like defense in Texas

2024Corp. Intern., 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002)).

2015Corp. Int’l, 85 S.W.3d at 174 (same); In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d at 704-05 (same); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Page 8 of 31 258 S.W.3d 580, *588 ; 2008 Tex. LEXIS 423, **15 [*588] The Culls argue this was all changed in 2002 by Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, in which the United States Supreme Court said the ″presumption is that the arbitrator should decide ’allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’″ 20 For several reasons, we disagree that this single sentence changed the federal arbitration landscape.

2021These procedural matters include claims of “waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” And they include the satisfaction of “prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate.” Id. at 521 (quoting BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 , 34–35, 134 S. Ct. 1198 , 1206–07 (2014)).

2020Although the Court acknowledged that, “[l]inguistically speaking, one might call any potentially dispositive gateway question a ‘question of arbitrability,’” it explained that “the phrase ‘question of arbitrability’ has a far more limited scope” and does not encompass “ ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition” or “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense.” Id. at 84 (citation omitted).

2004The presumptions favoring arbitration require that questions about the scope of arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitration "whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc ., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1473, 1477 (M.D.

2003The presumptions favoring arbitration require that questions about the scope of arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitration “whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, Inc., 2 F.Supp.2d 1473, 1477 (M.D.Ga.1998) (quoting Moses H.

2015Cone Memorial Hospital, supra, 460 U.S. 1, at 24-25 [**593] (referring to ″waiver, delay, or a like defense″).

2015Corp., the Supreme Court held, "[the FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." 460 U.S. at 24-25 ; see also OPE Intl LP v. Chet Morrison Contrs., Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2001).

2024Id.; see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182, 185, 187 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (addressing contract- formation or contract-validity defenses raised by party opposing arbitration); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex. 2013) (addressing argument that claims fall outside scope of arbitration agreement). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Henry, 551 S.W.

2024Id.; Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494 , 499–500 (Tex. 2015). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115 (quoting In re Serv.

2023Corp. Int’l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)); see Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990).

2021Corp. Int’l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)); see also Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990).

2023Any waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional, Sedillo v. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.), and the party opposing arbitration on waiver grounds faces a “high hurdle.” Kennedy Hodges, 433 S.W.3d at 543 ; see also In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d at 705 (noting the “heavy burden of proof” required to establish waiver of the right to arbitration). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegatio

2015Corp. Int’l, 85 S.W.3d at 174 (same); In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d at 704-05 (same); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Page 8 of 31 258 S.W.3d 580, *588 ; 2008 Tex. LEXIS 423, **15 [*588] The Culls argue this was all changed in 2002 by Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, in which the United States Supreme Court said the ″presumption is that the arbitrator should decide ’allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’″ 20 For several reasons, we disagree that this single sentence changed the federal arbitration landscape.

2021These procedural matters include claims of “waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” And they include the satisfaction of “prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate.” Id. at 521 (quoting BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 , 34–35, 134 S. Ct. 1198 , 1206–07 (2014)).

2021These procedural matters include claims of “waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” And they include the satisfaction of “prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate.” Id. at 521 (quoting BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 , 34–35, 134 S. Ct. 1198 , 1206–07 (2014)).

2015But, taken to its ultimate conclusion, this "logic" would require the reviewing court to "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (emphasis added).

2015But, taken to its ultimate conclusion, this "logic" would require the reviewing court to "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 276 , 385 U. S. 282 (emphasis added).

1982See also Lovell v. Lovell, 202 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ.

1954Lovell v. Lovell, supra, Syl. 1; 27 Texas Law Review 725.

2024Id.; see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182, 185, 187 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (addressing contract- formation or contract-validity defenses raised by party opposing arbitration); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex. 2013) (addressing argument that claims fall outside scope of arbitration agreement). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Henry, 551 S.W.

2024Id.; see also In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182, 185, 187 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (addressing contract- formation or contract-validity defenses raised by party opposing arbitration); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex. 2013) (addressing argument that claims fall outside scope of arbitration agreement). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Henry, 551 S.W.

2023Any waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional, Sedillo v. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.), and the party opposing arbitration on waiver grounds faces a “high hurdle.” Kennedy Hodges, 433 S.W.3d at 543 ; see also In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d at 705 (noting the “heavy burden of proof” required to establish waiver of the right to arbitration). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegatio

2021Indeed, a like instruction was found to be nothing more than a “mild, neutral, and an obvious common-sense proposition.” Barron v. State, No. 08-12-00184-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8811 , at *24 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 12, 2016, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (quoting Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 803 (Tex. Crim.

2017We dence was sufficient to convict. 2 Curry filed a petition will refer to the deletion of the phrase in this case as a for discretionary review in which he argued that the court modification of the indictment, rather than an abandon- of appeals erred in its sufficiency analysis by failing to ment. apply Malik v. State. 3 We agreed and remanded the case to the court of appeals to reconsider Curry's sufficiency Legal Background point in light of Malik. 4 [HN1] Both the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Consti- 1 Curry v. State, 966 S.W.2d 203, 205-06 (Tex. tution guarantee an accused the right "t

2017We dence was sufficient to convict. 2 Curry filed a petition will refer to the deletion of the phrase in this case as a for discretionary review in which he argued that the court modification of the indictment, rather than an abandon- of appeals erred in its sufficiency analysis by failing to ment. apply Malik v. State. 3 We agreed and remanded the case to the court of appeals to reconsider Curry's sufficiency Legal Background point in light of Malik. 4 [HN1] Both the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Consti- 1 Curry v. State, 966 S.W.2d 203, 205-06 (Tex. tution guarantee an accused the right "t

2017See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 .

2016Last, we inquire into the probable value of the psychiatric assistance sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is not offered. . . . [I]n subsection (e) of the Criminal Justice Act, Congress has provided that indigent defendants shall receive the assistance of all experts “necessary for an adequate defense.” Numerous state statutes guarantee reimbursement for expert services under a like standard.13 The right to assistance of an expert is not exclusive to the indigent defendant; even a defendant in a criminal case who has not claimed indigent status, like Appellant,