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84 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1884–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.green2 sentences2017Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)) (‘[T]he presumption is that the arbitra tor should decide “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” ’). 2017Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)) (‘[T]he presumption is that the arbitra tor should decide “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” ’). | 8 | 28 |
The DUNES OF GP, LLC v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences2017"In interpreting an arbitration provision, 'any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.' " The Dunes of GP, L.L.C. v. Bradford , 966 So.2d 924 , 927 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Moses H. 2015This Court has previously stated that “[i]n interpreting an arbitration provision, ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbi- trable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is, the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ ” Dunes of GP, L.L.C. v. Bradford, 966 So.2d 924, 927 (Ala.2007) (quoting Moses H. | 2 | 4 |
Ex Parte Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.green2 sentences1999In deciding this question, we believe we must be guided by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which specifically hold that "`any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'" Ex parte Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.1986), quoting Moses H. 1999In deciding this question, we believe we must be guided by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which specifically hold that "`any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'" Ex parte Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 494 So.2d 1 , 2 (Ala. 1986), quoting Moses H. | 2 | 2 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,041 Eli W. Tullis and Edward F. Creekmore, Jr. v. Kohlmeyer & Co., in Liquidation, Through Its Liquidatorsgreen2 sentences1987Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. , 460 U.S. 1 , 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 941-942 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (citing Coenen, supra , the Court held that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability") (footnote omitted); Tullis v. Kohlmeyer Co. , 551 F.2d 632 , 636 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[t]he crucial issue, as . . . 1987Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927, 941-942 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (citing Coenen, supra, the Court held that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (footnote omitted); Tullís v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 636 (5th Cir.1977) (“[t]he crucial issue, as ... | 2 | 2 |
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.green2 sentences2012Cone Mem’l Hasp., 460 U.S. at 25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 . “[A] motion to compel arbitration should not be denied ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’” Ex parte Colquitt, 808 So.2d 1018, 1024 (Ala.2001) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (I960)). 2012Cone Mem’l Hasp., 460 U.S. at 25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 . “[A] motion to compel arbitration should not be denied ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’” Ex parte Colquitt, 808 So.2d 1018, 1024 (Ala.2001) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (I960)). | 1 | 2 |
STV One Nineteen Senior Living, LLC v. Boydgreen2 sentences2023Summary " 'In interpreting an arbitration provision, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language 28 SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." ' " STV, 258 So. 3d at 325 (citations omitted; emphasis altered). " ' "Thus, a motion to compel arbitration should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asser 2023Summary " 'In interpreting an arbitration provision, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language 28 SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." ' " STV, 258 So. 3d at 325 (citations omitted; emphasis altered). " ' "Thus, a motion to compel arbitration should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asser | 1 | 1 |
Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp.green1 sentence2014Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st 2 In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 , 84–85 (2002), the United States Supreme Court stated that "the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide 'allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.'" (Quoting Moses H. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Colquittgreen1 sentence2012Cone Mem’l Hasp., 460 U.S. at 25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 . “[A] motion to compel arbitration should not be denied ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’” Ex parte Colquitt, 808 So.2d 1018, 1024 (Ala.2001) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (I960)). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowagreen1 sentence2003Federal courts applying this presumption in favor of arbitration have held that "any doubts about the construction or breach of the putative arbitration provision are to be resolved in favor of ordering arbitration." Johnson Controls, Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 713 F.2d 370, 373 (1983); Lomax v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Quality Truck and Auto Sales, Inc. v. Yassinegreen1 sentence2000The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." (Emphasis added.) Questions of arbitrability —that is, whether the parties agreed to submit their particular dispute to arbitration —"must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration," id. at 24 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ; but, in determining whether the parti | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrgreen1 sentence1961See the case of State of Iowa v. Carr, 8 Cir., 191 F. 257, 266 , where the Court said: “ ‘But the great weight of authority, the stronger reasons and the settled rule upon this subject in the courts of the United States, is that, while mere delay does not, either by limitation or laches, of itself constitute a bar to suits and claims of a state or of the United States, yet, when a sovereignty submits itself to the jurisdiction of a court of equity and prays its aid, its claims and rights are judicable by every other principle and rule of equity applicable to the claims and rights of private pa | 1 | 1 |
