like defense in North Carolina

1932In re Means, supra, at p. 313, it is said: “In Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15 (8. c., 142 N. C., 19 ), the child was awarded to a nonresident father, who had shown that he was worthy and in every way qualified to care for it, and a like principle is approved and applied elsewhere in well considered cases.

1918In Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15 (S. c., 142 N. C., 19 ), the child was awarded to a nonresident father, who had shown that he was worthy and in every way qualified to care for it, and a like principle is approved and applied elsewhere in well-considered cases.

1932In re Means, supra, at p. 313, it is said: “In Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15 (8. c., 142 N. C., 19 ), the child was awarded to a nonresident father, who had shown that he was worthy and in every way qualified to care for it, and a like principle is approved and applied elsewhere in well considered cases.

1918In Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15 (S. c., 142 N. C., 19 ), the child was awarded to a nonresident father, who had shown that he was worthy and in every way qualified to care for it, and a like principle is approved and applied elsewhere in well-considered cases.

1925A like rule of • construction was applied in Sanderson v. Sanderson, 178 N. C., 339 , as to the Consolidated Statutes.

1925A like rule of construction was applied in Sanderson v. Sanderson , 178 N.C. 339 , as to the Consolidated Statutes.

1915R. , 118 N.C. 1098 , and in cases before that time, it was declared to be the correct principle that if, on a given state of facts, two men of fair minds could come to different conclusions as to the existence of negligence, the question must be determined by the jury, and that a like principle should prevail in reference to the question of proximate cause.

1915R., 118 N. C., 1098 , and in cases before that time, it was declared to be the correct principle that if, on a given state of facts, two men of fair minds could come to different conclusions as to the existence of negligence, the question must be determined by the jury, and that a like principle should prevail in reference to the question of proximate cause.

2018“This is true whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[B]efore a dispute can be ordered resolved through arbitration, there must be a valid agreement to arbitrate.” Raspet, 147 N.C.

2018"This is true whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "[B]efore a dispute can be ordered resolved through arbitration, there must be a valid agreement to arbitrate." Raspet , 147 N.C.

2012App at 269-70, 645 S.E.2d at 827 (citing Miller Bldg.

2012"This is true 'whether the 24 Based on the court's conclusion that KB Home has waived its right to arbitrate the Claims, discussed infra, it is not necessary for the court to determine which arbitration agreement governs which Claim. 25 Plaintiffs Memo 14-18. 26 KB Home Memo 18-19. problem at hand is the . . . allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.'" Id. (quoting Cyclone Roofing, 312 N.C. at 229 ).

1998Ed. 2d 765 , the Fourth Circuit stated: “The [Federal] Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues *815 should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” County of Durham, 742 F.2d at 815 (quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25 , 74 L.

1978Consequently, it does not, upon its face, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or the like clause contained in Article I, § 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina. 294 N.C. at 525 .

1973G.S. 97-26 provides: “The pecuniary liability of the employer for medical, surgical, hospital service, nursing services, medicines, sick travel or other treatment required when ordered by the Commission, shall be limited to such charges as prevail in the same community for similar treatment of injured persons of a like standard of living when such treatment is paid for by the injured person . . . . ” Even when the employer has voluntarily paid for medical care of an employee, the court in Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C. 660 , 664, 75 S.E. 2d 777 , 781, stated: “When liability for the medical car

1973G.S. 97-26 provides: “The pecuniary liability of the employer for medical, surgical, hospital service, nursing services, medicines, sick travel or other treatment required when ordered by the Commission, shall be limited to such charges as prevail in the same community for similar treatment of injured persons of a like standard of living when such treatment is paid for by the injured person . . . . ” Even when the employer has voluntarily paid for medical care of an employee, the court in Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C. 660 , 664, 75 S.E. 2d 777 , 781, stated: “When liability for the medical car

1972Decisions to the effect that the court must determine, in passing upon a motion to non-suit, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other reasonable hypothesis but guilt, are apparently no longer the law, in view of the later decisions cited in this section.” See also, State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379 , 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967); State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25 , 153 S.E. 2d 741 (1967); State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C.

1972Decisions to the effect that the court must determine, in passing upon a motion to non-suit, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other reasonable hypothesis but guilt, are apparently no longer the law, in view of the later decisions cited in this section.” See also, State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379 , 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967); State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25 , 153 S.E. 2d 741 (1967); State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C.

1972In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 685 , Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court said: “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. * * * And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.

1972In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 685 , Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court said: “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. * * * And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.

1972Decisions to the effect that the court must determine, in passing upon a motion to non-suit, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other reasonable hypothesis but guilt, are apparently no longer the law, in view of the later decisions cited in this section.” See also, State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379 , 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967); State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25 , 153 S.E. 2d 741 (1967); State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C.

1972Decisions to the effect that the court must determine, in passing upon a motion to non-suit, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other reasonable hypothesis but guilt, are apparently no longer the law, in view of the later decisions cited in this section.” See also, State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379 , 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967); State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25 , 153 S.E. 2d 741 (1967); State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C.

1972Decisions to the effect that the court must determine, in passing upon a motion to non-suit, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other reasonable hypothesis but guilt, are apparently no longer the law, in view of the later decisions cited in this section.” See also, State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379 , 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967); State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25 , 153 S.E. 2d 741 (1967); State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C.

1939Dozier v. Wood, 208 N. C., 414 , 181 S. E., 336 ; Gunn v. Taxi Co., supra; Matthews v. Cheatham, supra; Mulford v. Hotel Co., supra. The plaintiff is entitled to have the whole evidence marshaled — both that of the defendant and that of the plaintiff — and considered in its most favorable light to him, and is entitled to all its inferences and intendments which are favorable to him.

1939Dozier v. Wood, 208 N. C., 414 , 181 S. E., 336 ; Gunn v. Taxi Co., supra; Matthews v. Cheatham, supra; Mulford v. Hotel Co., supra. The plaintiff is entitled to have the whole evidence marshaled — both that of the defendant and that of the plaintiff — and considered in its most favorable light to him, and is entitled to all its inferences and intendments which are favorable to him.

1918Ex Parte Davidge, 72 S. C., 16; Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige Chan., 596; 29 Cyc., 1600. • It may be well to note that on a hearing of this kind the judgment is not intended to be a final determination of the rights of the parties touching the care and control of the child, but, on a change of conditions, properly established and in the courts of the mother’s domicile or other courts having jurisdiction, the question may be further heard and determined. 29 Cyc., 1605, citing McGouch v. McGouch, 136 Ala., 170 , and other cases.

1914It seems that the case of Morehead v. Winston, 73 N. C., 398 , cannot be reconciled with the later decisions involving the position, and, to that extent, same may be considered as overruled.

1914The case was first tried before Foushee, J. , at November Term, 1912, when there was a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, but upon appeal by the intervenors and defendants, this Court granted a new trial, 162 N.C. 346 , where the principal facts are stated.

1914Co., 66 Wis., is in recognition of the same general principle.” *375 The cases in this State where recovery by third parties has been denied have been chiefly on contracts giving no indication that the interests of these persons were contemplated or being provided for, as in contracts of strict indemnity, a case presented in Clark v. Bonsal, 157 N. C., 270 , and in which there was nothing to indicate that the interests of third persons were at all considered, and the case of Peacock v. Williams, 98 N. C., 324 , may be referred to a like principle.