interpretation rule in Utah

2020“While a [district] court is generally allowed broad discretion in granting or denying discovery, the proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the [district] court’s decision for correctness.” State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 75, ¶ 8 , 21 P.3d 675 (cleaned up). ¶14 Lastly, Steffen contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion for mistrial.

2020“While a [district] court is generally allowed broad discretion in granting or denying discovery, the proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the [district] court’s decision for correctness.” State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 75, ¶ 8 , 21 P.3d 675 (cleaned up). ¶14 Lastly, Steffen contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion for mistrial.

2020To the extent this requires us to review the court of appeals’ application of rules of civil procedure 17 and 25, “the interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.” Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 15 , 16 P.3d 540 .

2020To the extent this requires us to review the court of appeals’ application of rules of civil procedure 17 and 25, “the interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.” Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 15 , 16 P.3d 540 .

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2017Taufer , 2014 UT 56 , ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hether a particular statute affords a particular class of persons an unconditional intervention right ... is a pure question of law *8 because it involves abstract statutory construction." In re United Effort Plan Tr. , 2013 UT 5 , ¶ 21, 296 P.3d 742 .

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2017Taufer , 2014 UT 56 , ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hether a particular statute affords a particular class of persons an unconditional intervention right ... is a pure question of law *8 because it involves abstract statutory construction." In re United Effort Plan Tr. , 2013 UT 5 , ¶ 21, 296 P.3d 742 .

2018In so doing the court rendered an interpretation of the standard set forth in subsection (4). 6 Cite as: 2018 UT 02 Opinion of the Court It said that the reference to “then-existing” illness requires only a showing that the witness is ailing and “not available today [on the date scheduled for trial].” (Emphasis added.) And because it was apparently conceded that Thomas was unwilling to leave her baby’s side in the baby’s then-current condition, the court found Thomas unavailable without further inquiry into the expected length of the condition or the possibility of Thomas appearing to testify

2018In so doing the court rendered an interpretation of the standard set forth in subsection (4). 6 Cite as: 2018 UT 02 Opinion of the Court It said that the reference to “then-existing” illness requires only a showing that the witness is ailing and “not available today [on the date scheduled for trial].” (Emphasis added.) And because it was apparently conceded that Thomas was unwilling to leave her baby’s side in the baby’s then-current condition, the court found Thomas unavailable without further inquiry into the expected length of the condition or the possibility of Thomas appearing to testify

2018"The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Gardiner v. Taufer , 2014 UT 56 , ¶ 13, 342 P.3d 269 (quotation simplified).

2018"The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Gardiner v. Taufer , 2014 UT 56 , ¶ 13, 342 P.3d 269 (quotation simplified).

2017As a result, the State insists that it was objectively reasonable for defense counsel to avoid drawing attention to those comments by postponing the challenge. ¶13 "The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. Rodrigues , 2009 UT 62 , ¶ 11, 218 P.3d 610 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

2017As a result, the State insists that it was objectively reasonable for defense counsel to avoid drawing attention to those comments by postponing the challenge. ¶13 "The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. Rodrigues , 2009 UT 62 , ¶ 11, 218 P.3d 610 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2024Ins., 2002 UT 54 , ¶ 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 (“Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the federal rules.” (cleaned up)). 20220565-CA 9 2024 UT App 22 Clear Creek v. Peterson Pipeline ¶20 Moreover, an interpretation of rule 13(a) that grounds it in the principles of claim preclusion best serves the purpose of the rule, which is one of judicial economy that is largely similar to the purposes behind the doctrine of claim preclusion, compare Raile Family Trust ex rel.

2024Ins., 2002 UT 54 , ¶ 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 (“Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the federal rules.” (cleaned up)). 20220565-CA 9 2024 UT App 22 Clear Creek v. Peterson Pipeline ¶20 Moreover, an interpretation of rule 13(a) that grounds it in the principles of claim preclusion best serves the purpose of the rule, which is one of judicial economy that is largely similar to the purposes behind the doctrine of claim preclusion, compare Raile Family Trust ex rel.

