like defense in Washington

2025“Courts must indulge every presumption in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Verbeek Properties, LLC v. GreenCo Env’t., Inc., 159 Wn.

2024Moreover, Washington has its own policy of favoring arbitration, meaning, “[c]ourts must indulge every presumption in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Verbeek Properties, LLC v. GreenCo Envtl., Inc., 159 Wn.

2025App. 82, 87 , 246 P.3d 205 (2010).

2024App. 82, 87 , 246 P.3d 205 (2010).

2018It noted "[t]he arbitrator should decide 'allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. (quoting Moses H.

2011Citing Moses, we concluded that the arbitrator should decide any "`allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'" Yakima, 133 Wash.App. at 288 , 135 P.3d 558 ; see Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 . ¶ 24 Further, the determination of whether election of remedies or waiver bar the grievance requires interpretation of the CBA.

2012App. 400, 406 n.8, 200 P.3d 254 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Moses H.

2010Again, "`[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'" Id. at 406, 200 P.3d 254 (quoting Moses H.

2011Verbeek Props., LLC v. GreenCo Envtl., Inc., 159 Wash.App. 82, 87 , 246 P.3d 205 (2010); Heights at Issaquah Ridge Owners Ass'n v. Burton Landscape Grp., Inc., 148 Wash.App. 400, 405 , 200 P.3d 254 (2009); see also Peninsula Sch.

2010Heights, 148 Wn.

2010The arbitrator should decide “ 'allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ ” Id. at 288 (quoting Moses H.

2006Co., 815 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1987) (alterations in original) (quoting John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 557 ). ¶[19 The arbitrator should decide “allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H.

2007Thus, the second principle that serves as a foundation for the actual malice standard is that "`there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.'" Id. at 504 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 ). ¶ 42 "Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209 .

2007Thus, the second principle that serves as a foundation for the actual malice standard is that “ ‘there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.’ ” Id. at 504 n.22 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ). ¶42 “Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 .

2007Thus, the second principle that serves as a foundation for the actual malice standard is that "`there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.'" Id. at 504 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 ). ¶ 42 "Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209 .

2007Thus, the second principle that serves as a foundation for the actual malice standard is that “ ‘there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.’ ” Id. at 504 n.22 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ). ¶42 “Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 .

2007Thus, the second principle that serves as a foundation for the actual malice standard is that "`there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.'" Id. at 504 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 ). ¶ 42 "Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209 .

2007Thus, the second principle that serves as a foundation for the actual malice standard is that “ ‘there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.’ ” Id. at 504 n.22 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ). ¶42 “Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 .

2004Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 . ¶8 Although federal and state courts presume arbitrability, “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S. Ct. 1652 , 134 L.

2004Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 . ¶8 Although federal and state courts presume arbitrability, “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 , 116 S. Ct. 1652 , 134 L.

1922Pierce Loan Co. v. Killian, 153 Mo. App. 106 , 132 S. W. 280 ; Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610 , 82 S. W. 109 ; Edwards v. White (Tex. Civ.

1922Pierce Loan Co. v. Killian, 153 Mo. App. 106 , 132 S. W. 280 ; Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610 , 82 S. W. 109 ; Edwards v. White (Tex. Civ.

1922Pierce Loan Co. v. Killian, 153 Mo. App. 106 , 132 S. W. 280 ; Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610 , 82 S. W. 109 ; Edwards v. White (Tex. Civ.

1922Pierce Loan Co. v. Killian, 153 Mo. App. 106 , 132 S. W. 280 ; Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610 , 82 S. W. 109 ; Edwards v. White (Tex. Civ.

2020These procedural matters include claims of “waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 34-35 , 134 S. Ct. 1198 , 188 L.

2020These procedural matters include claims of “waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 34-35 , 134 S. Ct. 1198 , 188 L.

2019The parties agree. 6 No. 78365-3-1/7 presumption ‘in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Zuver, 153 Wn.2d at 301 (quoting Moses H.

