travelers Insurance green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Borgia v. Prudential Insurance Company green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Tyler Trusts green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| McGonigle v. Currence green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Patterson v. Armco, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Commonwealth v. Stago green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| United States v. White green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Lower Merion Township v. Schenk green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Simpson v. Allstate Insurance green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Commonwealth v. Kinsey green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Watson v. Jones green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Kardon v. Portare green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Pennsylvania v. Myers neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Williams v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Newman green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Dellacasse v. Floyd Exrs. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| McFadden v. Pennzoil Company green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Erie Trust Company's Case (No. 2) green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.