| Elkins, Bly & Co. v. McKeangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weiser v. Holzmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart v. Capital Fertilizer Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84-85 , 123 S.Ct. 588 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002), the United States Supreme Court stated that "the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide 'al!egation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ ” (Quoting Moses H. 2014In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84-85 , 123 S.Ct. 588 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002), the United States Supreme Court stated that "the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide 'al!egation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ ” (Quoting Moses H. | 3 | 2009–2014 |
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
green
2 sentences2000The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." (Emphasis added.) Questions of arbitrability —that is, whether the parties agreed to submit their particular dispute to arbitration —"must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration," id. at 24 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ; but, in determining whether the parti 2000The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." (Emphasis added.) Questions of arbitrability —that is, whether the parties agreed to submit their particular dispute to arbitration —"must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration," id. at 24 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ; but, in determining whether the parti | 3 | 2000–2006 |
Parmer v. Parmer
green
2 sentences1982And a like rule has been applied for similar reasons to the statutory right of redemption. — Palmer [Parmer] v. Palmer [Parmer] , 74 Ala. 285 . 1887And a like rule has been applied for similar reasons to the statutory right of redemp tion. — Palmer v. Palmer, 74 Ala. 285 . | 3 | 1887–1982 |
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004The case before us differs from Auvil in that there remains in the case before us the prospect that the principal, Unum, may be called to answer for the acts of its agent, Curtis Brown. "[W]hen a soliciting agent commits a fraud upon one who seeks insurance coverage, his insurer principal will be liable for that fraud, if the fraud was perpetrated by the agent within the scope of his employment." Strickland, 491 So.2d at 874 . "`[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the const 2004The case before us differs from Auvil in that there remains in the case before us the prospect that the principal, Unum, may be called to answer for the acts of its agent, Curtis Brown. "[W]hen a soliciting agent commits a fraud upon one who seeks insurance coverage, his insurer principal will be liable for that fraud, if the fraud was perpetrated by the agent within the scope of his employment." Strickland, 491 So.2d at 874 . "`[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the const | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Dale S. COENEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. W. PRESSPRICH & CO., Inc., Defendant-Appellee, and Stirling Homex Corporation, Defendant
green
2 sentences1987Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. , 460 U.S. 1 , 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 941-942 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (citing Coenen, supra , the Court held that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability") (footnote omitted); Tullis v. Kohlmeyer Co. , 551 F.2d 632 , 636 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[t]he crucial issue, as . . . 1987Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927, 941-942 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (citing Coenen, supra, the Court held that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (footnote omitted); Tullís v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 636 (5th Cir.1977) (“[t]he crucial issue, as ... | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences1984"We were confronted with a like claim in Thomas v. State , 40 Ala. App. 697 , 122 So.2d 535 , a habeas corpus appeal. 1984"We were confronted with a like claim in Thomas v. State , 40 Ala. App. 697 , 122 So.2d 535 , a habeas corpus appeal. | 2 | 1964–1984 |
Elizabeth Homes, LLC v. Cato
green
1 sentence2018Moreover, in Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato , 968 So.2d 1 , 7 (Ala. 2007), this Court observed: "In interpreting an arbitration provision, 'any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.' Moses H. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Koullas v. Ramsey
green
1 sentence2017Even assuming, arguendo, that an uncertainty or a latent ambiguity exists in the language of the document establishing the EDR program concerning covered and noncovered disputes, it is well settled that federal policy "dictates that [any uncertainty or ambiguity] be resolved in favor of arbitration." Koullas , 683 So.2d at 417 . "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses H. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama v. Rigas
green
1 sentence2006"The Federal Arbitration Act creates a strong presumption in favor of *Page 237 arbitration, and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, `whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or' a like defense to arbitrability.'" Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama v. Rigas , 923 So.2d at 1083 (quoting Moses H. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Strickland
green
1 sentence2004The case before us differs from Auvil in that there remains in the case before us the prospect that the principal, Unum, may be called to answer for the acts of its agent, Curtis Brown. "[W]hen a soliciting agent commits a fraud upon one who seeks insurance coverage, his insurer principal will be liable for that fraud, if the fraud was perpetrated by the agent within the scope of his employment." Strickland, 491 So.2d at 874 . "`[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the const | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. U.