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2024But we disagree with the State about when that showing must occur. __________________________________________________________ 4 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 . 5 See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 10 , 1 P.3d 1087 (“The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law. . . .” (cleaned up)); Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 5 , 184 P.3d 592 (“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of constitutional provisions, granting it no deference.” (cleaned up)). 6 See In re United Effort Plan Tr., 2013 UT 5, ¶ 18 , 296 P.3d 742 . 7 State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

2024Ins., 2002 UT 54 , ¶ 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 (“Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the federal rules.” (cleaned up)). 20220565-CA 9 2024 UT App 22 Clear Creek v. Peterson Pipeline ¶20 Moreover, an interpretation of rule 13(a) that grounds it in the principles of claim preclusion best serves the purpose of the rule, which is one of judicial economy that is largely similar to the purposes behind the doctrine of claim preclusion, compare Raile Family Trust ex rel.

2023Indeed, Clayton acknowledged, at oral argument before this court, that if we adopt the State’s interpretation of the rule, no additional foundational evidence needed to be presented with regard to the officers’ statements. 20210890-CA 11 2023 UT App 84 State v. Clayton enacted to give specificity to the new constitutional provision allowing admission of “reliable hearsay” at preliminary hearings, see Utah R.

2023Since the enactment of these amendments, “[a]dmission of evidence at preliminary hearings is exclusively governed by the reliable hearsay language in the Utah Constitution and rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.” Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 16 . ¶13 At the preliminary hearing in this case, the State offered the officers’ statements under rule 1102(b)(8), arguing that the statements met the requirements of that rule because they were “written” and had been made “pursuant to a notification that a false statement made therein is punishable.” The magistrate (and, later, the district court in con

2022In contrast, “whether the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact, which we review for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Patterson v. Knight, 2017 UT App 22, ¶ 5 , 391 P.3d 1075 (cleaned up). ¶18 Some cases have suggested that a non-deferential standard of review applies—even to questions of fact—where the district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement rests solely on documentary evidence.

2022In contrast, “whether the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact, which we review for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Patterson v. Knight, 2017 UT App 22, ¶ 5 , 391 P.3d 1075 (cleaned up). ¶18 Some cases have suggested that a non-deferential standard of review applies—even to questions of fact—where the district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement rests solely on documentary evidence.

2022“Questions of contract 20210013-CA 7 2022 UT App 75 Park Property v. G6 Hospitality interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions we accord the trial court’s interpretation no presumption of correctness.” Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995) (cleaned up).

2021While we understand the Utah Supreme Court’s admonition that “no set of rules or guidelines can exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer [as to duty],” Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44, ¶ 29 , 122 P.3d 533 (cleaned up), when interpreting these rules, we are “bound by the text of the rule,” Strand v. Nupetco Assocs., 2017 UT App 55, ¶ 4 , 397 P.3d 724 . “[W]e look to the express language of the rule . . . [and] read each term in the rule according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” See Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 16 , 250 P.3d 48 (cleaned 20190867-CA 13 2021 UT App

2021While we understand the Utah Supreme Court’s admonition that “no set of rules or guidelines can exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer [as to duty],” Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44, ¶ 29 , 122 P.3d 533 (cleaned up), when interpreting these rules, we are “bound by the text of the rule,” Strand v. Nupetco Assocs., 2017 UT App 55, ¶ 4 , 397 P.3d 724 . “[W]e look to the express language of the rule . . . [and] read each term in the rule according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” See Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 16 , 250 P.3d 48 (cleaned 20190867-CA 13 2021 UT App

2021While we understand the Utah Supreme Court’s admonition that “no set of rules or guidelines can exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer [as to duty],” Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44, ¶ 29 , 122 P.3d 533 (cleaned up), when interpreting these rules, we are “bound by the text of the rule,” Strand v. Nupetco Assocs., 2017 UT App 55, ¶ 4 , 397 P.3d 724 . “[W]e look to the express language of the rule . . . [and] read each term in the rule according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” See Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 16 , 250 P.3d 48 (cleaned 20190867-CA 13 2021 UT App

2021We review the district court’s interpretation of rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for correctness, but because its “determination of whether the issues were tried with all parties’ implied consent is highly fact intensive, we grant the [district] court a fairly broad measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set of facts.” Pilot v. Hill, 2019 UT 10, ¶ 9 , 437 P.3d 362 (cleaned up).

2021We review the district court’s interpretation of rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for correctness, but because its “determination of whether the issues were tried with all parties’ implied consent is highly fact intensive, we grant the [district] court a fairly broad measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set of facts.” Pilot v. Hill, 2019 UT 10, ¶ 9 , 437 P.3d 362 (cleaned up).