2017The Federal Arbitration Act(FAA)applies to all employment contracts except in narrow circumstances not relevant here) Under section 2 of that act, written arbitration agreements "'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'"2 We "indulge every presumption 'in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.m3 We review de novo a trial court's order denying arbitration.4 The party op

2017The Federal Arbitration Act(FAA)applies to all employment contracts except in narrow circumstances not relevant here) Under section 2 of that act, written arbitration agreements "'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'"2 We "indulge every presumption 'in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.m3 We review de novo a trial court's order denying arbitration.4 The party op

2017The Federal Arbitration Act(FAA)applies to all employment contracts except in narrow circumstances not relevant here) Under section 2 of that act, written arbitration agreements "'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'"2 We "indulge every presumption 'in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.m3 We review de novo a trial court's order denying arbitration.4 The party op

2009Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ). [9] 537 U.S. 79, 81 , 123 S.Ct. 588 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002). [10] Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 , 123 S.Ct. 588 . [11] 150 Wash.2d 375, 389 , 78 P.3d 161 (2003). [12] Mike M.

2009Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ). [9] 537 U.S. 79, 81 , 123 S.Ct. 588 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002). [10] Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 , 123 S.Ct. 588 . [11] 150 Wash.2d 375, 389 , 78 P.3d 161 (2003). [12] Mike M.

1977A like principle is declared in State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968).

1977A like principle is declared in State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968).

1963The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Boles, 246 N. C. 83, 85 , 97 S. E. (2d) 476 , in considering a like claim of error under analogous circumstances, stated: “In passing on defendant’s assignments based on exceptions Nos. 4 and 5, we must do so in the light of the facts before Judge Johnston at the time he made the ruling complained of.

1963The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Boles, 246 N. C. 83, 85 , 97 S. E. (2d) 476 , in considering a like claim of error under analogous circumstances, stated: “In passing on defendant’s assignments based on exceptions Nos. 4 and 5, we must do so in the light of the facts before Judge Johnston at the time he made the ruling complained of.

1959A similar argument was advanced in the case of Wilcox v. Carroll, 127 Wash. 1 , 219 Pac. 34 (1923), where a like instruction was given.

1959A similar argument was advanced in the case of Wilcox v. Carroll, 127 Wash. 1 , 219 Pac. 34 (1923), where a like instruction was given.

1943J. 438, § 587, says: “It is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client’s death, between parties, all of whom claim under the cliént; and, so, where the controversy is to determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person and both parties claim under him, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other as regards the communications of deceased with his attorney.” *97 This court has adopted a like rule in the cases of Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351 , 98 Pac. 756 ; In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331 , 140 Pac. 340

1943J. 438, § 587, says: “It is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client’s death, between parties, all of whom claim under the cliént; and, so, where the controversy is to determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person and both parties claim under him, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other as regards the communications of deceased with his attorney.” *97 This court has adopted a like rule in the cases of Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351 , 98 Pac. 756 ; In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331 , 140 Pac. 340

1943J. 438, § 587, says: “It is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client’s death, between parties, all of whom claim under the cliént; and, so, where the controversy is to determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person and both parties claim under him, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other as regards the communications of deceased with his attorney.” *97 This court has adopted a like rule in the cases of Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351 , 98 Pac. 756 ; In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331 , 140 Pac. 340

1943J. 438, § 587, says: “It is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client’s death, between parties, all of whom claim under the cliént; and, so, where the controversy is to determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person and both parties claim under him, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other as regards the communications of deceased with his attorney.” *97 This court has adopted a like rule in the cases of Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351 , 98 Pac. 756 ; In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331 , 140 Pac. 340

1943J. 438, § 587, says: “It is generally considered that the rule of privilege does not apply in litigation, after the client’s death, between parties, all of whom claim under the cliént; and, so, where the controversy is to determine who shall take by succession the property of a deceased person and both parties claim under him, neither can set up a claim of privilege against the other as regards the communications of deceased with his attorney.” *97 This court has adopted a like rule in the cases of Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351 , 98 Pac. 756 ; In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331 , 140 Pac. 340