green
2 sentences2000Consequently, "in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 , *746 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted). 2000Consequently, "in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 , *746 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
green
2 sentences1998What has happened before, and what is happening in this case, reminds me of what happened in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto , *Page 561 517 U.S. 681 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996), in which franchisees brought an action in a Montana state court against a franchisor and its agent regarding a dispute under a standard form franchise agreement. 1998What has happened before, and what is happening in this case, reminds me of what happened in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto , *Page 561 517 U.S. 681 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 , 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996), in which franchisees brought an action in a Montana state court against a franchisor and its agent regarding a dispute under a standard form franchise agreement. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Rushton v. McKee & Co.
neutral
2 sentences1963A like test was stated in Rushton v. McKee and Co., 201 Ala. 49 , 77 So. 343 . 1963A like test was stated in Rushton v. McKee and Co., 201 Ala. 49 , 77 So. 343 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Felix v. State
green
2 sentences1948The case of Felix v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 161 , 179 S.W.2d 556 , lays down a like rule in a misdemeanor case where it was said: “ * * * the State may charge one or more phases of an offense in the conjunctive in one count. 1948The case of Felix v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 161 , 179 S.W.2d 556 , lays down a like rule in a misdemeanor case where it was said: “ * * * the State may charge one or more phases of an offense in the conjunctive in one count. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States
green
2 sentences1946Co., 234 Ala. 526 , 176 So. 301, 303 , observed: “It may be stated as a well settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. * * * Since an actual controversy is necessary, it is not within the province of appellate courts to decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or-from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. * * * Ordinarily an appellate court will not entertain appeal from the results of its action when its decision will not affect any substant 1946Co., 234 Ala. 526 , 176 So. 301, 303 , observed: “It may be stated as a well settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. * * * Since an actual controversy is necessary, it is not within the province of appellate courts to decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or-from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. * * * Ordinarily an appellate court will not entertain appeal from the results of its action when its decision will not affect any substant | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Poyner v. Whiddon
neutral
2 sentences1946Illustrative, is the following from Poyner v. Whiddon, 234 Ala. 168 , 174 So. 507, 510: “To entitle a party to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the action of a subordinate court or body, by the writ of certiorari, he must show that he is a party to the proceeding or ‘that he has a personal interest in the subject-matter, and not a mere public interest, in common with the general public.’ ” Speaking to a like principle, this Court in City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 1946Illustrative, is the following from Poyner v. Whiddon, 234 Ala. 168 , 174 So. 507, 510: “To entitle a party to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the action of a subordinate court or body, by the writ of certiorari, he must show that he is a party to the proceeding or ‘that he has a personal interest in the subject-matter, and not a mere public interest, in common with the general public.’ ” Speaking to a like principle, this Court in City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
green
2 sentences1946Co., 234 Ala. 526 , 176 So. 301, 303 , observed: “It may be stated as a well settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. * * * Since an actual controversy is necessary, it is not within the province of appellate courts to decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or-from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. * * * Ordinarily an appellate court will not entertain appeal from the results of its action when its decision will not affect any substant 1946Co., 234 Ala. 526 , 176 So. 301, 303 , observed: “It may be stated as a well settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. * * * Since an actual controversy is necessary, it is not within the province of appellate courts to decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or-from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. * * * Ordinarily an appellate court will not entertain appeal from the results of its action when its decision will not affect any substant | 1 | 1946–1946 |
City of Woodlawn v. Durham
neutral
1 sentence1941As noted in City of Birmingham v. Wills, supra, our own case of City of Woodlawn v. Durham, 162 Ala. 565 , 50 So. 356 , declared a like principle, and a resort to authorities elsewhere is unnecessary. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Webb v. State
neutral
1 sentence1941As noted in City of Birmingham v. Wills, supra, our own case of City of Woodlawn v. Durham, 162 Ala. 565 , 50 So. 356 , declared a like principle, and a resort to authorities elsewhere is unnecessary. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Ryan v. Young green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Allen v. Intendant & Councilmen of LaFayette green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Dothan Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Fullerton v. United States Casualty Co. neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Bank of Phoenix City v. Taylor green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Gibson v. Gaines neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Lester v. Jacobs green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Heirs of Hill v. Hill's ex'rs neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Roy v. Segrist neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Sowell v. Sowell's Adm'r green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Martin v. King neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Walls v. Skelton green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co. green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Fickeinsen v. Wheeling Electrical Co. green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Floyd neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Armstrong v. Walker neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Smith green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Baker v. Baker green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Vaughan v. Palmore neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Andrews v. Hobson's Adm'r green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.