like rule in Pennsylvania

1949A like rule has been enforced where the loss complained of resulted from the fall of an elevator in which plaintiff was a passenger: Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127 ; McKnight v. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489 .

1926A like rule has been enforced where the loss complained of resulted from the fall of an elevator in which plaintiff was a passenger: Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127; McKnight v. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489 .

1949A like rule has been enforced where the loss complained of resulted from the fall of an elevator in which plaintiff was a passenger: Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127 ; McKnight v. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489 .

1926A like rule has been enforced where the loss complained of resulted from the fall of an elevator in which plaintiff was a passenger: Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127; McKnight v. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489 .

1935The relation to the public created by its ordinances are, in such cases, not legislative, but contractual.” And in Barnes Laundry Co. v. Pittsburgh et al., supra, the Supreme Court said at page 36: “In reaching the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to subject municipal corporations, rendering the same character of service as public service companies, to like regulation with the latter, we have not overlooked our own authorities which hold that, when a city undertakes to supply water, it acts ‘not by virtue of any right of sovereignty, but exercises merely the functions of a privat

1920In reaching the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to subject municipal corporations, rendering the same character of service as public service companies, to like regulation with the latter, we have not overlooked our own authorities which hold that, when a city undertakes to supply water, it acts “not by virtue of any right of sovereignty, but exercises merely the functions of a private corporation,” and must be so considered (see Com. v. Casey, 231 Pa. 170,178 , and authorities there mentioned, together with cases holding a like principle, from this and other jurisdictions, cited

2015Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir.2004) ("There is a strong presumption against finding a waiver' of arbitration, and the party claiming that the right to arbitrate has been waived bears a heavy burden.”); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 759 S.E.2d 727, 736 (2014); Verbeek Props., LLC v. GreenCo Envtl., Inc., 159 Wash.App. 82 , 246 P.3d 205 , 207 (2010); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589-90 (Tex.2008). .

2015Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir.2004) ("There is a strong presumption against finding a waiver' of arbitration, and the party claiming that the right to arbitrate has been waived bears a heavy burden.”); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 408 S.C. 371 , 759 S.E.2d 727, 736 (2014); Verbeek Props., LLC v. GreenCo Envtl., Inc., 159 Wash.App. 82 , 246 P.3d 205 , 207 (2010); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589-90 (Tex.2008). .

2015Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ("[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”); Republic Ins.

2015Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ("[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”); Republic Ins.

2012Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which ‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. * * * ’ Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766, 769 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 .

2012Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which ‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. * * * ’ Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766, 769 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 .

1999Id. at 60 , 161 A. at 704 (quoting State v. Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456 , 161 S.W. 1006 (1913)). ¶ 7 In the January 18, 1995, proclamation to convene the Special Session on Crime, Governor Ridge called the legislature to consider, among other things, new measures to update Pennsylvania’s rape law; reform the Pardons Board process; close loopholes in the state’s firearms laws; provide for longer sentences for violent, repeat offenders; strengthen the state’s laws relating to juvenile crime; notify communities when a repeat sexual offender is released into the community; enhance protection for crime

1999Id. at 60 , 161 A. at 704 (quoting State v. Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456 , 161 S.W. 1006 (1913)). ¶ 7 In the January 18, 1995, proclamation to convene the Special Session on Crime, Governor Ridge called the legislature to consider, among other things, new measures to update Pennsylvania’s rape law; reform the Pardons Board process; close loopholes in the state’s firearms laws; provide for longer sentences for violent, repeat offenders; strengthen the state’s laws relating to juvenile crime; notify communities when a repeat sexual offender is released into the community; enhance protection for crime

1999Id. at 60 , 161 A. at 704 (quoting State v. Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456 , 161 S.W. 1006 (1913)). ¶ 7 In the January 18, 1995, proclamation to convene the Special Session on Crime, Governor Ridge called the legislature to consider, among other things, new measures to update Pennsylvania’s rape law; reform the Pardons Board process; close loopholes in the state’s firearms laws; provide for longer sentences for violent, repeat offenders; strengthen the state’s laws relating to juvenile crime; notify communities when a repeat sexual offender is released into the community; enhance protection for crime

1993The Incollingo court's notation in footnote nine advising that the strict liability rule of § 402A was not applicable to its decision, was necessary because the case was pled as a negligence case and recovery based upon strict liability was not sought. [2] In Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239 , 478 A.2d 807 (1984), a like claim was made.

1993The Incollingo court's notation in footnote nine advising that the strict liability rule of § 402A was not applicable to its decision, was necessary because the case was pled as a negligence case and recovery based upon strict liability was not sought. [2] In Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239 , 478 A.2d 807 (1984), a like claim was made.

1988We note that while Appellant has recognized the Supreme Court’s ruling on a like claim involving the right to "hybrid representation” in Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440 , 490 A.2d 811 (1985) he urges us to “reexamine the same” and change the court’s position.

1988We note that while Appellant has recognized the Supreme Court’s ruling on a like claim involving the right to "hybrid representation” in Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440 , 490 A.2d 811 (1985) he urges us to “reexamine the same” and change the court’s position.

1988Appellant asserts that such a change is warranted because the Supreme Court’s decision in Colson and the decision in the case on which it relies, Commonwealth v. Williams, 270 Pa.Super. 27 , 410 A.2d 880 (1979), are unsupported by underlying rationale.

1988Appellant asserts that such a change is warranted because the Supreme Court’s decision in Colson and the decision in the case on which it relies, Commonwealth v. Williams, 270 Pa.Super. 27 , 410 A.2d 880 (1979), are unsupported by underlying rationale.

1986Jan. 17, 1984 In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 , 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5 , 370 A.2d 509 (1977), and Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J.Super. 382 , 448 A.2d 1035 (1982), espousing the rule adopted in Painter , property owned by a husband or wife at the time of marriage enjoys an immunity to equitable distribution, and if such property, owned at the time of marriage, later increases in value, such increase enjoys a like immunity.

1986Jan. 17, 1984 In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 , 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5 , 370 A.2d 509 (1977), and Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J.Super. 382 , 448 A.2d 1035 (1982), espousing the rule adopted in Painter , property owned by a husband or wife at the time of marriage enjoys an immunity to equitable distribution, and if such property, owned at the time of marriage, later increases in value, such increase enjoys a like immunity.

1986Jan. 17, 1984 In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 , 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5 , 370 A.2d 509 (1977), and Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J.Super. 382 , 448 A.2d 1035 (1982), espousing the rule adopted in Painter , property owned by a husband or wife at the time of marriage enjoys an immunity to equitable distribution, and if such property, owned at the time of marriage, later increases in value, such increase enjoys a like immunity.

1986Jan. 17, 1984 In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 , 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5 , 370 A.2d 509 (1977), and Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J.Super. 382 , 448 A.2d 1035 (1982), espousing the rule adopted in Painter , property owned by a husband or wife at the time of marriage enjoys an immunity to equitable distribution, and if such property, owned at the time of marriage, later increases in value, such increase enjoys a like immunity.

1986Jan. 17, 1984 In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 , 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5 , 370 A.2d 509 (1977), and Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J.Super. 382 , 448 A.2d 1035 (1982), espousing the rule adopted in Painter , property owned by a husband or wife at the time of marriage enjoys an immunity to equitable distribution, and if such property, owned at the time of marriage, later increases in value, such increase enjoys a like immunity.

1986Jan. 17, 1984 In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 , 320 A.2d 484 (1974), Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J.Super. 5 , 370 A.2d 509 (1977), and Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J.Super. 382 , 448 A.2d 1035 (1982), espousing the rule adopted in Painter , property owned by a husband or wife at the time of marriage enjoys an immunity to equitable distribution, and if such property, owned at the time of marriage, later increases in value, such increase enjoys a like immunity.

1984Also, because “good cause” is equivalent to “necessitous and compelling” cause, Kleban v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 73 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 540 , 459 A.2d 53 (1983), a like analysis is pertinent to claimant Snyder’s voluntary quit issue.

1984Also, because “good cause” is equivalent to “necessitous and compelling” cause, Kleban v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 73 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 540 , 459 A.2d 53 (1983), a like analysis is pertinent to claimant Snyder’s voluntary quit issue.

1978Hence, the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.” (p. 75, 85 S.Ct. p. 216) In 1976, that court reaffirmed, in dictum, that “. inaccurate and defamatory reports of facts, [are] matters deserving no First Amendment protection . . . ” Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 , 96 S.Ct. 958, 967 , 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976).

1978Hence, the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.” (p. 75, 85 S.Ct. p. 216) In 1976, that court reaffirmed, in dictum, that “. inaccurate and defamatory reports of facts, [are] matters deserving no First Amendment protection . . . ” Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 , 96 S.Ct. 958, 967 , 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976).

1970And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.” Id. at 763 , 89 S. Ct. 2040 .

1970In Commonwealth v. Jordan, 407 Pa. 575 , 181 A. 2d 310 (1962), we were confronted with a like instruction that malice is presumed once a prima facie case of felonious homicide is made out.

1970In Commonwealth v. Jordan, 407 Pa. 575 , 181 A. 2d 310 (1962), we were confronted with a like instruction that malice is presumed once a prima facie case of felonious homicide is made out.

1966Yet, even though “a wholly owned subsidiary is generally incorporated or acquired by the parent corporation for the purpose of advantageously carrying on some phase of the parent corporation’s activities or business, the courts have been reluctant to disregard the separate legal entities . . . merely to grant relief from sales, or similar taxes at the expense of the state or its subdivisions.” Commonwealth v. Penn Fruit Co., Inc., 78 Dauph. 300, 304 (1962); see Commonwealth v. Prudential Industries, Inc., 80 Dauph. 381 (1963); Commonwealth v. Sylvan Seal Milk, Inc., 25 Pa. D. & C. 2d 790 (1961

1940It should be noted that in the instant case we have the additional fact of a corporation employing an attorney for the performance and rendition of legal services to others which comes squarely within the prohibition of the cases of Land Title & Trust Co. v Dworken, supra, and Judd et al, Appellees v City Trust & Savings Bank et al, supra, wherein our Supreme Court specifically holds that such practices constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

1936The federal courts apply a like principle'in receivership cases, where it has long been established: Trustees v. Greenough, supra; Buell v. Kanawha Lumber Corp., 201 Fed. 762 ; Carbon Steel Co. v. Slayback et al., 31 Fed. (2d) 702.

1936The federal courts apply a like principle'in receivership cases, where it has long been established: Trustees v. Greenough, supra; Buell v. Kanawha Lumber Corp., 201 Fed. 762 ; Carbon Steel Co. v. Slayback et al., 31 Fed. (2d) 702.

1931Dougherty v. Welshans, 233 Pa. 121 , presents a somewhat analagous situation and lays down the like principle, the land there being wild and mountainous.

1930A like principle was applied in Santa Fe Ry. v. Grant Bros., 228 U. S. 177 , so strongly relied on by appellant.

1930A like principle is stated in Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529 , where one servant is held liable for negligent injury to another servant of the same master.